Document created: 1 December 05
Air & Space Power Journal - Winter 2005

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Col George D. Kramlinger’s article “Narrowing the Global-Strike Gap with an Airborne Aircraft Carrier” (summer 2005) outlines an interesting near-term idea for global strike. In fact, his article suggests an even better solution for future-generation unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). That said, in the more distant future, through nanotechnology Colonel Kramlinger’s idea comes full circle and again becomes an effective means for global strike.

Long-range unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) coupled with unmanned tankers could provide continuous presence without the use of large, vulnerable, and expensive airborne aircraft carriers. We could place these UCAVs in extremely long-duration, continuous orbit in close proximity to the target area or anywhere else since they would no longer need to land to accommodate an onboard pilot, and unmanned tankers could refuel them. This arrangement would provide the flexibility to disperse the force and thus make it less vulnerable and visible during hostilities. Effective attack of a target would still require the principle of mass, but we would need to achieve mass only at the precise moment of attack. On the other hand, we could deliberately form the long-range UCAV force in mass to provide force presence, as we do today with the aircraft carrier.

In the distant future, nanotechnology—coupled with effects-based weapons—could enable small, long-range UCAVs to launch nanoweapons or nanoplatforms. This concept uses a similar mother-ship principle outlined by Colonel Kramlinger except for the fact that the mother ship would be a small, long-range UAV. Nevertheless, by then space-based weapons could negate the need for atmospheric-based platforms altogether.

Let’s not be bashful. A long-range UCAV force could replace the oceangoing aircraft carrier since the objective behind all of these concepts, both current and future, is the application of appropriate effects—controlled and delivered through the air by any means. (See page two of my unpublished research paper entitled “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: The Parallel Warrior’s Platform in the Military after Next” [Newport, RI: US Navy War College, October 1998].)

I certainly agree with Maj Jeffrey W. Decker’s article “Return of the Bomber Barons: The Resurgence of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation for the Early Twenty-first Century” (summer 2005) on the importance—indeed, the necessity—of long-range strike to the Air Force mission. I am not nearly as hopeful, however, that we will see any real movement in that direction in the foreseeable future.

As of today, the Air Force has over 2,500 fighter aircraft but only 181 bombers. Over the next decade, the service plans to buy as many as 2,000 more fighters—F/A-22s and F-35s—but there are no plans to buy any bombers. The Air Force has issued a proposal—at the prodding of Congress—for ideas on an “interim” bomber that would bridge the gap between the current bomber-force structure and the hypothetical B-3 that will probably not enter the inventory until 2037 (that’s right—over three decades from now). Instead of long range, this interim bomber will have an unspecified “medium” range of about 1,500 nautical miles. Even so, the long-range budget contains no money for such a bomber. The $100 million cited by Decker is a very far cry from the $10–15 billion needed to field such a weapon system. Where would the money come from to buy such a plane? Would the Air Force leadership cut fighter procurement to field it?

Increasingly, threat scenarios posit a major war in Asia—the “traditional” threat in the jargon of the current Quadrennial Defense Review. Although it is not polite to say so aloud, one potential adversary in such scenarios might be China. In such an eventuality, the 2,500 short-range fighters of the Air Force would necessarily play only a minor role. After all, where would we find bases that did not lie within range of China’s hundreds of ballistic missiles? Would we seriously consider attempting to conduct a prolonged air campaign entailing 10-hour combat missions flown from Guam in single-seat aircraft? Instead, the dwindling supply of heavy bombers—of which 21 are stealthy B-2s—would be asked to carry the load, but Chinese air defenses, which sport the latest surface-to-air missiles, would prove formidable. Only the B-2—or older B-1s and B-52s remaining well out of range and armed with standoff weapons not yet purchased—could be expected to survive and maintain any type of rational operations tempo.

The Air Force must be careful. For decades it has claimed to be the sole practitioner of long-range strike (exclusive of the Navy’s submarine-launched ballistic missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles). If the Navy were clever, it would buy strike versions of the joint unmanned combat aerial vehicle and put them on carrier decks, thus giving it a true long-range, penetrating strike capability from close-in bases. The Navy would then become heir to the long-range strike mission that the Air Force seems unwilling to take seriously.

