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Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2005

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Boydmania

I would like to make a few points in response to Dr. David Mets’s article on John Boyd and his legacy (“Boydmania,” fall 2004). First, in many respects, he intentionally crafted the article tongue in cheek, and it has set off much discussion, for which we must heartily thank him. After all, encouraging professional dialogue is one of this journal’s missions. The article did indulge in a rather unkind snipe at Boyd biographer Robert Coram, based on his published works. I subscribe to the Carl Becker concept that we are all historians and bound to interpret reality based upon our own experience. Thus, I feel that Coram is welcome as a commentator—sometimes we need a fresh perspective to help us understand ourselves. Obviously, Coram was a bit starstruck, but Boyd is a compelling subject.

Until the appearance of Coram’s book, John Boyd’s legacy had gone largely unheralded. He is now the subject of business strategists and foreign emulators. One of the things I most admire about Boyd’s character is that he did some of his best work without regard to compensation. He famously refused anything but a token salary for his postretirement civilian efforts. He is antithetical to the megarich consultants and Enronized chief executive officers of contemporary times—a great example of service before self that is lacking today. The success of this book and of the various business models that have followed in its wake has certainly brought the Air Force enormous goodwill and greater public awareness of the challenges we face when technology and conservatism face off within the military. Like Isaac Newton, Boyd was not a person one would necessarily want to engage socially, but he was eminently interesting.

Despite Dr. Mets’s comments regarding the lightweight-fighter and air-superiority-fighter concepts, I think they are the best overall endorsement of Boyd’s ideas. They have given America such unquestioned aerial superiority that few nations have been willing to engage our military aviation during the past 15 years. When he writes, “Did the . . . F-15 and F-16 rescue us from doom? I doubt it” (p. 101), Dr. Mets implies that lightweight, agile fighters are largely unneeded because they have scored only a few aerial victories for the Air Force. He also doubts that they needed gun armament since they made all their kills with missiles (although the A-10 and F-15E have scored kills with a gun and laser-guided bombs, respectively, and the history of current operations still needs to be written). I contend that Israel has fully tested Boyd’s ideas and has wrung the maximum benefit out of the F-15 and F-16. In Israel, airspace limitations and the immediacy of the threat validate everything Boyd professed: a combat aircraft must always outperform its adversary in close quarters, depending upon something as mundane as the rules of engagement. The beauty of these two aircraft is that the addition of higher-technology weapons has enhanced them and that they are excellent station keepers with visually acquired targets of concern. Beyond-visual-range technology is no blessing if a pilot mistakenly engages nonhostile targets.

Boyd’s energy-maneuvering fighter theories grow more applicable every day; we are at the precipice of a revolution with relatively low-cost, high-speed, highly maneuverable unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Boyd would have especially enjoyed an energy-maneuvering supremacy that comes without having a human in the cockpit. Furthermore, the cannon on the F-16 has proven useful, even as a fallback weapon for use in counterdrug and counterterror operations against suicide aircraft or other border-penetrating craft.

Finally, Dr. Mets makes a somewhat scathing indictment of the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop in strategic thinking, stating that we turned inside that loop in 1975 during the Mayaguez incident with disastrous results (in fact, our enemies then seemed to have gotten inside our OODA loop and understood that our demands were deadly serious). Dr. Mets also cites as an OODA conceptual failure the burning of Washington in the War of 1812 after an ill-advised declaration of war. Such examples, however, are faulty analogies. Rash actions and tactical setbacks are not an indictment of OODA but are actually failures to observe and orient accurately. Communications, for example, are a necessary part of any action, and failures there can distort a force’s entire combat orientation. The great American victory in the War of 1812’s Battle of New Orleans was also the result of needlessly turning inside the British OODA loop (the war had ended) but became necessary because of slow communication. Andrew Jackson’s tactical genius showed that our orientation had improved since the British burned Washington two years previously. A military cannot be too tentative or rash without consequence but can always employ the OODA loop to put itself in the best position to win. The loop, of course, is a judgment tool and can be misapplied. The point is to get a fast, clear, and accurate picture before engagement. In closing, my thanks for the excellent article and the commentary that followed!

MSgt Gary W. Boyd, USAF, Retired
McGuire AFB, New Jersey

CARBALLO ON DEAL

Accidents invariably happen for reasons but not necessarily big reasons. That is why I think Brig Gen Duane W. Deal’s article “Beyond the Widget: Columbia Accident Lessons Affirmed” (summer 2004) conveys an important message. While discussing the reasons that led to the accident that cost the lives of seven astronauts on 1 February 2003, the author perceptively says, “It is far better to prevent, rather than investigate, accidents” (p. 32). Someone once said that “accidents happen after a series of ‘small’ major mistakes.” A wise person learns from past mistakes and does not trip more than once on the same rock.

The seriousness, precision, responsibility, and—above all—sense of loyalty with which the author discusses the series of events preceding the Columbia accident lead us to believe we have learned some important lessons. Hopefully this incident will become fertile ground from which new measures will sprout, ensuring the consistency and safety of future spaceflights. In my view, these flights must continue since, as we say in Argentina, “When God closes a door, He opens a window.” Many people believe that since the earth is becoming smaller, God is opening the window of space, where many of the answers to our questions and needs lie.

Blindness occurs among people who have good sight as well as among countries whose leadership seems to have discernment. Desiring to save money, we often resort to procedures, such as outsourcing, that seem to reduce costs but in the long term end up as false savings that actually cost us much more. As General Deal observes, “In the 1990s, the NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] top-down mantra became ‘Faster, Better, Cheaper’ ” (p. 32). Many times these factors pitch safety against deadlines and the need to reduce costs. But how much delay did the Columbia accident cause to the space program? Worse yet, what was its ultimate cost? Was this “savings” worth it? What about the loss of those precious lives and the suffering their families have had to endure? What about NASA’s loss of prestige?

We hear people say that when it comes to religion, one can compromise on anything except core beliefs. Therefore, I believe that insofar as space is concerned, one can compromise on anything except safety issues. How should one withstand political or taxpayer pressure, which can often change the course of history? Have we forgotten Vietnam? The space program felt pressured to launch that fateful flight.

This article has taught me many things about how to avoid mediocrity, apathy, and the bad judgment that leads to a false sense of security when one falls into a routine. Above all, it taught me about having the courage to say no and convince taxpayers that avoiding false savings helps ensure that we put their tax dollars to the best use possible.

Just as our daily decisions may risk our lives, so may our professional decisions risk people’s earthly (or we could say air and space) future. For that reason, we should definitely say no to routine and yes to proven doctrine, since doctrine is a tool that leaders can use to make sound decisions. It shows them the steps to follow and reduces the probability of mistakes.

I also enjoyed reading the discussion that dealt with avoiding the condensing of information or the shortening of project-related meetings since both can result in false savings. The best savings entail using sufficient time to attain the intended goal. Another factor that stands out is the importance of leadership. We could never attain our goals without good leaders who totally commit themselves to the mission, have contagious enthusiasm that moves their subordinates to perform every task with love, and seek perfection even in the smallest of tasks.

We must include air and space power among the main factors that will define much of the world’s future. By the time those who do not recognize its importance realize their mistake, it may be too late.

Col Pablo Marcos Rafael Carballo, 
Argentine Air Force, Retired
Córdoba, Argentina

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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