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Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2005

Air Superiority

A Sine Qua Non?

Col José C. D’Odorico, Argentine Air Force, Retired

I beg clemency from those who may blame me for betraying one of the most revered airpower dogmas—the notion that one always needs to conduct a battle for air superiority—but the time has come to question whether some popular doctrinal concepts espoused by the world’s major air forces truly apply to smaller air forces. Clinging to customary doctrinal practices based only on emphatic assertions that they are correct could be as imprudent as allowing ourselves to be seduced by a modernizing urge to change everything. Therefore I ask the reader to pause and think before deciding to make me pay dearly for defying the most respected principle of air war—at least until now.

To begin this discussion, we should ask ourselves if we must swear upon the basic--airpower-doctrine manual’s assertion that regardless of circumstances in a given situation, a struggle for air superiority is mandatory before striking the enemy’s centers of gravity. Most veteran pilots will not hesitate to stress what has served as a golden rule since the -Allies experienced such painful losses when they flew massive bombing raids over Europe in World War II. That war seemed to demonstrate that air superiority was a prerequisite to attacking strategic targets. Additionally, experience since that war shows that ground forces lose their freedom of maneuver when opposing aviation can strike defensive positions, artillery, mechanized assets, and armor day or night, regardless of the weather.

Belief in the need to gain air superiority has been instilled in the world’s air forces as a principle that they have to follow if they want to win a war. This doctrine quickly spread and gained respect all around the world. Curiously, despite the fact that the doctrine strongly affected long-standing tactical rules, few strategists felt compelled to conduct in-depth studies to determine whether it had universal validity. Instead, air strategists preferred to praise and provide a doctrinal framework for the experiences of veteran air forces.

If the world’s big air forces approved that doctrine, how could members of smaller and less experienced ones question what their own leaders taught? The new gospel of aerial war ruled the air staffs and overruled anything that went against lessons learned the hard way. Skeptics found themselves doomed to professional ostracism, and no one dared challenge the axioms made holy by Hugh Trenchard, Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and Alexander de Seversky.

Winning Air Superiority

I share the belief that in order to gain freedom to maneuver in the air and on the land, we need to have (1) as a minimum, local air superiority, and (2) as a maximum, air supremacy over the whole theater of operations. But this agreement does not lead me to give up the title of this article. To gain adequate freedom of action in the air, we may or may not need to commit significant military resources. Time and local circumstances will determine the real degree of that commitment. Essentially, the main concern is not how to eliminate the opposing air threat but to discern whether we need to launch a distinct air superiority campaign to eliminate those threats before attacking strategic targets or whether we might skip such a campaign and attack the enemy’s vital centers right away.

Because new weapon systems and tactical procedures continuously put current strategies to the test, we must neither stagnate nor allow air doctrines espoused by stronger countries to inhibit the development of defense theories adjusted to local and regional realities. No two countries are the same, and neither are their defense requirements. Beyond serving as a general reference, foreign doctrine usually has limited application to nations with military potential different than that of the country which promulgated it. Hasty adaptations have more negative than positive results for smaller states because they encourage expectations and expenditures misaligned with actual requirements.

In underdeveloped countries, an unbiased analysis of the situation can lead an air staff to discard a general theory that war automatically demands expenditure of scarce air assets on potentially superfluous operations. The basic question is, must we necessarily commit scarce, costly, and hard-to-replace aerial resources to fight for air superiority? If we quickly accept this requirement, would sufficient airpower assets then remain to carry out air attacks to paralyze, neutralize, or destroy opposing strategic targets and provide close air support to friendly ground forces? Could we carry out more operations to achieve those core goals in spite of the opposition that the enemy could present? That is, would we be able to reach and strike desired targets despite the opponent’s air defenses? No doubt answers to these questions clarify the dilemma of whether or not one always needs to battle for air superiority.

Reviewing some examples from military history might help us decide whether a given war requires us to respect the usual air superiority doctrine or seek some creative alternative. When two powers with strong modern air forces clash, one can assume that both possess air defense systems capable of inflicting serious losses on the other. Let us briefly review three recent examples.

