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Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2005

Vortices

Train While You Fight

A New Mind-Set for Airpower Operations in Low Intensity Conflict

Lt Col Phil Haun, USAF*

*Colonel Haun is the commanding officer of the 355th Fighter Squadron, Eielson AFB, Alaska.

Most Airmen acknowledge the adage "train the way you fight" with an intuitive understanding of the necessity of combat forces properly preparing for battle. Fortunately, the US Air Force does a fine job of readying its forces for combat. Annual squadron-training plans based on realistic aircrew proficiency (RAP) requirements, along with major exercises such as Red Flag, Cope Thunder, and Air Warrior as well as air and space expeditionary force (AEF) ground-training requirements, provide deployed Air Force commanders with the world's most capable and prepared air force.¹ Once these forces reach a theater, however, focus shifts to ongoing combat operations with reduced emphasis on training and maintaining proficiency. For conventional wars or short-duration deployments, such a shift away from continuation training makes sense. However, the recent extension of AEF rotations from 90 to 120 days and the nature of low intensity conflicts in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have increased the need for conducting training to maintain required levels of combat proficiency. Unexercised combat skills atrophy, and current operations in Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have not adapted to provide sufficient employment opportunities for aircrews to maintain core skills. The Air Force must continue to shift from a mind-set that sees continuation training in combat zones as a luxury to one that accepts the responsibility for ensuring that deployed combat forces receive such training. The motto "train while you fight" conveys a more appropriate way of viewing the relationship between preparing for and conducting combat operations. This article draws on the challenges experienced by Airmen in Afghanistan as they "kept sharp the point of the spear," analyzes joint-doctrine training requirements, addresses the risks associated with continuation training in a combat environment, and makes recommendations for theater-training requirements.

A-10 Air Operations in Afghanistan

Current A-10 operations in Afghanistan present a perfect example of the importance of routine training required to hone skills. The limited number of A-10 squadrons and the high demand for their capabilities in-theater have forced the Air Force to deploy A-10 units on four- to six-month rotations since 2002. A-10 operations there, conducted around-the-clock, provide dedicated close air support (CAS) for Army, Marine, and special operations forces throughout Afghanistan. Routine missions vary from convoy escort to support for infiltration/exfiltration helicopter operations, armed reconnaissance, show-of-presence missions for voter registration, route reconnaissance, traditional CAS for ground forces, and airborne and ground-alert CAS for emergency situations. In light of the hit-and-run guerilla tactics used by the Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists and the strict rules of engagement in place to limit collateral damage to Afghanistan's already scant infrastructure, we rarely call upon A-10s to employ ordnance. On average, my pilots employed air-to-surface weapons twice on 85 missions during our squadron's 24-week deployment. Those particular employment missions, however, were intense troops-in-contact situations with friendly and enemy forces engaged within 1,000 meters of each other-the most demanding of CAS missions, whose success requires exceptional pilot skill. We expect A-10 pilots to perform perfectly in such critical situations more than three months after they last dropped a bomb, shot a rocket, or fired the aircraft's GAU-8 30 mm gun. In such situations, degraded performance could result in fratricide and could have very negative strategic-level consequences. In contrast, if these same pilots had not performed a weapons delivery for three months at their home station, we would not consider them combat-mission ready or even qualified to deploy to the theater.

The Relationship of Training and Combat
Operations in Joint Doctrine

Afghanistan is the most recent of many low intensity conflicts in which Airmen have performed CAS. Lessons learned from previous experiences, now recorded in doctrine, emphasize the importance of training during limited combat operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), 3 September 2003, the bible for conducting CAS operations, references training as a requisite for successful operations in relation to four separate areas. It cites realistic training and mission rehearsal as methods of significantly reducing the likelihood of fratricide, which has "usually been the result of confusion on the battlefield." It also notes that in "limited visibility and adverse weather CAS demands a higher level of proficiency that can only come about through dedicated, realistic, CAS training." Furthermore, the publication states that the commander's tactical-risk assessments involve processing all available information to ascertain the level of acceptable risk to friendly forces and noncombatants.² Commanders must have confidence in their aircrews' ability to perform, which, in turn, comes from the level of training that their units have received. Finally, effective CAS assumes not only the proficiency of CAS aircrews and the capabilities of their aircraft but also their ability to integrate all maneuver and fire-support elements. In reality, pilots can practice and gain proficiency in the integration of multiservice units only after they have deployed to the theater.

Cost-Benefit Analysis:
Why the Air Force Should Better Integrate Training

Before Air Force commanders accept the argument for continuation training within combat operations, they must perform their own cost-benefit calculus. Some costs are straightforward, such as the time, money, and political clout required to develop suitable air-to-surface ranges, carve out military operating areas, and provide and allocate training munitions and sorties. Other costs are indirect and associated with training risks, such as the chance of a midair collision, losses from enemy surface-to-air fire, collateral damage from an inadvertent off-range release of live ordnance, or a live-ordnance training accident (e.g., the F-18 bombing of Air Force and Army personnel at Udari Range, Kuwait, in 2001). The possibility also exists that any of those events, should they occur, could cause negative international relations and domestic political fallout. Similarly, allowing the use of combat aircrews and aircraft for training could create a shortage of airpower available to fill unexpected combat taskings. There is little doubt that combat-zone training exacts a cost in terms of dollars, time, and additional risks.

