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Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2005

Air & Space Power Journal

Quick-Look

Stabilizing Critical Continuity of the Air 
and Space Expeditionary Force

Douglas E. Lee
Capt Joseph T. Morgan, USAF

Although the tour length of the air and space expeditionary force (AEF) works well for most personnel who support a deployment, in some specific areas it proves more detrimental than beneficial. For that reason, we should consider alternatives in order to ensure seamless transitions. The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board defines the AEF as an adaptable and rapidly employable set of air and space assets that provide the president, secretary of defense, and combatant commanders with options for missions ranging from humanitarian airlift to combat operations.1 As originally conceived, the AEF concept included 10 prepackaged combat units (using Airmen assigned to a regular unit) that rotated every three months over a 15-month period.2 Beginning with AEF Cycle Five in September 2004, baseline deployment extended to 120 days, changing the rotation cycle to 20 months.3 However, some Airmen serve in critical locations (operations centers and unified or subunified commands) and key positions (directorate and division chiefs) beyond the normal 120-day cycle, with tour lengths up to a year. Recently, several 120-day AEF positions at Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) were extended to a year.

As AEF units rotate, key functions—such as US Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) combined air and space operations center (CAOC) located on Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar—lose expertise vital to long-term US goals. Assignment lengths at this CAOC vary—normally one year for senior leadership and 120 days for staff. The center supports the combined force commander’s objectives for three disparate geographical areas—Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. Although personnel receive training prior to assuming their duties at the CAOC, several issues extend their “spin-up” time:

• Understanding and establishing relationships with other organizations (e.g., USCENTCOM, MNF-I, Multinational Corps-Iraq, components, and coalition partners). This process becomes more complicated when an AOC supports more than one operation.

• Learning issues unique to an area of responsibility (AOR) not normally supported by an AEF unit. For example, Ninth Air Force understands issues associated with Southwest Asia, but Twelfth Air Force’s AOR is normally US Southern Command, the two areas having little in common.

• Understanding the personality-driven nature of filtering information during a tour. Based on individual expertise, incumbents will categorize what is important during their tours and pass that -information on to their successors, potentially overlooking other areas considered low priority. On longer tours, -replacement personnel have an opportunity to learn all aspects of their jobs; for short tours, however, the changeover brief is more critical.

Extending the AEF cycle to four months has the obvious benefit of one less changeover during the year, effectively adding 90 more days of benefits associated with deployed, fully trained personnel. But one must still contend with the training time associated with the three cycles that change during the rest of the year. Although extending deployments to a year will mitigate changeovers, other challenges can surface. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example, long-term units bring institutional processes with them rather than use those in place in the AOR. Something as minor as changing a database format can have lasting effects when established procedures in the AOR are tailored to the original database. Also, productivity may decline during longer tours as individuals “wear out” from the high operations tempo and perhaps negatively affect morale and welfare, both for those deployed and those “left behind.”

Several possible courses of action come to mind. First, whenever feasible, we should split each AEF, rotating half the personnel midway through its cycle. For example, all AEF personnel in the CAOC now rotate at the same time. This complete changeover reduces overall effectiveness during the weeks it takes new staff to come up to speed. If the staff split and rotated every two months, half of the personnel would be fully trained at any given time. This concept would ensure continuity while newly arriving personnel learn their responsibilities. Furthermore, this option would reduce the number of personnel that an organization in the “AEF bucket” must deploy, allowing that unit to better meet its “normal” workload. However, potential drawbacks with a longer deployment—six months overall rather than the current four months—include decreased unit cohesion and strain on home units.

Second, we should perform a personnel review to identify potential billets we can fill at the home-station AOC in a “virtual” mode. Shifting those -responsibilities reduces both the AEF manning -requirements and the associated spin-up required during each rotation cycle.

Third, we should establish a virtual environment where individuals slated to rotate could gain hands-on experience working with current operational data, processes, and tools. Familiarization courses play a critical role in training personnel but do not fill the void between theoretical scenarios and actual operations. Refresher or capstone courses, based on applications developed by using real-world data, would allow individuals awaiting deployment to learn in a low-threat environment.

Fourth, as with Air Force positions at MNF-I, we could extend tours for all personnel who support critical mission requirements to one year, using a quarterly or biannual rotation cycle. Doing so would reduce acclimation time by at least 75 percent. Assuming it takes four to six weeks to establish a learning curve, we can convert three to four months from learning to production time during a yearlong tour. If we initiated remote tours, we could also establish a feeder system in which Airmen would spend at least a year in the numbered air force that supports the AOR, thus reducing the learning curve.

Fifth, we should develop a personnel plan that identifies Airmen for a primary combatant command and either a secondary combatant command or functional unified command. Given the diverse nature of each theater, a deliberate development plan that exposes Airmen to an AOR’s unique conditions for multiple tours would produce subject-matter experts in all fields—from support to operations. Following the path of a secondary combatant command would help ease manpower requirements associated with a long-term presence in a given theater. Cross-pollination with the functional commands ensures maintenance of a contemporary war-fighting focus in that command.

Last, we should create a phased approach for emerging areas that will require a long-term US presence. Expanding missions from an expeditionary to a permanent commitment significantly disrupts the AEF process. By developing a phased plan, we would provide a road map that allows the performance of personnel actions in a timely manner while preserving the flexibility inherent in the AEF for truly expeditionary contingencies:

• Phase Zero (expeditionary force presence): AEF deployment-cycle assets during combat and stabilization operations.

• Phase One (up to three years): Transition to one-year tours as the commitment expands, thus preventing the degradation of continuity and proficiency.

• Phase Two (three to five years): Initiation of command-sponsored permanent change of station (PCS) and unaccompanied tours as the infrastructure expands.

• Phase Three (five years plus): Conversion of all billets to PCS status.

Notes

1. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on United States Air Expeditionary Forces, vol. 1, Summary, SAB-TR-07-01 (Washington, DC: USAF Scientific Advisory Board, November 1997), vii.

2. John T. Correll, “The EAF in Peace and War,” Air Force Magazine 85, no. 7 (July 2002), http://www.afa.org/ magazine/July2002/0702eaf.asp.

3. Gen John P. Jumper, “Chief’s Sight Picture: Adapting the AEF—Longer Deployment, More Forces,” 6 July 2004, http://www.af.mil/media/viewpoints/adapting_aef.html.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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