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Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2005

Air & Space Power Journal

Quick-Look

Contingency Response Group

Time to Expand the Box and Think “Coalition”

Alexander M. Wathen

The Air Force chief of staff’s contingency response group (CRG) concept envisions a unique subset of capabilities designed specifically to respond rapidly to contingencies as well as secure and protect airfields, rapidly assess and open air bases, and perform initial airfield/ air base operations to ensure a smooth transition to subsequent operations. Missing from the CRG concept of operations (CONOPS) and training plans is the construct of joining with our coalition partners throughout the globe. It is time to start thinking beyond “jointness” and begin moving into the realm of “coalition,” since recent history shows that unilateral US action is becoming politically less viable. Additionally, by addressing this shortfall, CRGs could become part of a programmatic solution to apparently unconnected problems no one yet seems to recognize:

• A reduced Department of Defense (DOD) force structure oriented toward the continental United States (CONUS) will decrease the number of flying hours for training in strategic airlift.

• A reduced and CONUS-oriented DOD force structure also drives up the requirement for strategic-airlift aircrews, further exacerbating the problem with flying hours for future training.

• Air traffic control has lost its focus on producing a worldwide, deployable capability.

• Combatant commands are not adequately leveraging CRGs in preparing for future military operations.

The DOD now operates in an age of ever-decreasing overseas military posture that is “permanent” in nature. This situation significantly lessens the number of users of the Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF), who previously required their troops and supplies to be flown back and forth to their permanent locations overseas. It allows or requires (depending on one’s point of view) a reduction in the channel and special-assignment airlift missions that make up a significant portion of the training flying-hour program that kept Air Mobility Command’s (AMC) strategic-airlift crews current and qualified. TWCF flying hours also “age” those pilots to make the leap from copilot to aircraft commander. At the same time, the Army’s requirements for airlift deployment to respond to contingencies are increasing, since that service must be able to deploy credible forces from the CONUS rather than overseas locations. The DOD will need a more robust capability to take those same troops to the fight anywhere in the world, on a much more stringent timeline. In other words, AMC needs more airlift capability. To meet that demand, Gen John Handy, commander of both US Transportation Command and AMC, is lobbying for more C-17s (current programmed end strength: 180; his target minimum: 222).1 At the present five-to-one ratio of crew to aircraft, that would mean a minimum of 210 more airlift crew members who need flying hours. Looking into the future, we see that without a ready-made flying-hour program provided by actual combat operations (today’s Operation Iraqi Freedom), AMC will need to generate significant overseas flying opportunities for its airlift crews.

Meanwhile, in response to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s desire for a lighter, faster, more deployable force, the Army Transformation Campaign Plan has as its goal by 2005 the deployment of a combat-capable brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours. According to a February 2002 study by the Logistics Management Institute of the Army’s ability to marshal troops and the Air Force’s ability to provide lift, the DOD isn’t even close. Based on a scenario that includes 244 C-17s (even more than General Handy’s 222), additional aircraft alone may not solve the problem since maximum aircraft on the ground at several points of departures and transit points choked the flow. The DOD will need significant practice to maximize the efficiency and execution of the lift flow.

In October 2001, the chief of staff of the Air Force stood up Task Force Enduring Look to implement “Air Force–wide data collection, exploitation, documentation, and reporting” for the service’s efforts in Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom.2 The task force’s “Quick Look no. 9” identified air traffic control and airfield operations as areas that require improvement. The textbook answer calls for including those capabilities in the CRGs—no argument here. The Air Force Contingency Response Group Operational Concept, version 1.0, April 2004, charged AMC’s Air Mobility Warfare Center with the responsibility of leading the development of a formal training curriculum for the CRGs, “which may include participation in exercises like EAGLE FLAG at Fort Dix, NJ, Large Package Week at Fort Bragg, NC, and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) exercises at Fort Polk, LA.”3 Separate studies indicate that such training is not enough. First, the controllers who eventually arrived in-theater to relieve the special-tactics teams (during Iraqi Freedom) were inadequately trained in the International Civil Aeronautical Organization’s rules of air traffic control and had trouble providing seamless interface with the Australian controllers who occupied the tower at Baghdad Inter-national Airport. Second, the problems with air traffic controllers appear systemic, not simply a problem of how to distribute limited positions. The Air Force hires, trains, and seasons them, and just when they reach seven-level qualification status, they go to the Federal Aviation Administration. Rearranging the billets will not fix the problem by itself. Joint training is great, but we need to stop allowing ourselves to think that we’ve done our job because we got to the joint level. Jointness must become not only the conduit to large-scale, multiforce coalition training exercises throughout the various operational commands, but also the envisioned criterion for mission readiness.

Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) has recently embarked upon the process of base support and expeditionary site planning for numerous bases throughout its area of operations. CENTAF’s teams do not include the assessment-team portions of the CRGs or air mobility operations groups (which will become CRGs in the future). We must connect CRGs to this process at the earliest stage.

The Air Mobility Warfare Center should use its charter to develop the training curriculum for CRGs to become advocates of large-scale, multinational exercises that will give all force modules the opportunity to deploy and train in coalition scenarios throughout our various operational commands. We must envision this process now for the program objective memorandum (POM) cycle for fiscal year 2008 (FY 08) since we are already too late for the FY 06 POM. As an out-of-cycle POM, the FY 07 version would require offsets to fund. We must bring operational commands (such as the CENTAF example) into the various planning cycles early because they must serve as advocates with our potential coalition partners, enlisting their participation in exercises within their operational areas. Additionally, we need to include Joint Forces Command (J-9) in the coordination process to ensure appropriate focus and integration with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s vision for the joint force.

By helping replace the TWCF flying hours lost to the ever-shrinking permanent overseas military structure, this vision serves the best interests of AMC. The Army should become an advocate because doing so will help that service achieve the objectives of its Transformation Campaign Plan. The same applies to all of the other services. At the tactical level, the vision is an absolute necessity for air traffic controllers because it offers the best mechanism for training under International Civil Aeronautical Organization scenarios. The same goes for airspace managers, operators of air and space operations centers, and others.

Our coalition partners possess unique capabilities and skill sets that we must integrate into the CRG construct because doing so (1) gives our war-fighting forces additional capability (e.g., through the Australian controller example, mentioned above) and (2) allows our coalition partners to invest in the process. Admittedly, in many cases, US forces can go it alone, but we must allow our partners an avenue to contribute and exercise that avenue through training. We must establish and codify identifiable, selectable capabilities similar to unit type codes the Air Force uses and then integrate those capabilities into our scheme for training. Working in this direction is the Asian Pacific Area Network’s Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT), a cadre of military planners from nations with Asia-Pacific interests capable of rapidly augmenting a multinational-force headquarters established to plan and execute coalition operations in response to military operations other than war and/or small-scale contingencies.4 At least 31 participatory nations (including the United States) have committed themselves to developing synergistic, rapid--response capabilities. The MPAT seeks to increase the speed of the multinational force’s initial response, interoperability, and overall mission effectiveness through unity of effort. This model warrants review by the people responsible for developing the CRG’s CONOPS.5

Although this Quick-Look has emphasized CRG training, it is time to realize that the changing face of our military basing presents challenges that will prove difficult to overcome. Supported combatant commands must become real supporters in the process of training and equipping the supporting forces. The DOD must focus on the challenges of training in a peacetime, steady-state military force (for peace is our ultimate goal) charged with the responsibility of deploying from the CONUS to anywhere in the world. We must program for that goal now. We cannot allow the current operations tempo to drive the budgetary process four years out. After all, if all our real-world conflicts were resolved, it would be much easier to cancel funded, large-scale, multinational coalition exercises (if the operations tempo so required) than create unfunded training exercises.

Notes

1. Alexander M. Wathen, “Mobility Forces Aircraft Fleet Mix: A Critical Junction,” CADRE Quick-Look 04-21, https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay2004/ari/QL2004-21.pdf.

2. Richard F. Bird, “Task Force Enduring Look, Food for Feedback: An Operations Analysts’ Reference on Wartime Data Collection” (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Air Force, 2003), 5, http://www.mors.org/meetings/ combat_analyst/ca_pres/Bird.pdf.

3. Barbara Lee, “Air Force Contingency Response Group Operational Concept, Version 1.0” (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Air Force, 2004), 13–14.

4. US Pacific Command Training Readiness and Transformation Directorate (J-7), Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT), 28 October 2004, http:// www2.apan-info.net/mpat/main-files/What%20is%20 MPAT_files/frame.htm.

5. For more information about the Asian Pacific Area Network and MPAT, see http://www.apan-info.net.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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