I agree with much of what Lt Col William B. Danskine proposes in his well-reasoned article “Aggressive ISR in the War on Terrorism: Breaking the Cold War Paradigm” (summer 2005). However, I think his suggestion that many nations should embrace the advantages of US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) flights over their territory ignores the political pragmatics of the issue. In almost every case, notwithstanding the U-2 flights over the Georgian-Russian border area mentioned in Colonel Danskine’s article, such flights are covert because the host nation doesn’t want to be publicly associated with them. Further, sharing intelligence with host nations is a very difficult but not insurmountable bureaucratic issue to solve. It will take a strong secretary of defense, director of national intelligence, and secretary of state acting on the orders of a confident president—and a few public executions when the bureaucrats drag their feet.

To begin this effort at the level of the US Embassy’s chief of mission will require great coordination and education between the Air Force attaché and the ambassador, to say the least. The ambassador’s priorities probably won’t be the same as the military’s, which will require some intra-embassy political bridge building. On the main point, though, I agree with Colonel Danskine. I find the persistent Cold War mentality evident in all of the services, particularly in recent testimony and briefings about future plans. As the primary provider of ISR, the Air Force must take the lead in breaking out of that mentality. It seems, however, that the solution is a net-centric warfare concept focused on enabling the ground and air war fighter to employ weaponry on fixed and mobile targets. This indeed validates the idea that we’re currently mired in a Cold War mind-set. That’s particularly disturbing since it dictates where our doctrine and dollars will be directed. Yes, a net-centric solution would enable vast amounts of information to be pushed to the lowest levels of the battlefield, but it would also require technology that focuses on the spectrum of threats—not just the traditional ones, such as the enemy’s Integrated Air Defense System or armor order of battle. By that, I mean those threats associated with the global war on terrorism, which Colonel Danskine addresses in his conclusions and recommendations.

Right now the buzzword in the Department of Defense is capability-based thinking, but I think the war on terrorism may be a unique case for reapplying threat-based thinking. In that paradigm, we must examine how our adversary employs his forces, how his culture dictates his behavior and his view of our culture, where he will likely be most comfortable operating, and what targets of ours he will find most attractive to strike. Then we must truly transform our doctrinal and investment decisions accordingly. Our current doctrine and technology are clearly inappropriate for finding small groups of people planning terrorist activities in Baghdad or Brooklyn.

Unless and until our planning and training move from a Cold War force-on-force mentality to one that tries to anticipate the enemy’s actions in a more global fashion, we will continue to repeat our past third-generation-warfare mistakes. But once it is reoriented, that new perspective will drive our employment of ISR and other assets most effectively and with the best capability for all of the war fighters on the right side of the fight.

Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.’s article “The Future of US Airpower on the Korean Peninsula” (fall 2005) does not give due consideration to whether US airpower must be in South Korea to deter and, if necessary, respond to North Korean aggression. One can argue that the continued presence of US forces in South Korea, including air forces, complicates the options of our commander in chief with regard to North Korean nuclear ambitions. The US military presence in South Korea enables North Korea to hold undue leverage in negotiations over its nuclear weapons. North Korea’s nuclear weapons, unlike its conventional arms, pose a grave threat to US interests and forces both in Japan and the United States itself. The United States should be free to respond to such a threat without endangering its South Korean allies.

Were US forces not in South Korea and the United States preempted or responded to North Korean nuclear mischief directed at off-peninsula US interests, North Korea would have no pretext for invading South Korea in response to US preemptive or retaliatory strikes on North Korean leadership and nuclear targets. However, the presence of US forces on the Korean peninsula makes South Korea as well as US forces in South Korea the obvious focus of any North Korean retaliation to a US strike. This fact has caused diplomatic challenges and has highlighted differences in US and South Korean approaches to responding to the North Korean nuclear threat.

Recent moves by the US Air Force to position more airpower in the Pacific theater can contribute to an outcome favorable to US interests on the North Korean nuclear issue. US forces in Japan, Guam, Alaska, and other locations can serve as a deterrent to Kim Jong Il’s nuclear ambitions as well as bring an effective response to a senseless conventional attack against South Korea. Airpower’s reach can give American leadership greater flexibility in dealing with the North Korean nuclear challenge. This may be a wiser application of US airpower, which, as Dr. Bechtol rightly states, can prove decisive. It’s time to reconsider the necessity and wisdom of positioning US forces and airpower on the Korean peninsula.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University

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