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Document created: 1 September 05
Air & Space Power Journal - Fal1 2005

Vortices

Centralized Execution
in the Air Force

Maj John Schaefer III, USAF*

*Major Schaefer is a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Two weeks into the war, you are on your way north into Iraq leading a two-ship of F-15Es, each loaded with eight GBU-12s and a GBU-10. It’s a clear, blue day, and your onboard sensors give you a good fix on a convoy of Iraqi trucks stalled on the road with heavy loads. But then the Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft interrupts your perfect sortie:

“Tipsy 07, this is Darkstar.”
“Darkstar, this is Tipsy 07. Go ahead.”
“Tipsy 07, Kmart directs you to proceed to X and destroy Y.”

Since the rules of engagement (ROE) specifically prohibit destroying Y, you make sure the tape is on before authenticating Darkstar and making him repeat the order. He confirms the order, emphasizing that it comes directly from Kmart—the joint force air and space component commander (JFACC)—and that it is time sensitive. You inform Darkstar that this mission will require you to divert and dutifully lead your two-ship to X and turn Y into piles of flaming wreckage. After hot-pit refueling at your divert base, you and your weapon systems officer fly home wondering if maintenance will be able to deliver enough jets for tonight’s sorties, considering your late return; you also discuss the merits of centralized execution of airpower. Meanwhile Kmart celebrates the crippling blow your sortie delivered to the Iraqi leadership.

The Master Tenet

Although advances in command-and-control technology have made centralized execution both feasible and appropriate in certain limited circumstances, one should carefully follow the guidelines laid out in Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, which defines centralized control as “the planning, direction, prioritization, synchronization, integration, and deconfliction of air and space capabilities to achieve the objectives of the joint force commander.” That document also describes decentralized execution as “the delegation of execution authority to responsible and capable lower-level commanders to achieve effective span of control and to foster disciplined initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.”¹ The airpower tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution arose when available technology did not allow commanders to see what their airpower assets were doing in real time. Specifically, the lack of reliable communications limited the direct control of those assets. The Air Force embraced decentralized execution partially in reaction to heavy losses suffered during the Vietnam War, when individuals outside the theater controlled planning and execution. Aircrews had to use tactics ill suited to the threat, resulting in reduced effectiveness and unnecessary losses. Information flowed slowly to and from the theater, and the means of communication dictated transmission of only the most important data. Technology available at the time did not provide the fidelity required for successful centralized execution.

Current technology, however, provides commanders with real-time information about all their assets and high-quality intelligence about the enemy’s assets. Our ability to collect and disseminate data continues to grow exponentially. As the introductory scenario illustrates, this growth has led to instances of commanders easily reaching forward and successfully employing centralized execution. Since this phenomenon has already occurred and the temptation to utilize it will only grow as our assets and weapons connect to the global information grid, an examination of centralized execution seems appropriate.

Centralized or Decentralized Execution?

According to Lt Col Woody Parramore, USAF, retired, “Centralized execution happens if a sortie carries out its mission under direct control of an air and space operations center (AOC) (whether a theater AOC, the tanker airlift control center, or the space AOC), with no other echelon in the chain of command issuing orders.”² Armed with this definition, we can examine AFDD 1’s reasons for employing decentralized execution, situations that may call for centralized execution, and guidelines for using centralized execution. AFDD 1 addresses decentralized execution’s ability to “achieve effective span of control” by pointing out that modern technology brings the commander a flood of data far greater than he or she can absorb and translate into situational awareness. No commander can know everything about every asset in a complex theater with hundreds of players. This argument sets a boundary for the extent to which one should use centralized execution but does not preclude it. Commanders should remain focused on higher-level issues and avoid delving into tactical details. Small operations make centralized execution even more tempting, but commanders can assure the routine achievement of greater effects by letting highly skilled Airmen execute their assigned duties while airborne.

In both small and large air campaigns, the challenge lies in identifying sorties that lend themselves to centralized execution. The JFACC should have a system or staff, such as a time-sensitive targeting cell, in place that recognizes those rare instances as they occur and knows their limitations in using centralized execution to meet the commander’s intent. When personnel or equipment issues cause centralized execution to tie up assets that could produce better effects by allowing the theater air control system (TACS) to run its course, one should avoid centralized execution.³ If an input into the TACS can produce a desired effect, then one doesn’t need centralized execution. For instance, if the ground commander decides to make killing a particular enemy armored division the priority for the next week, then the JFACC should make appropriate inputs into the TACS to generate air tasking orders that will accomplish this goal. Attempting to reach forward and individually redirect the number of sorties required to achieve this effect is not the preferred option.

