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Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2005

PIREP

Editor’s Note: PIREP is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot to pass on current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we intend to use this department to let readers know about air and space power items of interest.

Expeditionary Mobility Task Force

Projecting Combat Power

Brig Gen Bobby J. Wilkes, USAF*
Col Murrell F. Stinnette, USAF
Maj Randall Reed, USAF

*General Wilkes is commander of the 21st Expeditionary Mobility Task Force (EMTF), McGuire AFB, New Jersey. Colonel Stinnette is special assistant to the EMTF commander, and Major Reed is a mobility strategist/EMTF executive officer.

Overcoming the dual challenge of time and distance to project and sustain combat power requires a “national military capability that is comprehensive in character, global in reach, swift in response, and highly effective in its actions.”¹ Air Mobility Command (AMC) provides a critical component of that capability in the form of the Expeditionary Mobility Task Force (EMTF), which enhances the inherent expeditionary nature of air and space forces by focusing mobility capabilities in order to accelerate battle rhythm, maintain initiative, and increase the value of air and space to joint forces.² These forces draw upon the -ability of air and space assets to spearhead the US response and shape the battlespace. Defining the EMTF’s role in projecting combat power and shaping the battlespace rests upon three factors: force presentation, capabilities, and effects.

Force Presentation

The character of the EMTF resides in AMC’s commitment to enrich its expeditionary culture and war-fighting focus.³ In October 2003, the command stood down its two numbered air forces and transferred non-war-fighting functions (organizing, training, and equipping) to the headquarters staff. In like manner, former war-fighting operations of the numbered air forces passed to the newly reactivated Eighteenth Air Force. The organizational change within AMC yields two distinct advantages to the regional combatant commands. First, AMC presents a streamlined fighting force under a single numbered-air-force commander who is free from the concerns of Title 10 issues. Second, AMC strengthened air-mobility support by creating two light, lean, and agile response forces (the EMTFs) from the remnants of the legacy numbered air forces. Upon creation of the EMTFs, AMC altered the presentation of forces from global hemispheres to the combatant commands. The 15th EMTF, headquartered at Travis AFB, California, provides air-mobility support for Northern Command, Southern Command, and Pacific Command. Similarly, the 21st EMTF, headquartered at McGuire AFB, New Jersey, concentrates on Joint Forces Command, European Command, and Central Command. Meeting the air-mobility-support needs of the combatant commands hinges upon the central figure of the EMTF commander and manipulation of the Air Mobility Operations Group (AMOG) and the Contingency Response Wing (CRW) (fig. 1).

The EMTF commander—AMC’s senior air-mobility expert to the combatant commands—has responsibility for leading air-mobility--response forces, executing that tasking in two ways. On the one hand, at the tactical and operational levels of war, the EMTF commander may deploy forward on behalf of AMC to serve in a number of capacities, including Director of Mobility Forces. On the other hand, the commander provides the means to expand the nation’s air-mobility infrastructure despite strategic distances and austere locations—a distinct US advantage. In either case, the EMTF commander employs the task force forces in dynamic fashion to meet the needs of the war fighter. To do so with speed, the EMTF relies upon its three functional components: fixed, deployable, and specialized.

Each EMTF controls the fixed component through an AMOG, a network of overseas locations that serves as the vanguard of the task force—one group at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and the other at Ramstein AB, Germany (fig. 2). By providing en route support to air and space forces, the AMOG holds open the door to expedite projection of the US military’s combat power. The significance of the AMOG, however, goes far beyond en route support. The potential of US military forces to influence events abroad depends heavily upon the AMOGs for global access, which, among other things, denies adversaries the advantage of time as a sanctuary. Thus, it becomes even more important for the EMTF to expand the overseas network beyond 27 fixed locations. The task forces employ expeditionary support forces of the deployable component to provide access when and where we need it.

Expanding the scope and reach of expeditionary forces rests with the deployable components of the EMTFs located at Travis AFB and McGuire AFB (see fig. 1). Each task force uses a variety of expeditionary teams from the CRW that surge from the United States within 12 hours of notification to deliver and sustain joint forces as well as employ theater air-mobility forces. This capability gives war-fighting commands the flexibility to place expeditionary forces according to need. Establishing mobility infrastructure at times and places of our choosing gives the United States a tremendous advantage, forcing an adversary into the undesirable position of having to defend everywhere, all the time.