Between 1965 and 1972, the Americans did not conduct a specific campaign to establish air superiority over North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia because US airpower could reach any spot over those territories and accomplish its missions as often as desired without taking unacceptable risks. Although significant casualties occurred, most involved helicopters and tactical aircraft. No dedicated air superiority campaigns against North Vietnamese air assets or air defenses preceded bombing strikes in Operations Rolling Thunder and Linebacker I and II. In fact the entire war was characterized by vast differences in the size, quality, and power of the opposing air forces. American superiority proved overwhelming against the limited North Vietnamese opposition, based on Soviet and Chinese equipment and doctrine. Soviet-supplied MiG aircraft seldom challenged American fighters and bombers except when US planes were laden with bomb loads.¹

The second example comes from the Persian Gulf War of 1991, in which a coalition of more than 30 countries struck Iraq. Because Iraq had a strong air force hardened by an eight-year war against Iran, everybody expected the coalition to make air superiority its first priority. Operation Desert Storm included four air phases defined by their individual strategic goals, but these phases did not follow a sequential timeline. Lt Gen Charles Horner, the coalition air component commander, described the phases as follows: one (strategic air campaign), two (air superiority over the Kuwaiti theater of operations), three (battlefield preparation), and four (ground war).²

According to General Horner, phase two originated with Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf of the Army but did not enjoy wide discussion within the air component because the latter deemed it redundant. Meanwhile Desert Storm became the first parallel air war in history when coalition forces conducted the first three phases almost simultaneously. Never-theless, the war achieved ambitious strategic effects with minimal losses and synchronized the employment of all air and space assets operating in the theater.³

Gulf War target selection took place mostly at US Central Command rather than in Washington, as during the Vietnam War, and planners wisely exploited the technological surprise afforded by the F-117A Nighthawk, launching huge strike packages and decisively employing precision-guided munitions (PGM). Strategic air attacks, carried out in such a way that they resembled suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), paralyzed Iraqi command, control, communications, and intelligence, leading to the subsequent ineffectiveness, disarray, and destruction of Saddam Hussein’s military forces, including his air force, whose performance proved less than impressive.

In this intense but short episode, phase one implicitly enabled the establishment of air superiority without the need to undertake a dedicated phase-two air superiority effort. The first phase intrinsically involved gaining the control of air and space that facilitated strategic strikes. Although coalition forces did not exclusively fight to win air superiority as a priority, they did not ignore it as a necessary condition and launched a condensed, multifaceted campaign that allowed them to enjoy air superiority’s usual advantages.

A third case took place in the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982, in which no plan for winning air superiority existed. Each side used its scarce air assets to attack enemy military targets and their mutually limited antiaircraft capabilities. Thus, neither side could gain air superiority, and both air forces relied upon courage to offset the absence of that advantage. Sometimes, to make up for that shortage, planners in the Fuerza Aérea Argentina (Argentine air force) used ploys, such as diversions and extremely low-altitude flights, to create tactical surprises and achieve positive results.⁴

The British tried to exploit their technological advantages. Despite suffering losses caused by superior British technologies such as AIM-9L air-to-air missiles, vertical-takeoff-and-landing aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, radar warning receivers, and so forth, Argentine flights still reached their targets repeatedly. In the Falklands/Malvinas War, neither side could undertake a dedicated air superiority campaign due to the theater’s location, limited infrastructure, and lack of resources on both sides. Neither air force could conduct major SEAD operations although both knew how airpower should be employed.⁵

I believe that in this century we will see the gradual disappearance of dedicated air superiority campaigns and that airmen will have to go to battle with a different perspective. The fact that World War II–type wars are becoming less and less frequent confirms this belief. We currently express our inherent human aggressiveness through operational models different from those of the recent past, forcing strategists to reassess their operating environment.

I also believe that this change will require reeducating airmen to bring them into accord with the new political-military reality. We will have to revamp doctrinal concepts to accommodate matters of concern to military and political leaders. These new concepts, although only partially developed, will have strong repercussions in military-airpower thought. This complicated and inevitable updating process will demand the strategists’ proverbial lucidity if it hopes to avoid interfering with other doctrinal concepts that we should keep because they remain current. Once again, brilliant minds will have a chance to excel by reexamining those dogmas that will determine airpower’s role in future conflicts.

The latest military events in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places offer a great deal of material for study. Because the initial lessons garnered by researchers still entail ambiguous conclusions, one must therefore regard them with caution. Thus, many airmen will continue to foresee the axiomatic need to battle for air superiority without assessing the peculiarities of each military situation. I am convinced that academicians will face a difficult task trying to correct the mind-set of aerial traditionalists and explain the reason for those doctrinal changes, but they need to start as soon as possible to keep air forces from falling behind the times. Aviation has always been at the forefront of events, and there is no reason to modify that tradition.