AFDD 1 also notes that decentralized execution serves to “foster disciplined initiative.” When properly used, centralized execution redirects a sortie’s effort but should not take all initiative away from the aircrew. Our entire system of training seeks to develop aircrews that can take stock of the existing tactical -situation and execute their mission. Centralized execution that removes the ability to adjust to real-world conditions amounts to micromanagement and is counterproductive. For instance, transmitting exact attack parameters for a new target instead of assigning the target with a run-in restriction to avoid overflight of a particular area may result in the aircrew’s not having the flexibility to employ due to such real-world conditions as bad weather in the target area. When employed properly, centralized execution does not restrict aircrew initiative any more than publishing a change to the ROE would.

Current and emerging technologies require reevaluation of AFDD 1’s statement that decentralized execution improves “situational responsiveness.” In previous conflicts, oftentimes only aircrews saw the tactical situation and the true lay of the aerial battlefield. Commanders relied on after-action reports and reconnaissance assets, usually with long delays, to shape their picture of the battlespace. Modern surveillance and communications assets have significantly improved battlespace awareness. The situation now dictates who has a better view of events on the battlefield. In some cases, control elements located with or above friendly surface forces, such as ground or airborne forward air controllers, may have a much more accurate picture of action on the ground than the AOC does. On the other hand, weather, threats, and lighting conditions may degrade the control element’s situational awareness so severely that one finds much better real-time situational awareness on the AOC floor. In a perfect world, the control element would pull the same information off the global information grid that the AOC sees, but current avionics limitations and the demands of flying and surviving in a hostile environment sometimes inhibit this process. Because of longer sortie durations and limited data pipelines to the cockpit, the information that aircrews have on takeoff can lose currency by the time they reach their target areas. Thus, centralized execution might offer the only way of capitalizing on emerging information and quickly responding to the changing situation on the battlefield.

Finally, although AFDD 1 declares that decentralized execution fosters “tactical flexibility,” it does concede that “in some situations, there may be valid reasons for execution of specific operations at higher levels, most notably when the JFC [joint force commander] (or perhaps even higher authorities) may wish to control strategic effects, even at the sacrifice of tactical efficiency.”⁴ One can justify losing some incremental tactical progress toward the commander’s intent provided by decentralized execution when centralized execution will spur significant movement toward strategic objectives. Additionally, political constraints may force a commander to employ centralized execution. For example, during the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy exercised strong personal control of low-level activities to avoid blundering into a nuclear war.⁵

The Road Ahead

In his article “Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution in the Era of Forward Reach,” Maj Mark Davis argues for modifying the decentralized-execution portion of the master airpower tenet in order to align Air Force and joint doctrine.⁶ Since World War II, however, this master tenet has repeatedly proven itself as the best way to employ airpower. Ignoring it can lead to compromising the remaining tenets of airpower and to losing effects. Overuse of centralized execution shackles the flexibility that allows trained Airmen to achieve airpower’s maximum effects. Nonetheless, recent events have shown that centralized execution will occur. However, the unique characteristics of airpower and space power dictate that decentralized execution remain the norm. Although Air Force doctrine acknowledges that commanders may use centralized execution, it does not provide in-depth analysis of the inherent trade-offs. An examination of the Air Force’s reasons for employing decentralized execution reveals some practical guidelines for using centralized execution.

The Effects

One must first consider whether any benefits would accrue to tactical, operational, or strategic effects from employing centralized rather than decentralized execution. One can justify some loss of effectiveness or efficiency at a lower level in exchange for gains at a higher level. For example, centralized execution might prove appropriate for redirecting sorties to deliver a fatal blow to enemy command-and-control systems, preventing the spread of a conflict over political borders, attacking time-sensitive targets, or complying with political constraints at the direction of civilian leadership. One should not use centralized execution simply to exchange one tactical effect for -another—something best accomplished by changing guidance to the decentralized system. The AOC staff must recognize that “because we can” does not qualify as justification for switching to a centralized-execution mode. Similarly, the JFACC should not habitually use centralized execution simply because the capability exists but should do so only when its increased effects justify deviating from the master tenet.

Who’s in Charge?