In addition to the fixed and deployable components, the EMTF presents a specialized component comprised of Theater Deployable Communications (TDC) and Combat Camera (ComCam). This component seeks to establish initial communications infrastructure and provide battlespace imagery to speed the decision cycle of the US command chain. Compared to the fixed and deployable components, the specialized component is relatively small. Nevertheless, force presentation of the EMTF according to combatant commands helps mitigate the low density of the specialized component, thus allowing focused application where the war fighter needs this expertise the most.

In summary, AMC strengthens the character of the EMTF by presenting forces uniquely tailored to the combatant commander. These tailored forces increase the speed with which the task force can adjust to the supported command’s air-mobility needs. Thus, as an expeditionary war-fighting entity of AMC, the EMTF provides a foundation of rapid projection and sustainment of US military might. The potency of the EMTF as a war-fighting entity rests on a unique array of capabilities.

Capabilities

Each component of the EMTF provides capabilities uniquely suited to supporting the projection and employment of expeditionary forces to achieve joint-force objectives. Beginning with the fixed component, the AMOG provides robust command and control (C2) of air-mobility forces, aerial port, and aircraft maintenance.

Fixed Component

The fixed component provides a standing capability for the United States to respond to any crisis around the globe. As the vanguard of the EMTF, the AMOG accelerates air-mobility operations by exercising three essential functions, the first of which is C2.

Command and Control. C2 gives the network of bases within the AMOG the means to make adjustments for local conditions yet -synchronize local activities with global operations to enhance responsiveness. This directly benefits the war fighter by optimizing the flow of forces. Too little flow prolongs the buildup of combat power; interestingly enough, too much flow yields the same result. Therefore, AMOG Airmen leverage C2 to manage factors that detract from optimized flow—chief among these are airfield limitations, retrogrades, stage-crew management, and in-transit visibility (ITV).

The basic measurement of airfield capacity is the maximum on ground (MOG), the highest number of aircraft that can cycle through an airfield simultaneously and still be loaded, unloaded, serviced, and repaired within scheduled ground times.⁴ Sometimes, however, certain airfield limitations come into play. For example, an airfield normally capable of receiving and parking 20 aircraft in rapid succession may, for any number of reasons, have enough resources to service only five aircraft at any one time. Thus, that particular station has a working MOG of five. Any attempt to cycle too many aircraft through an airfield creates a self-induced choke point and slows down the arrival of combat forces and equipment. Failure to manage the MOG eventually restricts the timely buildup of US forces and risks loss of initiative. Commanders throughout the air-mobility system use C2 to meter the airflow to manage the MOG while maintaining the velocity necessary to meet the war fighters’ needs. Such management also requires the use of C2 to address other flow-related challenges, namely retrograde missions, stage-crew management, and ITV.

Outbound flow performed by air-mobility forces has great value to war-fighting forces. Retrogrades support the joint force by moving patients and high-value items to rear areas or out of the theater entirely. Such missions passing through AMOG locations add to the challenges of force flow and MOG management. Air-mobility C2 provides a means of prioritizing and metering airflow to balance the inbound and outbound needs of combatant commanders.

Timing the arrival of inbound crews with the availability of rested crews to keep expeditionary forces on the move requires C2. Combatant commanders cannot afford for aircraft to sit idle while aircrews rest; nor can AMOG locations allow the number of aircraft to exceed the MOG. The C2 of stage-crew management ensures the matching of a rested and qualified crew to the right mission, a serviceable aircraft, and the exact amount of cargo and number of passengers required for all down-line stations.

Another important factor in maintaining flow, ITV allows the combatant commander to monitor the status and location of assets and personnel from the point of origin to final destination.⁵ The AMOG uses ITV to meter flow based on the scheduled arrival and departure of cargo and passengers. Additionally, the AMOG updates the ITV system based on actual arrival and departure times, a procedure that maintains data integrity and directly benefits the war fighter. Accurate information allows the war fighter to request changes to the flow or plan engagements in pursuit of objectives based on predictable buildup of forces. These are only a few of the reasons why C2 of the fixed component is so critical to air-mobility forces in general and the war fighter in particular.

