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Air & Space Power
Journal - Summer
2005
Maj Jeffrey W. Decker, USAF*
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The age of the manned strategic penetrating bomber is over. Flying missions into the heart of the U.S.S.R with gravity bombs is virtually a suicide flight. But just as the Navy could not give up battleships, the Air Force refuses to recognize the end of the World War II bomber mission. If the Air Force had a ground-force mission, we would still be breeding cavalry horses. |
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—Senator William Proxmire (D-WI), 1976 |
Air operations supporting US and coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq underscore America’s continued reliance on long-range bombardment aircraft. Staging from within the continental United States, Oman, and British bases at Royal Air Force (RAF) Fairford in the United Kingdom and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, B-1B, B-2B, and B-52H bombers played a crucial role in the overthrow of the Taliban government, disruption of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, and defeat of the Baathist regime in Iraq. Close air support from loitering bombers over the area of operations also proved noteworthy. Whether requested by special-operations troops on horseback in Afghanistan (with the latest in satellite-communications gear) or by intelligence assets on Baghdad street corners, the bomber force delivered precision munitions on any target, anywhere, thus demonstrating the viability, flexibility, and adaptability of the twenty-first-century Airman and long-range bombardment aviation.
Since Senator Proxmire’s remarks in 1976, bombers have not faded away to the “boneyard” in Arizona but have maintained and increased their relevance. The Bush administration’s National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS), which advocates preemption rather than deterrence or response and reemphasizes the need “to protect this nation and its people against further attacks and emerging threats,” means that the long-range bomber will undoubtedly play a central role in assuring the national security of the United States in the early twenty-first century and supporting what is now known as the Bush Doctrine.1
In each of the three major military operations of the past decade—the Gulf War, Kosovo and now Afghanistan—long range strategic aircraft have progressively assumed a larger share of the operational burden, thanks to their long range, to their heavy payload and to constant improvements in precision-guided munitions (PGM).
—Giovanni de Briganti
—”2001: The End of Tactical Airpower?”
As a candidate for the presidential election of 2000, George W. Bush campaigned to transform America’s armed forces. During an address at the Citadel, he outlined his thoughts on military transformation: “Our forces in the next century must be agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a minimum of logistical support. We must be able to project our power over long distances, in days and weeks, rather than months. . . . In the air, we must be able to strike from across the world with pinpoint accuracy with long-range aircraft and perhaps with unmanned systems” (emphasis added).2
The national security environment as espoused in the NSS of 2002 advocates a policy of preemption and “defend[ing] the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants.”3 Previous national security strategies reflected the “struggle over ideas: destructive totalitarian visions versus freedom and equality.”4 This “cold war” strategy dictated a deterrent posture requiring bombers, missile-equipped submarines, and intercontinental ballistic missiles on hair-trigger alert. Today, however, “America is . . . threatened less by conquering states than we are failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of an embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends” (emphasis added).5 As President Bush stressed in a congressional address shortly after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, “the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.”6
Though America has continuously adhered to a defensive-oriented policy since the beginnings of the republic, President Bush’s decision to defend “the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders” is a response to the enemies America now faces—irrational, nonstate actors (terrorist organizations) who rely on support from rogue states.7 The president reiterated this warning in his address to the nation on 17 March 2003, before the commencement of hostilities in Iraq: “In this century, when evil men plot chemical, biological and nuclear terror, a policy of appeasement could bring destruction of a kind never before seen on this earth. Terrorists and terrorist states do not reveal these threats with fair notice, in formal declarations—and responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense, it is suicide.”8 In the current national security environment, the US Air Force will continue to rely on long-range bombardment aviation in order to meet the requirements of the NSS.
Beginning with Operation Desert Storm, the B-52G force—the proud Strategic Air Command shield still adorning the bombers’ fuselages—deployed to Diego Garcia; Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Moron Air Base, Spain; and RAF Fairford. The venerable “B-52s flew 1,624 missions, dropped 72,000 weapons (totaling more than 25,700 tons) on targets in Kuwait and southern Iraq, and on airfields, industrial targets and storage areas in Iraq. B-52s dropped 29 percent of all US bombs and 38 percent of all Air Force bombs during the war.”9 However, the B-52’s inability to deliver precision munitions significantly diminished the effect of the bombing. Combined with the B-1B’s no-show and concerns about collateral damage/friendly fire, the Air Force began to work toward obtaining a true precision capability.
