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Air & Space Power
Journal - Spring 2005
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Desert One and Air Force Special
Operations Command
A 25-Year Retrospective
Maj Gianni Koskinas, USAF
After the Vietnam War, the Air Force’s special operations forces (AFSOF) had deteriorated so much that they could not respond to a situation in Iran. On 4 November 1979, supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini stormed the US Embassy in Tehran and held the staff hostage. In response, the US government scrambled to assemble an ad hoc task force to rescue the hostages. Although an elite Army counterterrorism unit had completed certification training that same month, it had no Air Force counterpart. Because of the near--eradication of the SOF community in the 1970s, the American military could not respond adequately to this emergency.
The rescue attempt went no further than its initial landing site, code-named Desert One. Although the mission failed, it called attention to a preexisting problem. The United States had neither the resources nor the capability to counter the emerging threat of terrorism. Thus, Desert One became the catalyst for reprioritizing US SOF units within the Department of Defense (DOD).
From a purely Air Force perspective, Desert One clearly demonstrates the service’s neglect of its special forces after Vietnam. The Air Force had invested heavily in revitalizing its aging fleet of fighter aircraft in the late 1970s but considered SOF units a diversion of valuable resources. Although this position is understandable in light of overall Cold War strategy, Desert One provided the impetus for a change in behavior and made revitalization of these forces a prominent item on the DOD’s agenda.
We see significant differences in AFSOF units before and after Desert One. Veterans of that mission argue that before 1980, almost no one considered SOF missions integrated joint operations. After the rescue attempt, air commandos developed the modern notion of a joint SOF unit focused on counterterrorism. In short, Desert One and Project Honey -Badger—code name for a second rescue mission never attempted—established the paradigm for “Black SOF” units, the dominant tribe within the SOF community that focuses on counter-terrorism.
Ultimately, congressional persistence and support from key DOD leaders led to the crea-tion of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), its air component. As both commands strove to establish their organizational relevance, Black SOF dominated USSOCOM’s agenda and steered that command’s force structure, training, and priorities, using Desert One as its -raison d’être. To the contrary, “White SOF” units—noncounterterrorism--oriented special operators—have been overshadowed and considered secondary to their more clandestine counterparts.
Amy Zegart, author of Flawed by Design, argues that national security organizations are deeply affected by circumstances and factors associated with their creation. But as America continues to fight a global war on terrorism (GWOT), the SOF community will have to move from the single-mission focus of Desert One to a campaign--oriented strategy. The Desert One paradigm cannot accommodate the current security environment because it depends on habitual relationships among “fenced in” assets that surge occasionally rather than deploy continuously. Since 9/11, USSOCOM has tried to create a better balance between Black and White SOF units. The first is essential in crisis management, and the latter fundamental in augmenting the stressed Black SOF community as well as taking a leading role in the ever-growing arena of foreign internal defense.
Similarly, AFSOC must adjust its campaign strategy to the GWOT by transforming AFSOF resources and newly acquired combat search and rescue forces into a capabilities-based force. Ultimately, AFSOC should create “buckets” of special air-warfare capabilities that include “rescue” and AFSOF assets. The Desert One model has served the SOF community well for the past two decades, but 9/11 should change AFSOC from a platform-based, single-model force to a capabilities-based force.
To Learn More . . .
Kyle, James H., with John Robert Eidson. The Guts to Try: The Untold
Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-Scene Desert Commander.
Phoenix: Primer Publishers, 1995.
Marquis, Susan L. Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations
Forces. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997.
Zegart, Amy B. Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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