Aerial Port. During the Cold War, forces poised to repel a static threat had the benefit of stockpiled materiel in strategic locations. If necessary, US-based forces would utilize prepositioned equipment to ease the burden of transatlantic transport. Today the great uncertainty faced by the United States regarding the occurrence and location of threats causes war-fighting commanders to rely upon the timely air shipment of equipment, materiel, and personnel. As a result, the port function of the fixed component becomes the gateway for expeditionary forces.

In fiscal year 2004, more than 800,000 short tons of war-fighter cargo and two million passengers passed through the gateway of EMTF ports and terminals.⁶ Sustaining significant war-fighter throughput requires the combined use of C2, ITV, and the synchronization of numerous modes of transportation. Additionally, ports place equal emphasis on optimizing throughput to ensure that the right materiel and people get to the right place at the right time through careful load planning and the availability of airplanes in a good state of repair.

Aircraft Maintenance. When expeditionary forces are on the move, aircraft maintenance assures that airframes can maintain the force flow required by the war fighter. The EMTF relies upon AMOG maintainers, among the most experienced in AMC, to produce three synergistic results. First, these maintainers are usually qualified to repair more than one aircraft type and to service commercial carriers. Second, having multiqualified Airmen allows a reduced US footprint by using a smaller force. Finally, their high level of experience helps maintain a reliable flow of forces to the war-fighting commander (one aircraft launch every nine minutes during fiscal year 2004) despite challenges such as compressed timelines, limited parts, and aging aircraft.

These capabilities—C2, port, and aircraft maintenance—allow the war-fighting commander to plan with confidence, knowing that the fixed component of the EMTF will hold open the door for combat forces to arrive ready for decisive action. However, war fighters require a more responsive system—a deployable component that can expand well beyond the 27 locations of the fixed component.

Deployable Component

Deployable teams extend the reach of both EMTF frontline forces and those based in the continental United States. These expeditionary Airmen can leave on a moment’s notice to deploy, sustain, employ, and redeploy US forces. Three parts of the deployable component fall under the umbrella of the CRW: the Contingency Response Group (CRG), Control Team and Support Team, and Air Mobility Liaison Officer (AMLO). The fourth—the Air Mobility Operations Squadron (AMOS)—reports directly to the EMTF commander.

Contingency Response Group. An Air Force capability with effects that span the joint force, the CRG serves as the first of five force modules to assess and open air bases to extend the reach of air and space forces (fig. 3). The CRG concept of operations also specifies that the group have proficiency in handing over growing airfield operations to follow-on forces, the latter divided among the remaining force modules: maintain C2, establish the air base, generate the mission, and operate the air base. Because establishing initial opera-tions requires numerous skill sets, each CRG consists of 16 specialties among 113 Airmen. If required by the mission, the CRG’s 16 specialties can expand their capabilities through augmentation of the air and space expeditionary force to include units such as RED HORSE (Rapid Engineers Deployable Heavy Operations Repair Squadron, Engineers) teams and increased force protection. Of the eight CRGs in the Air Force, six reside in the EMTFs (three in each CRW of an EMTF), one in US Air Forces in Europe, and one in Pacific Air Forces. Not only does the CRG expand air and space expeditionary airfield operations, it also provides scalability in the form of control teams and support teams.

Control Team and Support Team. The Control Team and Support Team are modular units designed to expand the capabilities of a lodgment. The former directs activities to keep the airflow moving; the latter augments existing forces that control ramp activities. In both cases, the EMTF—through the CRW—alters the size of the teams on a case-by-case basis to match capabilities to the degree of augmentation or extension required by operations in support of the war fighter. By avoiding the one-size-fits-all approach, the task force maintains agility and increases responsiveness to dynamic requirements. Maintaining self-sustaining teams—ready to deploy within 12 hours of -notification and begin execution upon touchdown—produces agility, and flowing from one tasking to another results in responsiveness.

The core capabilities of these teams, like those of the fixed component, include C2, port, and quick-turn maintenance but may also include other specialties such as security forces, intelligence, and weather. The Control Team, the larger of the two, can sustain 24-hour operations. The Support Team also changes structure, although for lesser requirements than the Control Team. The fact that Control and Support Teams can establish air-mobility operations when and where needed provides two key advantages to the war fighter: increased access for expeditionary forces and a greater range of options for force employment. Options for employment become even greater thanks to the third leg of the CRW triad.

