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Air & Space Power Journal - Spring 2005

Vortices

The Advanced Special Operations Air Mobility Platform (M-X)

The Time Is Now

Col William E. Saier, USAF, Retired*

Now in its fifth decade of operational use, Air Force Special Operations Command’s (AFSOC) MC-130E Combat Talon I aircraft still answers the call to provide clandestine infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply missions. This remarkable warbird and its younger sibling, the MC-130H Combat Talon II (which is only in its second decade of use), continue to prove themselves in combat in both Afghanistan and Iraq. However, with each passing year the time when these two aircraft will no longer be able to clandestinely penetrate and survive hostile airspace draws closer and closer. The most recent publication of AFSOC’s Way Ahead predicts future threats that will bring about this development and their significance:

Threats to Aircraft. The next 25 years will see the proliferation of infrared (IR), radar-guided, and directed energy (DE) threats that will render many existing aircraft obsolete by the end of this period. Between DE and radar-guided threats current AFSOF [Air Force special operations forces] aircraft will have survivability challenges in the years 2016 and beyond. This evolving threat has the potential to significantly challenge the capability for Special Operations Forces (SOF) to achieve tactical surprise through clandestine air mobility due to the increasing technological capability of passive aircraft detection at further distances.

Infrared. IR man-portable surface-to-air missiles, already a significant hazard to AFSOC aircraft, will be an increasingly dangerous threat as more capable missile systems with advanced counter-countermeasures proliferate. Furthermore, the traditional AFSOC tactic of avoiding MANPADS [man-portable air defense system] by operating mostly at night will become less effective as our enemies acquire more night vision devices.

Radar Guided. Emerging as a serious threat to AFSOF aircraft, the technology in radar-guided missiles is rapidly improving. Systems like the SA-10, SA-11, SA-12, and SA-20 (formerly SA-10C) are formidable systems capable of engaging targets at long ranges and at low altitudes. Recent articles in military journals describe the next generation of Russian-designed missile systems having ranges of over 240 nautical miles, altitude capability down to 1-meter above the ground level at those distances, and the capability of outmaneuvering most aircraft. Many of today’s missiles and most future radar missiles will incorporate various types of anti-jamming technologies, which make them difficult to defeat.

Directed Energy. High-energy lasers will transform the battlefield in the far term. Lasers capable of shooting down aircraft have already been fielded by some nations. As a result, by the 2020 time frame, detection may become synonymous with instant aircraft destruction in some parts of the world. Proliferation of laser technology is expected to become worldwide in the next 30 years.¹

Anytime, Anyplace, Anywhere

For General Hester’s words to remain true—for AFSOC in the future to be able to truly go “anytime, anyplace, anywhere” at our choosing—AFSOC and the Air Force need to begin a serious effort to replace the aging Combat Talon I and II aircraft with a “next generation” of low-observable (LO) aircraft. An advanced LO aircraft with enhanced agility in the objective area is a “must have” to counter a future adversary’s antiaccess and area-denial strategies.

The Past

The raison d’être of AFSOC’s Combat Talon aircraft has been the clandestine penetration of enemy territory, most often for the purpose of achieving “tactical surprise” by United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) ground and maritime forces. Military forces, for thousands of years, have known the importance of achieving tactical surprise over the enemy. As an example of how far back military commanders have used the concept of achieving “tactical surprise,” consider the following:

Thutmose III (1504–1450 B.C.) became Egypt’s greatest warrior pharaoh, and is known to history as the “Napoleon of Egypt.” Thutmose III established the empire far into Asia, exacting tribute from Babylon, Assyria, and the Hittites. He fought 17 campaigns abroad and was victorious in all of them. . . . The battle of Megiddo (Armageddon in the Bible) demonstrated all the characteristics of a modern army in battle. Thutmose III moved his army of 20,000 men from Egypt to Gaza, a distance of 250 miles, in less than 9 days and did so undetected. He immediately undertook another 10-day forced march . . . where he prepared to cross the mountains into enemy territory. Thutmose had to choose among three routes, two of which were easy marches but longer distances. The third was through a narrow defile but much shorter. . . . Thutmose’s intelligence units learned that the enemy was deployed to protect the easier routes. In a bold gamble, Thutmose risked security for surprise. Taking the dangerous route, he arrived completely undetected outside the city of Megiddo, where he faced only a screening force of enemy soldiers. The result was a smashing victory. . . . The Battle of Megiddo provides an example of an army that utilized every major tactical device used by modern armies. Thutmose took advantage of his intelligence-gathering capacity and located the deployment of the enemy force. Using this information, he was able to achieve tactical surprise and to mass his forces at the point of the enemy’s greatest weakness.²

For AFSOC aircrews flying Combat Talon aircraft, planning to conduct clandestine operations and achieving tactical surprise have become “second nature.” It is inherent in everything AFSOC does and is as important today as it was to Thutmose III over 3,000 years ago. In combat operations from the tragedy in the Iranian desert at Desert One to the successes achieved in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom, AFSOC’s Combat Talon aircrews have spent countless hours planning and executing missions that emphasized clandestine infiltration and exfiltration. Aircrews use the concept of “detection avoidance navigation/threat avoidance navigation” (DAN/TAN), which emphasizes, first and foremost, undetected (clandestine) flight operations.³ If an aircraft can avoid detection, then the risk to that aircraft is at the bottom end of the scale (fig. 1).

