Air and Space Power in Special 
Operations

Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF, Editor

Often performed behind a veil of secrecy, aerial special operations have endured as a well-established part of warfare since World War II. Whether called air commandos, Jungle Jim personnel, special operators, or “snake eaters,” Airmen who perform these duties have distinguished themselves as a breed apart, sometimes even regarded with suspicion by their compatriots. Since the early days of the Cold War, special operations Airmen have inhabited a twilight zone between war and peace, performing hazardous, clandestine activities during “peacetime” that rival their most daring wartime exploits. Although special operations units disbanded following World War II and again after the Korean War, they became increasingly institutionalized over the years, a trend that culminated in the establishment of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) on the eve of the first Gulf War in 1990, just as the Cold War concluded. Today’s AFSOC emerged from a long series of reorganizations, sometimes in response to formative events. The year 2005 happens to mark the anniversaries of three such events—the 35th anniversary of the raid on the Son Tay prisoner of war camp in North Vietnam in 1970, the 30th anniversary of the Mayaguez operation in Southeast Asia in 1975, and the 25th anniversary of the Desert One hostage rescue attempt in Iran in 1980. Although none enjoyed complete success, each operation influenced the way today’s Air Force organizes, trains, and equips its special operations forces.

Even though Cold War counterinsurgency—most notably in Southeast Asia—remains a central part of AFSOC’s heritage, special operations Airmen have adapted themselves to a changing world. Key participants in all manner of worldwide conflicts and humanitarian operations during the inter-war era of the 1990s, they have enjoyed a dramatic renaissance since the start of the global war on terror. Highly trained, empowered by space-based communication and navigation networks, employing specially modified equipment, and using sophisticated tactics, special operations Airmen have proven indispensable in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other trouble spots. Small in number but potent in effectiveness, AFSOC units can act as powerful force multipliers if properly employed.

However, these Airmen know better than to rest on their laurels. They face significant aircraft—modernization challenges and must perform logistical miracles to support operations in far-flung hostile theaters. Moreover, the enemy’s increasingly dangerous air-defense weaponry threatens to deny AFSOC forces access to important areas. Doctrinal questions also loom on the horizon. The use of Battlefield Airmen to perform a wide variety of functions such as providing precise target coordinates to aircraft delivering Joint Direct Attack Munitions has proven spectacularly successful in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, the adaptability of opposing forces will require constant doctrinal innovation. Additionally, since airpower does more than simply destroy things, special operations Airmen must become more adept at providing security, restoring order, and helping rebuild infrastructure and institutions in war-ravaged or disaster-stricken areas. Bolstering allied militaries in their struggle against insurgencies has long been a staple task of special operations, and new challenges such as rebuilding the Iraqi air force have now arisen.

Simply stated, failure in these undertakings is not an option. Special operators must handle many tasks quietly and discreetly. In some cases, only experts have the qualifications to choose among competing alternatives in organization, training, equipment, or procedure, but all Airmen should ponder how best to integrate AFSOC’s capabilities into US and coalition strategies. By engaging in professional dialogue about the key issues facing special operations Airmen, we can all become involved in these important matters. We dedicate this issue of Air and Space Power Journal to advancing that professional debate.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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