Despite challenges to the bomber force (standup of Air Combat Command, retirement of the B-52G, and funding shortages), the 1990s saw the beginnings of a concerted effort to enhance the bomber’s conventional capabilities. The B-1B Block-D improvement program and introduction of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) for both the B-52H and B-1B, as well as the fielding of the B-2 Spirit, bolstered a bomber force dramatically reduced in numbers but now strengthened in conventional capabilities and tested during Operation Allied Force. Commencing 23 March 1999, air operations in Allied Force attempted to stop Slobodan Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing in Kosovo: “Of some 700 U.S. combat aircraft committed to the operation al-together, a mere 21 heavy bombers (10 B-52s, 5 B-1s, and 6 B-2s) delivered 11,000 out of the more than 23,000 U.S. air-to-ground munitions that were expended over the operation’s 78-day course.”10
Combat operations in Afghanistan, though brief, highlighted the strengthened capabilities of America’s bomber force and applicability in executing the Bush Doctrine. Limited by political concerns, overflight clearances, forward-basing locations, and long distances, the majority of Air Force airpower (fighter platforms) then in Southwest Asia did participate in direct combat operations in Afghanistan, though executing only “six percent of total sorties.”11 Bomber aircraft, with their long range, had no problems conducting missions from as far away as Whiteman AFB, Missouri. Equipped with JDAMs and in-flight reprogramming capabilities, “B-1 and B-52 bombers flew 10 percent of the strike sorties, but delivered 11,500 of the 17,500 total munitions expended (7 October through 23 December 2001).”12 The B-1B, derided for not participating in Desert Storm, dropped more bombs on Afghanistan than any other aircraft, earning recognition as a vital workhorse in the conflict. The ability to deliver long-range precision munitions, regardless of location, loiter on station for follow-on taskings, and carry a significant payload equal to that of multiple small platforms marked the bomber as a crucial component in this military campaign.
Mirroring Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom reinforced the growing relevance of airpower—specifically America’s bomber force: “Deploying 11 B-1Bs, four B-2s and 28 B-52s, these 43 aircraft flew a total of 505 sorties between March 20 and April 18 [2003] and struck a third of all aim points in Iraq.”13 Especially noteworthy was the attack on a restaurant in the Al Monsoor district in Baghdad on 7 April. In just 45 minutes, an on-call B-1B delivered four retargeted JDAM munitions against a suspected meeting place of Saddam Hussein and his top leadership. Although the mission failed to decapitate the Baathist regime and eliminate Saddam, this almost “real-time” target change did display what a long-range bomber with PGMs could accomplish.
The bomber force continues to serve in Southwest Asia, flying missions from Diego Garcia that support ongoing operations in Afghanistan. In his address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies on 21 January 2004, Dr. James G. Roche, then the secretary of the Air Force, reemphasized the renewed importance of bombers, specifically the B-1B: “With intercontinental range, duration over a target area measured in hours, and the new tactic of stacking aircraft in benign areas for execution of time sensitive or emerging targets, the B-1 is now a theater weapon of choice.”14 In addition, rotating bomber air-expeditionary forces are now forward-deployed to Andersen AFB, Guam, providing a reassuring presence to our Pacific Rim allies as well as communicating US resolve in the global war on terror.
Combining improvements in information technology, munitions, and organization, the Air Force can provide global reach and precision engagement against strategic, operational, and tactical targets. In addition, the bomber force’s precision has reduced or eliminated most negative effects, such as the collateral damage and fratricide associated with their use. No longer delivering large numbers of nonprecision munitions, as they did during Vietnam-era Arc Light missions, bombers now execute long-range missions against a myriad of vital centers/targets with modern PGMs. The combined force air component commander/joint force air component commander has a robust delivery capability against terrorist training camps, leadership safe houses, cave complexes, or more traditional targets such as command and control, leadership, and fielded forces in the modern battlespace.
The bomber’s unique strengths of payload, range, and responsiveness coupled with precision attack are the cornerstone of America’s airpower and force projection.
—Air Force White Paper on
—Long Range Bombers, March 1999
When terrorists are located, we must be able to react rapidly, before intelligence on their whereabouts is compromised or becomes dated. This requires forces that can strike quickly, over long distances, and without warning. . . . Our best bet is to use long-range aircraft such as the B-2 bombers, carrier based aircraft, or cruise missiles.