In contrast, we cannot calculate the benefits of training as easily as we can the cost of munitions, flying hours, and range maintenance. Rather, we can best measure them in terms of avoiding combat failures and their negative strategic-level ramifications. One of the most obvious benefits is the increase in aircrew proficiency, which will reduce an operator's weapon-employment mistakes, such as aiming-point and switch errors. Misguided or unguided precision munitions can lead to significant collateral damage and fratricide. Continuation training can also increase the reliability of aircraft and weapons systems by allowing aircrews to exercise these systems and identify potential problems under a controlled environment. In Enduring Freedom, for example, members of my A-10 squadron deployed without having had the opportunity to boresight their aircraft's guns.³ Our employment of the guns in-theater on a training range helped identify several gun-system malfunctions, avoiding the possibility of those problems occurring during an actual troops-in-contact mission. A final benefit of increased aircrew proficiency and aircraft reliability that comes from training lies in a more effective combat force that reduces the number of lost opportunities to attack enemy forces. More than likely, aircrews with lower proficiency in flying less reliable aircraft will experience "dry" attack passes caused by switch errors, failure to obtain required weapons-release parameters, and previously undetected weapons-system problems. A dry pass squanders a rare opportunity to attack the enemy, who can then survive, flee, and position himself to attack our forces again.

Types of Training during Combat Operations

The types of continuation training that may be integrated with combat operations run the gamut from limited, partial-task training to large-force mission rehearsals. The most familiar training resembles that conducted at home base, using military operating areas and air-to-surface ranges to perform such missions as basic surface attack with inert and/or live ordnance and dry surface-attack tactics with scenarios that include simulated threats. To the cost of training munitions and range maintenance we must add the opportunity cost associated with training lines otherwise used for operational missions, such as airborne CAS alert or pipeline surveillance. These lines will not likely make the cut on the floor of the master air attack plan unless we recognize the war-fighting value of training and put hard requirements in place.⁴ One practical solution calls for using the existing yearly RAP requirements and tailoring the required number and types of events to the length of deployment. We could further adapt these requirements to the particular theater. It may not be necessary to require low-altitude tactical navigation or air-combat training for the low-threat, medium-altitude environment of Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, but training for high-altitude-release bombs is essential.

Given the varied deployment schedules of the other services, Air Force units will probably enter the area of operation and integrate with units with which they have never previously trained. Mission rehearsal can ensure the effective performance of composite-force missions, such as a joint air attack team, which combine Air Force fixed-wing and Army rotary-wing attack aircraft. Successful completion of a mission rehearsal must occur prior to accepting an on-call tasking for special-operations missions. Conventional Air Force units that fly in support of such missions also participate in the rehearsal, which serves to validate tactics as well as identify problems and shortfalls prior to engaging the enemy. Even after these forces have prepared themselves for this type of mission, additional rehearsals-such as live-fire operations-continue to refine tactics and sharpen skills.⁵

In addition to dedicated training missions, partial-task training can be incorporated into existing combat-mission taskings. Missions such as airborne CAS alert require extended holding over low-threat areas for a vulnerability period specified by the air tasking order. Aircraft can perform dry deliveries of laser-guided bombs or dry roll-ins during this time, provided the special instructions (SPINS) include such safeguards as restrictions on weapons' switch positions, altitude, and targets to guard against inadvertent releases of live munitions.⁶ Extended periods of operations within surface-to-air threats must also be avoided. Partial-task training has the added benefit of reducing boredom during otherwise tedious missions, keepings aircrews mentally alert and ready to respond to any surprise or short-notice tasking.

Conclusion

This article has focused on the legitimate Air Force challenge of maintaining combat skills during extended low-intensity combat operations. CAS operations by A-10s in Afghanistan well illustrate the challenges Airmen face in maintaining combat proficiency in-theater. JP 3-09.3 recognizes the importance of realistic training in conducting CAS; moreover, the addition of RAP requirements, a focus on mission rehearsals, and controlled partial-task training now strengthen combat skills in-theater. Although this training in a combat theater comes at a cost expressed in both dollars and risks, that expense is offset by increases in aircrews' combat proficiency and the reliability of weapons systems, which reduce "bad" incidents and maximize available employment opportunities. Continuation training during combat is not a luxury but a requirement. "Train while you fight" must become the new mind-set for today's Airmen.⁷

Eielson AFB, Alaska

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Notes

1. Although the Air Force makes an effort to match up similarly tasked AEF units in major exercises, in Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, Air Force units find themselves working with Army, Navy, and Marine units that they have never met or trained with prior to deployment. To improve AEF spin-up, we should make an effort to integrate predeployment training across the services-a difficult task but one exceedingly worthwhile in establishing both standard operating procedures and mutual trust.

2. Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), 3 September 2003, I-4, V-40, and V-13.

3. During upgrades of Litening targeting pods just prior to deployment, analysis of targeting-pod strafe video showed that the jets were not boresighted for high-altitude strafe. (Before the acquisition of targeting pods, jets were boresighted for long-range strafe, a low-angle delivery.)

4. In Enduring Freedom, joint tactical attack controller (JTAC) training missions increased after planners realized that airborne training missions can be easily rerolled to troops-in-contact situations, as can airborne CAS missions holding in dedicated kill boxes.

5. Recent missions in Fallujah and Baghdad, Iraq, have included live rehearsals.

6. In Enduring Freedom, SPINS-specific switch positions for A-10s carrying live munitions allowed for dry roll-ins, greatly facilitating weapons-employment training.

7. Special thanks to Lt Gen Walter Buchanan, commander of Ninth Air Force and of the combined forces air component, for inputs to this article. As he rightly pointed out,

I suggest we need to consider . . . that what we describe may not be compatible with an economy of force mission where I have "just enough" assets to do the mission. If so, then maybe an economy-of-force mission is not compatible with an extended 120-day deployment. To pull jets out of the line and dedicate them to training means I have two (or more) not available to support the ground fight. That's OK as long as I have excess mission capacity. While I know I can do this on the margins easily enough even with today's force, I worry that I may not be able to commit to the dedicated training sorties per pilot or crew that you suggest. But I agree that any is better than none.

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Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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