Air Mobility Liaison Officer. Through the AMLO—the EMTF representative to first--response ground forces at the division level or higher—the task force puts “boots on the ground” to help ground commanders integrate air mobility into their expeditionary planning and execution. AMLOs increase general -understanding of air-mobility capabilities and limitations, assisting with load-planning and departure-planning exercises. Through this interaction, these officers learn to interpret the capabilities and limitations of their host service. Therefore, when ground units get the call to mobilize, AMLOs advise expeditionary air and space forces on the best way to support the ground commander’s needs. During employment, they remain with their assigned units to conduct both landing and drop-zone operations as well as coordinate theater lift for sustainment and maneuver.

Air Mobility Operations Squadron. To plan and execute the full range of air-mobility missions in pursuit of joint-force objectives, the full-spectrum capability known as the AMOS combines eight core specialties: airlift, air refueling, aeromedical evacuation, tactics, weather, logistics, airspace, and intelligence expertise. During peacetime, AMOS personnel help war-fighting staffs gain experience by participating in air and space operations center (AOC) validation exercises and planning conferences. During conflict, AMOS Airmen deploy to the theater AOC and form the core expertise of the air-mobility division. The AMOS serves as a bridge from this division to AMC’s Tanker Airlift Control Center—the functional AOC of Eighteenth Air Force—which provides a critical link between theater operations and the center’s direct-delivery missions that support theater operations.

When the AMOS deploys in support of humanitarian operations, no active AOC may exist; therefore, the squadron deploys with its own shelters and communications equipment to form a stand-alone air-mobility division. Finally, AMOS Airmen populate the theater Deployment and Distribution Operations Center within the J-4 to help integrate air mobility into the distribution network and refine airlift requirements to increase distribution velocity. The EMTF makes a heavy investment in the AMOS because that squadron devotes itself completely to supporting the war fighter at the operational level.

Specialized Component

The third component of the EMTF consists of two specialized teams that are every bit as important as the core capabilities of the fixed and deployable components. Both of them, TDC and ComCam, round out the expeditionary menu of capabilities focused on the war fighter.

Theater Deployable Communications. The TDC establishes near-instantaneous communications capability in austere locations, which greatly enhances the ability of joint forces to execute their assigned missions. Interoperable with sister-service and legacy communications systems, TDC systems can transmit and receive voice, data, and video signals from wireless, satellite, or hard-wire sources. Modular and scalable capability supports small or large force packages of up to 1,200 people. Select specialists from the TDC also form a cadre of communications technicians who support an airborne communications package capable of global, secure data and voice communications for cabinet-level civilians and combatant commanders.

Combat Camera. The 1st ComCam Squadron of the 21st EMTF—the only active duty combat-camera squadron in the Air Force—collects, edits, and disseminates imagery across the joint force, even up to the national leadership. Imagery used for combat assessment, decision making, and preservation of the historical record for items of national interest keeps this unit in high demand—a popu-larity well justified in other areas as well.

Adversaries can set the context of a conflict and sway public sentiment by being the first to provide information; therefore, they try to discredit the United States through disseminating misleading information and propaganda.⁷ ComCam helps protect the legitimacy of US actions by making truthful images widely available in minimum time. As a result, the United States maintains the strategic initiative, placing opponents at a significant disadvantage.

The character and reach of the EMTF reflect the organization of the task force and the function of its components. However, when the EMTF integrates with air and space expeditionary forces as well as joint forces, projection of combat power becomes more than rapid transit across strategic distances. Power projection of compelling force is but one effect that increases the responsiveness and potency of all US military forces.

Effects

Today’s military has a clear-cut imperative: establish the front line of defense abroad by taking the fight to the enemy, and seize the initiative at the source.⁸ Although combat forces based in the continental United States are prepared to meet that imperative, they rely on support forces that are every bit as expeditionary. As stated before, the EMTF enhances the inherent expeditionary nature of air and space forces. As the vanguard of the air-mobility system, EMTF forces are crucial to the support of airlift and air-refueling missions that extend the speed and range of air expeditions. Portions of the EMTF’s deployable and fixed forces work to increase the velocity of deploying units, while other parts speed downrange to unload cargo and passengers in preparation for decisive action. The war-fighting focus of the EMTF increases the responsiveness of global air mobility, which narrows the gap between deployment and employment of expeditionary air and space forces.