—Andrew Krepinevich Jr., 2002
Noted historian Williamson Murray identified the lack of spending on a new bomber as the most glaring challenge currently impeding the present and future capabilities of bombardment aviation: “For fiscal years 1998 and 1999, the investment ratio favors fighters by slightly less than 5 to 1.”15 The Long-Range Air Power Panel chaired by Gen Larry D. Welch, former Air Force chief of staff, suggested that “the Air Force needs to ‘begin major [research and development] work on a follow-on bomber immediately.’ “16 The Air Force White Paper on Long Range Bombers of March 1999 asserted a similar conclusion: “Although the economic service life and mishap rates indicate a replacement timeline beginning in 2013, future pressures on the timeline may cause a change to this date.”17 A key planning factor called for maintaining a fleet of 170 aircraft in order to support 130 combat-coded bombers. With continued investment in heavy fighters (“$300 billion over the next 30 years on 4,000 tactical aircraft”),18 the Air Force will rely on limited modernization and PGMs to enhance the capabilities of the shrinking bomber force. Disagreeing with this approach, congressional members have added funds to begin reactivating 23 of the 30 mothballed B-1Bs (tail no. 86-0097 returned to service in early September 2004). In addition Congress has authorized $100 million to begin work on a new bomber, believing that the “USAF must have a fast stealthy replacement for the aging B-52 sooner rather than later.”19 Even the recently released U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, 2004 reiterates the importance of global attack (albeit possibly diminishing the capabilities of the current bomber force):
Currently, striking targets conventionally across the globe from the United States requires employing long-range bombers, which takes many hours and enables mobile targets to hide before the strike force arrives. In addition, legacy bombers [B-1B, B-2, and B-52H] can only operate in permissive and moderate threat environments. One of the keys to achieving DoD’s current transformational objective of denying sanctuary to adversaries is the following transformational capability: . . . Rapid and precise attack of any target on the globe with persistent effects. . . . The Air Force is conducting a Long Range Strike Analysis of Alternatives to determine the most effective way to develop this capability.20 (emphasis in original)
Results of the current Long Range Strike Analysis will not be made public for some time. In view of the ongoing costs in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the shifting of funds to pay for Army transformation, however, the Air Force will find it difficult to pay for a new bomber. Consequently, the introduction of new precision and next-generation munitions may have to serve as a stopgap measure until additional funds become available.
Operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrated the dilemma facing US forces today—employing overwhelming force but causing minimal collateral damage to civilians. Allied Force unveiled munitions designed to short-circuit electrical systems without destroying the entire electrical grid, ensuring rapid reconstitution after the conclusion of hostilities. However, operations in Afghanistan reinforced the requirement for destroying bunkers and cave complexes with large penetrator warheads and explosive yield. Future planners will face this same dilemma; fortunately, however, investment in new and improved weapons remains healthy. For example, the AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) and AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) bestow additional standoff capability that complements the more publicized JDAM. Two recently publicized munitions—the Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) weapon and electromagnetic bomb (E-bomb)—represent efforts to pursue kinetic and effects-based ordnance capabilities against current and potential adversaries. In addition to the JSOW, JASSM, JDAM, MOAB, and E-bomb, other next--generation munitions are in development.
The Federation of American Scientists reports that “an object striking a target at Mach 8 will generate 64 times the force of an object of the same mass striking the target at Mach 1. This phenomenon makes hypersonic weapons well suited to attacking hardened or deeply buried targets such as command bunkers or biological-weapon storage facilities.”21 Despite programs now under development, such as the Fast Reaction Standoff Weapon and the Department of the Army Research and Program Agency’s Affordable Rapid Response Missile Demonstrator (both designed for fighter and bomber platforms), we still need a capability to strike at deeply buried targets that these two weapons cannot penetrate. Ongoing efforts such as the Hard and/or Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability (HDBTDC) Program seek to improve penetrators (Advanced Unitary Penetrator) and fusing technologies (Hard-Target Smart Fuse) to enhance penetration and damage. Even a 20,000-pound penetrator using the HDBTDC’s smart fuse has been suggested. Carried only on the B-2B and B-52H and using existing JDAM technology, this “superpenetrator” will provide a significant nonnuclear kinetic punch against deeply buried storage bunkers for weapons of mass destruction, command and control facilities, and leadership targets. Reintroduced funding in the defense budget for fiscal year 2006 will facilitate research of the viability of a small-yield nuclear penetrator. Combined with additional improvements in future munitions, such programs mean that America’s bombardment forces will possess both the necessary accuracy and kinetic force to execute long-range precision strikes in lieu of a new airframe.