Readers should note that I am not opposed to exploiting the benefits that air superiority confers in any military circumstance. On the contrary, I believe that, given the appropriate balance of military forces, strategists should prioritize applications of offensive airpower to paralyze, neutralize, or destroy physical targets that will contribute to the attainment of military ends and strategic goals. Nevertheless, the choice between conducting an initial air superiority campaign and directly exploiting a reasonable preexisting ability to reach strategic targets will depend on careful examination of intelligence data. Desert Storm showed that nothing prevents the achievement of local air superiority from becoming an integral piece of the strategic campaign, but success or failure may well be determined by the quality of intelligence assessments. The practical way to achieve success will depend on each situation and the nature of friendly and opposing forces, which will determine the kind of operations carried out and their timelines.

The Military Air Problem in
 Second-Level Countries

Theoretically, when one plans an air campaign, the first step would entail determining what one should do to achieve the assigned mission and to analyze the type, quality, and amount of opposition confronted. Properly comparing and weighing all the opposing factors will suggest likely courses of action that should bring about the desired outcome. But it will be no simple task to build such a plan and execute it with efficient operations when the campaign begins. Before developing a plan, we will have to analyze the enemy’s capabilities, but we cannot count on having intelligence data as complete and updated as we might like. Therefore, we would base that step on examining the best available estimates of the opponent’s defensive capabilities and figuring out the most appropriate strike procedures.

The air assets of less-developed countries are generally small in number and not very sophisticated. Their combat aviation typically consists of a few dozen multirole aircraft outfitted with vintage technologies. Suppliers like to keep other countries below their own national capabilities, avoid arms races, and maintain a safe regional military balance. This means that neighboring countries will not have to confront unacceptable risks. Less-developed countries will be able to organize only incomplete air defenses characterized by gaps in radar coverage, a situation not conducive to efficient responses to incoming air strikes. This problem will work to the advantage of an -enemy capable of achieving tactical surprise and may even allow multiple air attacks against key targets.

One must base any plan for air strikes inside hostile territory on current, accurate information. In small countries, air assets and weaponry are scarce; replacing them is difficult; substituting for them is costly; and trained crews are a luxury because training is limited. Therefore, one must plan every strike operation carefully to ensure the recovery of air assets, which such countries need for subsequent operations.

Success will most likely depend on inexpensive subsonic aircraft. At a minimum, a reliable aircraft should include a navigation and fire-control system, global positioning system, radar warning system, defense against surface-to-air missiles, and multifunction radar. Furthermore, it should carry approximately two tons of PGMs and a couple of self-defense air--interceptor missiles.

The availability of standoff munitions would greatly increase the threat posed by intruding aircraft. Air refueling—another desirable feature—would not be essential if the aircraft’s combat radius were on the order of 1,000 kilo-meters. The aircraft would need to execute a high-low-high flight profile to evade enemy air defenses, although such a profile would entail high fuel consumption.

This short list of requirements will not fulfill every conceivable need planners may imagine, but it does offer useful guidelines. Because of the low number of combat aircraft in small air forces, one should plan each operation to almost guarantee that every aircraft successfully reaches and strikes its target. In these circumstances, it would be imprudent and unnecessary to commit country A’s air force to a dedicated, preliminary air superiority campaign because country B would be in the same air superiority condition as A. Therefore, why battle to gain a condition that one can already exploit?

Country A’s aircraft would have a high probability of reaching their designated targets without country B having the ability to stop the attack. Without any previous struggle for air superiority, country A’s air staff might use its creativity to devise clever fragmentary orders to help its planes penetrate and neutralize the risk posed by country B’s air defenses. A similar thought will occur to country B’s air staff. What kinds of defense will country A use to counter any attack on its vital centers? Certainly their defenses will not exceed what country B has. Therefore, why should we believe that B will risk its meager resources to fight a meaningless air superiority battle?

We now turn to a clearer example. The air superiority situation faced in a notional confrontation between two great powers (countries C and D) would bear little resemblance to the one described for small countries like A and B. In a clash between large countries, the need for air superiority would arise with stark urgency. Each air force would probably have sufficient power to prevent the other from flying over its territory with impunity—a situation that might call for a preliminary air superiority campaign. However, for countries A and B, mutual freedom of action in the air would result from mutual weakness. Therefore, planners in countries A and B would have to devote a major effort to orchestrating clever penetrations of enemy airspace, casting aside the theory and doctrine learned from major air forces. They will simply need to apply their own methods, tailored to the reality of their resource-constrained situation.