Given the employment of centralized execution, the JFACC must remain the single air commander, responsible for ensuring that such execution does not degrade effectiveness by leading to the de facto establishment of private air forces at the disposal of supported ground commanders. AFDD 1 clearly states that the JFACC should “mediate the competing demands for tactical support against the strategic and operational requirements of the conflict.”⁷ This responsibility remains the JFACC’s even if that commander chooses, based on his or her expertise as an Airman, to employ centralized execution to support the ground commander. In order to maximize its effects, airpower should remain under the command of an Airman, regardless of the method of execution selected by the JFACC.

The Right People at the AOC

Because centralized execution adds to the responsibility of the AOC, it must be staffed with experienced war fighters. Sending the squadron’s youngest four-ship flight lead or a field grader fresh off the staff but not yet back on his or her game to the AOC will not work with centralized execution. The recent effort to treat AOCs as weapon systems has paid great dividends in standardizing and upgrading their equipment. Since this new equipment has made limited centralized execution a reality, AOCs must put it in the hands of current, tactically proficient Airmen who can recognize when such execution represents the best way of fulfilling the commander’s intent.

Making Up for Pipeline Shortfalls

One can use centralized execution to overcome shortfalls in existing information pipelines. Because AOCs often have access to more information than do aircrews in the cockpit, they can use the additional data to reach forward and centrally execute sorties when pipeline shortfalls prevent crews from obtaining information in a timely fashion. The long-term fix would entail increasing the size of the pipelines to the cockpit and enhancing the quality of the information so that aircrews can subscribe to the types of data they need. In the meantime, an accurate picture of the theater-information architecture will help identify situations in which physical or network limitations prevent maximum effectiveness when assets operate under decentralized execution. The JFACC and his or her staff need to know about such limitations so they can use centralized execution to push forward information that can radically alter a sortie’s effectiveness.

Training for Decentralized Execution

Our current system of training produces Airmen who can gather information from multiple sources and make the right decisions in the air during the heat of battle—a great source of strength for the Air Force. Our service will always need individuals capable of flexibly employing their weapon systems. Thus, the Air Force needs to ensure that the incorporation of limited centralized execution does not eventually produce a force of Airmen unable to act on their own.

Deviate with Caution

Central execution of a sortie should not create an airborne puppet. The AOC must still honor the remaining tenets and principles of airpower, leaving the aircrew enough flexibility to achieve the desired effect. AFDD 1 addresses this issue: “Centralized control maximizes the flexibility and effectiveness of air and space power; however, it must not become a recipe for micromanagement, stifling the initiative subordinates need to deal with combat’s inevitable uncertainties.”⁸ This statement also applies to properly employed centralized execution. Similarly, the AOC should keep the overall situation in mind to avoid losing the effects of numerous sorties when the centralized execution of a few sorties results in failure to achieve sufficient mass. Limited use of centralized execution will allow the JFACC to capitalize on technology yet still realize maximum effects by adhering to the remaining tenets of airpower. Indeed, according to AFDD 1, “Commanders must apply their professional judgment and experience to the principles and tenets as they employ air and space power in a given situation.”⁹ This balancing act currently includes the use of centralized execution, whose employment should become easier as technology advances.

The Air Force should take to heart Giulio Douhet’s observation that “victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.”¹⁰ Because technological progress increases the likelihood of utilizing limited centralized execution, the Air Force needs to anticipate the attendant changes and incorporate them into its doctrine, training, and operations. q

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Notes

1. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 28, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Main.asp?.

2. Lt Col Woody W. Parramore, USAF, retired, “Defining Decentralized Execution in Order to Recognize Centralized Execution,” Aerospace Power Journal 18, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 25, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj04/fal04/fal04.pdf .

3. According to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 13-1AOCV3, Operational Procedures—Aerospace Operations Center, 1 July 2002, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/13/afi13-1aocv3/afi13-1aocv3.pdf, the TACS “consists of mobile facilities, equipment and trained personnel to permit tailored C2 for aerospace operations throughout the spectrum of conflict” (7). See chap. 2 of this AFI for a detailed overview of the TACS.

4. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 30.

5. Lt Col Phillip K. Heacock, “The Viability of Centralized Command and Control (C²),” Air University Review 30, no. 2 (January–February 1979), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1979/jan-feb/heacock.html .

6. Maj Mark G. Davis, “Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution in the Era of Forward Reach,” Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1835.pdf.

7. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 28.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 27.

10. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942; new imprint, Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 30.

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Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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