A military force is not properly balanced against itself. It should be weighted against the enemy. It should be designed and proportioned to evade an enemy’s strength and to exploit his weakness.
—Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg
In looking back at the war [World War I] and all its lessons we must not overlook the most important lesson of all: all wars produce new methods and fresh problems. The last war was full of surprises—the next one is likely to be no less prolific in unexpected developments. Hence we must study the past in the light of the probabilities of the future, which is what really matters.
—Lt Gen Sir Arthur Edward McNamara
The United States now faces external threats that bear little similarity to those posed by the old Soviet Union. General Vandenberg’s comment reflected an Air Force tasked as the primary deterrent force to contain the Russian bear. The Soviet Union is gone, but his observation still has relevance as the Air Force and its sister services transform to fight a dramatically different enemy. Some people seek to meet this challenge by purchasing more weapons systems, but continuing deficits, transformation priorities, and defense spending that hovers close to 4 percent of the gross domestic product may undermine their proposal. The president has laid out an NSS of preemptive action and the elimination of those who would harm our country. For the foreseeable future, the Air Force bomber fleet will continue as our first line of defense, able to reach globally and deliver precision weapons rapidly by using a combination of stealth and standoff capabilities. The current bomber force stands ready to engage a variety of adversaries; however, the battlespace will continue to evolve, and requirements for global attack will not diminish. The Air Force must maintain a viable, long-range bombardment force armed with the latest munitions to meet both effects- and kinetic-based targeting needs until it develops and fields a next-generation long-range capability.
*Major Decker is commander of the 9th Munitions Squadron, Beale AFB, California.
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Notes
1. Donna Miles, “Bush Begins Second Term Vowing to Protect Nation,” Armed Forces Press Service, 20 January 2005, http://www.pentagon.mil/news/Jan2005/n0120 2005_2005012006.html.
2. George W. Bush (campaign address, the Citadel, 23 September 1999), http://www.ransac.org/Official%20 Documents/U.S.%20Government/White%20House/ bush-092399.html.
3. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), i, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
4. Ibid., 1.
5. Ibid.
6. Bill Sammon, Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism—From inside the Bush White House (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2002), 212.
7. National Security Strategy, 6.
8. Pres. George W. Bush (address to the nation—ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, 17 March 2003), http:// www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/wariniraq/ -gwbushiraq31703.htm.
9. Department of Defense, White Paper: Air Force Performance in Desert Storm (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, April 1991). See also “Air Force Performance in Operation Desert Storm,” http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/appendix/whitepaper.html.
10. Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, Project Air Force MR-1365-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 87, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1365.
11. Christopher J. Bowie, Robert P. Haffa Jr., and Robert E. Mullens, Future War: What Trends in America’s Post Cold-War Military Conflicts Tell Us about Early 21st Century Warfare, Analysis Center Paper (Arlington, VA: Northrop Grumman Corporation, January 2003), 6.
12. “Operation Enduring Freedom: The Air Campaign,” Efreedomnews.com, 12 January 2003, http://www. efreedomnews.com/News%20Archive/Afghanistan/Air%20War.htm.
13. Adam J. Hebert, “The Long Reach of the Heavy Bombers,” Air Force Magazine 86, no. 11 (November 2003): 24–29.
14. Dr. James G. Roche, secretary of the Air Force (address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 21 January 2004).
15. Williamson Murray, “The United States Should Begin Work on a New Bomber Now,” Policy Analysis, no. 368 (16 March 2000): 1.
16. Ibid., 12.
17. Department of Defense, Air Force White Paper on Long Range Bombers (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, March 1999), 24.
18. Tactical Aircraft: Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce Average Age of Aircraft, GAO-01-163 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, February 2001), 26.
19. John A. Tirpak, “Washington Watch,” Air Force Magazine 87, no. 1 (January 2004): 8.
20. Department of Defense, The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, 2004 (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Air Force, Future Concepts and Transformation Division, December 2004), 62–63, http://www.af.mil/ -library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2004.pdf.
21. “Smart Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists, 3 January 2002, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ smart/index.html (accessed 11 January 2003).
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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