Figure 1. Detection avoidance navigation/threat avoidance navigation

Aircrews continue to use extensive premission intelligence data for thorough route planning. Once in the air, aircrews take maximum advantage of low-altitude flight profiles via the use of terrain-following and terrain-avoidance radars combined with the maximum use of terrain masking. In this way the aircrew has the greatest potential to avoid detection, particularly by enemy radar systems. Unfortunately for AFSOC aircrews, the threats an adversary can pose progressively worsen. On the other hand, AFSOC aircrew tactics for clandestine operations are at or near their limit. Aircrew and aircraft fly most of their missions at night and ideally in adverse weather that will degrade the enemy’s threat-detection capabilities (without degrading the AFSOC aircraft’s capabilities). AFSOC aircrews are flying as low as possible—given current technology and safety concerns. Regrettably, there is no practical way to reduce the large radar cross section (RCS) of a C-130 aircraft, which presents the biggest “giveaway” to detection. While it is true that the visual, acoustic, and IR signatures of a C-130 are also large, it’s the large RCS that gives the enemy the greatest opportunity to detect AFSOC aircraft. These aircraft will eventually become more and more susceptible, both in terms of detection and lethal engagement, to the increased threat created by adversaries with enhanced detection capabilities. The result will be an ever-expanding portion of the world where current AFSOC aircraft and aircrews will be unable to complete their mission.

The Future

AFSOC recently completed its M-X Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), a 15-month effort that explored potential concepts for the follow-on to the venerable (and often vulnerable) Combat Talon. While AFSOC continues to modify its Combat Talon aircraft with enhancements to increase mission effectiveness and survivability, it just won’t be able to make the radar detectability of such a huge aircraft with a large RCS any better. Couple that with the fact that aircraft and aircrew can’t fly any lower or any faster; night can’t become any darker; adverse weather isn’t something one can conjure up when needed; there are areas in the world where AFSOC may need to go where there is no terrain to hide in; and one quickly comes to the conclusion that AFSOC needs a new LO aircraft to remain relevant in the future. The effectiveness-analysis section of the M-X AoA included an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) penetration triangle (fig. 2).⁴

As the triangle shows, three factors affect the success of penetrating an IADS. If AFSOC Combat Talons can’t fly any faster and they can’t fly any lower, then the only way to favorably affect the triangle is in the area of low observability. A new “next generation” clandestine-penetrator-concept aircraft for AFSOC was recently described in AFSOC’s Way Ahead:

M-X Aircraft: This conceptual aircraft is required to support and improve SOF rapid global mobility beyond 2015. Reduced overseas basing and anti-access/area denial strategies drive the need for a high-speed, long-range air mobility platform capable of performing clandestine missions in denied, politically sensitive, or hostile airspace. The M-X will be designed to defeat sophisticated integrated air defense systems with low-observable/stealth design technology combined with advanced air defense systems electronic countermeasures for increased survivability. The M-X needs “agility in the objective area” which means it must be able to accomplish short take-off and landings and/or hover at medium heights. The declining capability of the aging SOF C-130 fleet to penetrate deep into sophisticated hostile airspace beyond 2015 adds emphasis to this program. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review report specifically states “Special Operations Forces will need the ability to conduct covert deep insertions over great distances.”⁵

This aircraft would possess the LO characteristics that when combined with low-altitude flight and appropriate speed capability would “reopen” hostile and denied airspace to clandestine flight operations. This will allow AFSOC aircraft and aircrews to deliver USSOCOM land and maritime forces well into the future, “anytime, anyplace, anywhere.”

Hurlburt Field, Florida

*The author is currently working as a civilian contractor for Headquarters AFSOC on the “Advanced Special Operations Air Mobility Platform (M-X) Analysis of Alternatives.”

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Notes

1. US Air Force, AFSOC’s Way Ahead (Hurlburt Field, FL: Air Force Special Operations Command [Plans and Programs Office], n.d.), 8–9.

2. Richard A. Gabriel and Karen S. Metz, A Short History of War: The Evolution of Warfare and Weapons, Professional Readings in Military Strategy, no. 5 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 30 June 1992), 17, 21–22.

3. Jacobs Sverdrup Technology, Inc., Advanced Special Operations Air Mobility Platform (M-X) Analysis of Alternatives, vol. 1 (Hurlburt Field, FL: Air Force Special Operations Command, 30 September 2004), 49–50.

4. Ibid., 74.

5. AFSOC’s Way Ahead, 15.

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Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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