Now I hope that my thoughts will become clearer when readers note that I do not reject a useful historical concept out of hand but argue that one should interpret it flexibly. This is why I urge an analysis free of any preconceived notions as a first step in the study of each conflict. Surely this method will help us understand how to employ air forces in second-level countries.

Other Realities

The use of doctrines designed for large-scale military operations will cause serious distortions if applied to countries like A and B due to the enormous gap in military potential. But some militaries from weak states express an inexplicable fascination with wars involving major powers. They aspire to imitate or even surpass the victorious forces of major powers, sometimes without assessing the conditions under which they would employ such forces. At first they begin to feel like the fictional partners of a country that has managed to crush the resistance of another nation barely three or four weeks after launching an aerial blitzkrieg that destroyed 85 percent of that country’s strategic targets, including its aviation.

Although they are not major players, they enthusiastically share the victory and allow the doctrine that godfathered the resounding triumph to mesmerize them. They naïvely ignore the fact that powerful states fight in ways that correspond to their material capabilities but that minor states lag far behind in those capabilities. Therefore, smaller countries cannot have the same doctrine as powerful ones. But this does not mean that we discard everything powerful nations do or think. Every lesson taught in the major leagues of warfare deserves respect, evaluation, and adaptation to the minor leagues, where second-level professionals receive their education. Airmen from small countries should not seek a master’s degree when they attend a high school (from the equipment standpoint).

As if there were not enough problems to solve, emerging strategic scenarios suggest the need for another review of current doctrine. The conventional twentieth-century wars that involved airpower, ranging from World War I to Kosovo, are being replaced by an assortment of clashes that more closely resemble persistent, dangerous domestic quarrels than traditional military confrontations. Nevertheless, those outbreaks have an unmistakable virulence derived from sociopolitical and economic issues almost as disturbing as the issues that provoked previous wars since they prompt the military involvement of major powers through multinational institutions and coalitions.

In such wars, the notion that one must always fight for air superiority constitutes only one dogma among many that are open to challenge. The whole theory and doctrine of conventional warfare become destabilized because the confrontation often occurs between a state and a nonstate actor, as in Chechnya, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where the opponents against whom we might fight for air superiority lack air assets. Very seldom do these contenders own military air resources, even if they have a handful of vintage fighters or light civilian aircraft. In the latter case, the users will try to hide behind international civil-aviation regulations, even if they perform essentially military aerial missions.

In addition, one will not always encounter clearly defined enemy territories against which to send fighter-bombers to destroy strategic targets. Hostile areas often overlap areas that should legally remain under government control. Furthermore, violent outbreaks frequently occur in urban areas, where detecting enemy forces is very complicated and where strike aircraft cannot intervene without risking friendly casualties as well as undesired political effects.⁶

Under such strange circumstances, will air staffs still need to consider how to gain freedom of action in the air? A look at recent history suggests a decrease in that requirement. Illegal factions may organize a basic antiaircraft defense based on small-caliber automatic weapons and man-portable air defense systems that will prove lethal against low-flying planes. That sort of defense can shoot down aircraft because most of the fixed-wing and rotary-wing flights traverse open areas where the enemy usually finds refuge from aerial incursions. Despite their sophisticated protection, the vulnerability of helicopters increases substantially when they have to operate in urban areas.

In guerrilla-occupied locations, one can omit fighting for air superiority due to lack of need—not because one questions the concept. When the state finds itself under attack by ground-based forces following the rules of guerrilla warfare, the air force has full control of the air without having previously engaged in combat. This premise does not exclude the risk posed by antiaircraft weapons the enemy might have; neither does it justify SEAD operations due to the small number and fleeting nature of very small mobile targets. Guerrilla-force air defenses do not offer meaningful opposition and do not prevent the government from exploiting air superiority. On the other hand, the air staff has to plan to support ground forces responsible for performing important operations. In such scenarios, special forces supported as needed by the other services will fight the battle on the ground.

Does this mean that by not having an opponent in the air, the air force will no longer have a main role in the battle? Absence of a battle for air superiority does not deny the valuable services aviation can provide. This force has much to offer in terms of offensive reconnaissance, tactical air transport, airborne command and control, psychological operations, close air support, combat search and rescue, and medical evacuation.

Neither can we overlook the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for reconnaissance and long-range attack of surface targets. The US Congress has foreseen the participation of these vehicles in future US national defense strategy. Indeed, in the defense appropriation for fiscal year 2001, it called for the Department of Defense to “aggressively pursue and field remotely controlled combat systems with this goal: within 10 years one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft will be unmanned.” To begin implementing that goal, Congress appropriated funding for the development of both UAVs and unmanned combat aerial vehicles.⁷

Second-level states with limited defense resources are far from incorporating advanced equipment into their arsenals, except for the more modest types. Once those new offensive UAV systems attain operational status in the Northern Hemisphere, they will revolutionize airpower doctrine. Two examples foreshadow the near future. Northrop Grumman’s RQ-4A Global Hawk UAV has flown nonstop between the United States and Australia. It can fly as fast as 340 knots, reach altitudes up to 65,000 feet, and remain airborne as long as 35 hours.⁸ The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin in the United States and Dassault Aviation in France are testing other UAVs. Those projects lead us to believe that soon we will have stealth UAV platforms that will reach their targets without having to wait for a successful campaign to establish air superiority.

Even though less-wealthy states will have to continue thinking for many years in terms of “historical” air operations due to their old-fashioned air resources, this does not mean that they must totally abandon their hopes of having some new technologies. Financial constraints can serve as an incentive to prompt national research consistent with domestic budgets. For example, the Argentinean organization CITEFA (Armed Forces Scientific and Technical Research Institute) is slowly developing a rotary-wing remotely piloted vehicle that might make for an interesting beginning.⁹

In “nonconventional” theaters of operations, we may see an operational environment that suggests the employment of few forces in reduced areas that lack target systems but have small, relatively valuable individual targets. But make no mistake. The change that we envision does not mean that we no longer need to keep and exploit air superiority. Though the new military environment differs from previous ones, we must retain the capability to wage conventional war as a backup option, which is not the same as saying that such wars will never happen.

Advice for Today’s Airmen

To state that one never needs to battle for air superiority might raise angry accusations of betraying the doctrine that enabled the glory of airpower. But in a less-heated debate, the most stubborn orthodoxies will gradually give way in the face of evidence based on convincing experiences. Examples and exercises incorporating nonconventional factors will contribute to this outcome.

Open-minded, progressive strategists will more than likely gain the admiration and respect of researchers and scholars. It is imperative not to fall behind when updating doctrine, but this is not the first time that a need for change has disrupted the aeronautical family. Members of the aeronautical community should remember that aviation displays a strong predisposition to produce frequent, surprising events. Suffice it to recall that human-kind required only 66 years to go from flying the first heavier-than-air craft to visiting the moon.

What was the main virtue of the prophets who accurately foresaw airpower’s potential? They perceived how airpower might achieve decisive results in future wars, basing their ideas on reasoning and intuition rather than scientific formulations. That manner of acting need not change although the circumstances, of course, may differ from those of the “good old days.” Once again we are trying to see beyond what modern air forces can do if they have reliable information and a degree of detail greater than that available in the early days of aviation. The important point is that we face substantial changes in the nature of armed conflicts. Therefore, we must demonstrate sound reasoning and understanding because the coming changes will push us to correct airpower theory without undermining its essence.

That, then, is the summary of my argument, in which I underline the need to perform a full analysis of the situation before deciding if we need to battle for air superiority. Professionals do not undertake efforts that will yield no profits yet will consume costly, scarce air assets. This places strong and weak countries alike at risk. The difference lies in the fact that the former can replace their losses with the aid of their industries and national finances. Mistakes have more serious consequences for weak countries since by squandering their air assets in unnecessary air superiority endeavors, they detract from other operations that also require airpower.

My ideas do not oppose the destruction of enemy aircraft, air bases, and supplies; rather, they diverge slightly from prevailing beliefs about the need to struggle for air superiority. This last decision entails a dedicated initial air superiority campaign because the enemy’s aviation can curtail our own aerial freedom of action to strike key targets. On the other hand, we should omit an air superiority campaign when it serves merely to destroy enemy air assets for purely dogmatic reasons.

