DISTRIBUTION A:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Document created: 1 December 04
Air & Space Power Journal - Winter 2004

Doctrine NOTAM

US forces fighting in the peacemaking and peacekeeping operations of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have done so alongside the forces of allied and coalition countries. In fact, most recent American military operations have involved an ally or coalition partner. Some prominent examples include World Wars I and II; the Vietnam War; and Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. The current version of Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multi-national Operations, 5 April 2000—based on our corporate knowledge, experience, and lessons learned—provides the doctrine our commanders use as a starting point to plan and execute current and future combined operations. One of the keystone-level or above-the-line publications, JP 3-16 is intended for use by combatant, subunified, and joint task force commanders; service chiefs; and Joint Staff directors. As part of the third tier of the operational series in the joint-publication hierarchy, it delineates interfaces with allies and serves as a launching point into multinational operations. Its 106 pages include four chapters that provide joint doctrine for participation in multinational operations, describing our best current (and partially futuristic) ideas on the art of war. Airmen should quickly recognize the similarity between their own Air Force doctrine and its description of multinational air operations:

Air operations gain and maintain control of the air and exploit its use to achieve the [multi-national force commander’s] objectives. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of all available forces. Decentralized execution is essential to generate the tempo of operations required and to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat. (ix, italics added)

A nation involving itself in a coalition (an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action) or an alliance (a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives) must adhere to certain fundamentals, a commitment that requires close coordination with the other member nations to ensure that they operate in the most efficient manner. Conducting multinational operations at the highest levels of efficiency requires that the different nations fully use their strengths but minimize their weaknesses. Through coordination, they can attain this high level of performance across the spectrum of multinational operations, from all-out war to operations short of war.

Organizations comprised of different elements, such as coalitions and alliances, must have a command structure that takes into account differences in doctrine, types of equipment, training philosophies, and customs. It is vital, therefore, to establish a liaison to lessen the confusion associated with these differences. Commanders at all levels in the multinational force must be sensitive to such variations in order to command effectively; they must also be knowledgeable of the overall mission of the coalition or alliance, its associated risks, and the rules of engagement (ROE). Other critical concerns of the commander include operational control, foreign operational control, tactical control, support, and the chain of command.

Published 17 months before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, JP 3-16 proved useful to US commanders when their forces joined with militaries of several countries to plan, coordinate, and execute operations on various targets in response to those strikes. The multinational commanders of combined operations take political, military, and economic factors into consideration when conducting their mission analysis and assigning tasks. The many other factors they need to assess include intelligence and information gathering, host-nation support, and language and cultural barriers that could easily confuse the overall planning. When drafting the ROEs, they also must consider the impact of international law and the laws of armed conflict. In conflicts involving coalitions and alliances, such as Iraqi Freedom, each nation must enforce the discipline of its own forces to adhere to the ROEs because, particularly in these conflicts, the entire world watches and takes note if those forces fail to act in a certain proper and prescribed way.

No current plans exist to update JP 3-16. However, an associated document—JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations—appeared on 25 September 2002. That document and, when appropriate, other NATO publications provide logistic guidance to multinational commanders and their staffs. Never-theless, like a multinational coalition or alliance, multinational doctrine is very situational in nature. For that reason, beyond the broad overview and structure shown in JP 3-16, hard-and-fast doctrine can prove problematic to develop, awkward to use, and difficult to maintain as the world situation changes.

With respect to this special edition of Air and Space Power Journal and RAF Air Power Review, JP 3-16, appendix B, makes reference to several specific examples of multinational operations involving both countries:

• In the early 1900s, British and American forces fought together in the Boxer Rebellion, World War I, and in the Bolshevik Revolution.

• During World War II, US forces found themselves working closely with the British, both in a commanding role and in a subordinate position to British commanders. That coalition was decisive in defeating the Axis powers, thus reinforcing the United States’ continuing desire for a coalition approach to warfare.

• During Desert Storm, an air commander for the British forces and a US Air Force commander (US Central Command Air Forces) were heavily involved in planning air activity at the operational level.

Both the United States and the United Kingdom are extremely active in standardization with other allies and friendly nations, in order to achieve the highest cooperation among their militaries. They are also working towards the most efficient levels of research and development of resources to help nations get the most out of their militaries. Both countries are members of NATO’s standardization forums; the five-nation Air Standardization Coordinating Committee; and the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Standardization Program.

The bottom line is that JP 3-16 contains a wealth of information for our commanders about how US forces should interface with allied and coalition forces. Although written for more senior commanders, it can be adapted and used effectively by leaders at lower levels to guide operational- and tactical-level interactions and operations. By using JP 3-16 judiciously, we can anticipate the enemy’s plan and beat him at his own game. We can keep peace in the world and help persuade rogue nations to change their modus operandi, as well as their worldview.

Joint Publication 3-16. Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 5 April 2000.
Joint Publication 4-08. Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations, 25 September 2002.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

[ Back Issues | Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor ]