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Air & Space Power
Journal - Fal1 2005
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The Combat Aviation
Advisory Mission in Iraq
Maj Ioannis Koskinas, USAF
Until recently the greatest contribution of combat aviation advisory (CAA) involved keeping “brushfires” from flaring into “multiple fire-alarm emergencies.” In other words, CAA worked best when applied in support of host-nation assistance before a major contingency developed. Even though the current situation in Iraq does not follow this model, in reality, Operation Iraqi Freedom brings to the forefront the idea that the Air Force must increase its CAA capacity in order to support long-term US objectives. In fact, CAA will prove critical in the development of a credible Iraqi counterinsurgency (COIN) capability.
Few people would argue against the enduring value of CAA’s mission, which, according to some Air Force advocates, must expand to three or four times its current size. While no one disputes the importance of CAA in countries such as the Philippines and Colombia, apparently most Airmen—including the most fervent supporters of the CAA mission—fail to understand the need to introduce a robust CAA capability to Iraq. Although one could use operations all over the world to justify CAA’s growth, Iraqi Freedom demonstrates the absolute urgency and value of the organization. Unfortunately, CAA has had little effect on the current situation in Iraq. Since CAA is unique to the Air Force, it makes sense for Airmen to train Airmen.
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) understands that the training, mentoring, and development of an Iraqi security apparatus are mechanisms for building indigenous legitimacy and diminishing the need for coalition forces in Iraq. In the end, historical evidence suggests that properly composed and trained indigenous forces are most effective in defeating an insurgency. Since such long-term endeavors as COIN operations are best fought by indigenous rather than third-party forces, the United States would do well to develop a sound disengagement strategy from Iraq. In the not-so-distant future, US bombs dropped from US aircraft will signal failure in our campaign strategy to de-Americanize COIN operations in that country.
To accommodate the shift from an American-led COIN to an all-Iraqi capability, MNF-I developed Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) as a major subordinate component. Iraqi security forces will soon mature in capability, and coalition forces can then lower their footprint in Iraq—all because of MNSTC-I’s emphasis on the development of those security forces. As their numbers and capabilities grow, Iraqi ground forces (military and police) have begun assuming a more leading role in COIN operations.
Such is not the case for the Iraqi air force. While the country’s ground security forces now boast upwards of 180,000 personnel, its air force has experienced nominal growth from 162 personnel to 500-plus airmen only recently. The air force began accepting aircraft from a number of different countries, concentrating on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; airlift; and VIP support. Strategically, as part of a greater campaign plan in Iraq, the United States has a vested interest in the Iraqi air force’s successfully assuming air-component responsibilities of indigenous COIN operations to defeat the insurgency and establish internal order for the “new” Iraq. Complicating matters, although MNF-I has an air component coordination element and Multinational Corps-Iraq has an air liaison officer as the principal advisors and liaisons from the coalition force air component commander (CFACC), MNSTC-I has no formal liaison with the CFACC. The CFACC is aware of this issue, and Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) is trying to rectify it.
The bottom line is quite simple. Because airmen know best how to develop an air force, US Airmen should assume the leading role in development of the Iraqi air force. Only the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), under combat command authority of US Special Operations Command but solely comprised of USAF Airmen, has a specific charter to conduct the CAA mission.
In order to assess Iraqi airpower, the 6th SOS—the USAF’s sole foreign internal defense (FID) unit—should immediately deploy to create a plan for developing Iraq’s air force. After all, assessment of foreign aviation forces is one of the squadron’s core tasks. Due to the size of the Iraqi air force, current and projected, the USAF need not introduce aviation advisory teams in huge numbers but should do so under the Operational Aviation Detachment Alpha/Bravo concept. This approach will provide a unique advisory team that assists not only in flight training but also in maintenance, supply, munitions, ground safety, life support, and other critical aviation functions. In truth, although some individuals may guess at CAA mission requirements in Iraq, only combat aviation advisors have the wherewithal to assess, train, advise, and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment, and force integration.
Air Education and Training Command should take the lead in the initial training of Iraqi airmen by establishing their initial specialty schools and providing basic, intermediate, and senior developmental education. However, Air Force Special Operations Command—in particular the 6th SOS—should assume the core tasks of both advisory and direct assistance as well as force integration. This issue requires immediate attention because the USAF must play a leading role in converting the nascent capabilities of the Iraqi air force into valid COIN capabilities, thus giving the Iraqi government a viable air component that can team with COIN-capable Iraqi ground units.
The amount of FID work in US Central Command’s area of responsibility would justify expansion of the Department of Defense’s CAA forces from one squadron to multiple units, with an entire CAA squadron focusing on Iraq. After all, this is an economy-of-force issue. The ability to advise foreign aviation forces—in effect, assist them in their COIN capabilities—means that we don’t necessarily need to commit a large number of US forces to combat emerging insurgency and subversion in countries of interest.
The longer our military delays the expansion of its CAA capabilities, the worse off we will be in Iraq and in the global war on terrorism. Current conventional thinking holds that although Iraqi ground troops may be able to handle land-based COIN operations in the near future, coalition airpower will need to provide close air support for quite a long time. But such reasoning employs faulty logic. By considering the enemy’s ability to “spin” information operations, one can clearly understand that the Iraqization of COIN operations must occur in the air as well as on the ground. A lopsided approach that promotes COIN operations with a mostly Iraqi ground component and a mostly United States/United Kingdom air component will backfire as the insurgents continue to use propaganda to exploit coalition contributions in the air. Airmen must create an effective exit strategy that enables a transfer of the asymmetric advantages of the “high ground” to the new Iraqi military structure and reduces the US/UK combat-airpower footprint as soon as practical.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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