When the situation demands a fight for air superiority, we will have to devise plans for SEAD and the destruction of enemy air units in the air and on the ground. If no reason exists for an air superiority fight, we should carry out attacks against enemy air forces in parallel with strikes against other targets to strengthen the air freedom of action that we already possess. Therefore, planners have to think coolly without allowing objections from conservatives to intimidate them. A methodical analysis of the situation will reveal the best and most acceptable courses of action. To guarantee this goal, we will need to have a well-informed, open-minded intelligence service. An outdated, incomplete intelligence database will lead to faulty operations. In the air-and-space arena, such carelessness is very costly.

That is why the decision of whether or not to battle for air superiority is a heavy responsibility that one can neither delegate nor blindly adopt as if it were an inflexible requirement. In the air staff, the operations staff has to work very closely with the intelligence staff before proposing courses of action. It is very important that the operations staff have a clear under-standing of the need to plan for or omit an initial battle for air-and-space control. Fighting for air superiority as an ultimate goal does not make sense if we do not intend to exploit it.

Air superiority is a favorable condition that one can create directly or exploit in order to achieve subsequent strategic results. Again, I am not against that thought, but I am convinced that one must never waste scarce air resources by carrying out unnecessary operations. If country A can immediately strike the heart of its enemy, country B, with adequate aerial freedom of action, why get involved in an air superiority struggle? If country B is just as vulnerable to air attack as country A, it will have a weak defense of its own vital targets and will not present a strong defense. Presumably, A will satisfactorily accomplish its mission without undertaking redundant operations.

Incorporating this simple concept into doctrine and an air staff’s routine would mark another step in the efficient employment of air assets since it would produce a better cost-profit ratio. In small air forces, a single fighter is probably tantamount to an entire air unit of a major air force, and this appraisal justifies its use against the most profitable targets. The initial cost of such an aircraft does not solely represent its military value. Second-level countries would have only a remote chance of replacing it during a war because they will likely face arms embargoes imposed by major countries.

Epilogue

I do not know if these arguments will achieve my aim—to open a debate on these doctrinal matters. If I can persuade readers to discuss the issue, I shall be happy even if they disagree with me. I am far from demanding full concurrence. Rather, I am trying to shake the dust from concepts that conformists have already filed in the attic of aviation history. There are too many variations in human conflicts for us to thoughtlessly accept the rules of engagement and doctrines that worked in past wars.

In spite of a substantial gap between small air forces and those of first-level powers, the former do not have to rely exclusively on doctrine passed on or suggested to them from abroad. For a long time, small air forces have observed events in far-flung countries and have yielded to the temptation to adopt the experiences of others, believing that by imitating them they would not need to develop their own doctrines. I acknowledge the beneficial effects of that habit, but it also has led to costly, uncorrected mistakes. Nevertheless, we still have time to change the tendency to believe that what is imported is perfect while what is homemade lacks quality.

Small air forces have to adapt themselves to their own environments and situations, taking advantage of what is useful and setting aside what is not. We have to discover our own cosmos and learn how to operate within it, optimizing what is available and usable. We must not allow ourselves to be mesmerized by prodigious mirages generously displayed by advanced states. Instead, we propose addressing our outlook to regional issues—the ones that we actually need to solve.

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Notes

1. See Earl H. Tilford Jr., Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1991).

2. Tom Clancy with Chuck Horner, Every Man a Tiger (New York: Putnam, 1999), 274–75.

3. Ibid., 274.

4. See Comodoro Rubén Oscar Moro, Historia del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur (La Guerra Inaudita II) (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Air War School, August 1997).

5. Ibid., 4.

6. See Comodoro José C. D’Odorico, “La Guerra No Convencional” [Nonconventional Warfare] (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2003).

7. National Defense Appropriation Act of 2001, Senate -Report 106-292, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/ 2000_rpt/sr292.htm.

8. “RQ-4 Global Hawk—High Altitude, Long Endurance, Unmanned Aerial Reconnaissance System,” fact sheet, Northrup Grumman Integrated Systems, http://www.is. northropgrumman.com/new_fact_sheets/Northrop/Digital_press_kit/AFA/docs/global_hawk_fact_sheet.doc.

9. CITEFA is an organization headquartered close to Buenos Aires, Argentina. It is the civil-military center that evaluates and develops projects of interest to the Argentine armed forces. See J. C. D’Odorico, Revista Aérea (New York: Strato Publishing Co., 2001).

Contributor

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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