The qualities that make the EMTF such an important enabler for expeditionary air and space also apply to the joint force. A few notable additions include the AMLO, ComCam, and AMOS. Each of these EMTF components enhances the expeditionary combat power of sister services in some fashion. For example, AMLOs streamline unit deployment to speed projection of heavy combat power. ComCam provides imagery for combat assessment available to all services, and the AMOS manages theater lift for sustainment of combat forces.

War-fighting commanders are sure to continue stressing the need for increased speed, agility, and access. The EMTF, as part of the greater air-mobility system, is fundamental to meeting the war fighters’ needs. For that reason, the various components of the EMTF continue to evolve in order to produce desired effects for the joint force at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.

The EMTF continues to move forward, improving capabilities and making real the joint vision of full-spectrum dominance, which seeks to “control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations.”⁹ Such an ideal capability will depend upon the EMTF, in concert with air-mobility aircraft, to move forces at will. This may sound simple, but providing even faster response, persistence through sustainment, and the ability to relocate forces to any spot on the globe is no easy task.

Meeting this high expectation requires -forward-looking change, some of which is already under way or under consideration. Mastery of the base-opening skill set constitutes job number one for the CRG. Therefore, AMC is working to establish a formal training unit specifically designed for the CRG. Formal training serves as a mechanism to ensure that enough Airmen are equipped to meet growing demands for accelerated power projection.

At the operational level of war, full-spectrum dominance will require seamless air mobility, the net effect being little distinction between strategic and tactical air mobility.¹⁰ Therefore, the EMTF is leading the way in advocating technological and process changes to leverage reachback operations with US-based C2 and to smooth the seams between global and theater air-mobility operations. Some of the changes involve exploring the best way to integrate air mobility more fully into the joint scheme of maneuver by developing a cadre of air-mobility strategists within the AMOS.

The EMTF represents a sea change in how AMC approaches air-mobility support to the war fighter. It began with harnessing capabilities of the fixed, deployable, and specialized components into one parent organization focused on the war fighter. Such focus translates to the purposeful orientation of the EMTFs along combatant-command lines, which channels task-force resources to assure that US forces are poised and capable of swift, persistent, and decisive response.

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Notes

1. Daniel Gouré and Christopher M. Szara, eds., Air and Space Power in the New Millennium (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), xxiii.

2. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1, Air Warfare, 22 January 2000, 31.

3. Gen John W. Handy, “Warfighting Reorganization: Evolutionary Change to Support Expeditionary Air Force Operations,” The Air Mobility “Flight Plan,” February 2004, https://private.amc.af.mil/visionForAMC/reorganization. htm (accessed 25 January 2005).

4. Any number of factors can influence the MOG, which describes the number of aircraft an airfield can hold. For instance, “parking MOG”—an indication of how many aircraft can physically occupy space on an airfield—does not allow for easy access to aircraft for fueling operations, maintenance, loading, and the like. “Working MOG,” as described in the article, takes into account a myriad of factors that allow aircraft to cycle through an airfield. Limiting factors change, depending upon the resources available. For doctrinal references to the MOG, see former AFDD 1-1, Air Force Task List, 12 August 1998, 177; AFDD 2-6.2, Air Refueling, 19 July 1999, 57; and AFDD 2-6.3, Air Mobility Support, 10 November 1999, 33.

5. AFDD 2-4, Combat Support, 22 November 1999, 27.

6. Brig Gen Bobby J. Wilkes, commander, 21st Expeditionary Mobility Task Force, “EMTFs . . . One Year Later” (address to the Airlift Tanker Association Convention, Dallas, TX, 29 October 2004).

7. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 15–16.

8. National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 2.

9. Ibid., 20.

10. Lt Gen John R. Baker, vice-commander, Air Mobility Command, “Supporting Joint Operations: Getting There” (address to the Air and Space Conference, Washington, DC, 13 September 2004).

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Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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