Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare

Editorial Abstract: The possibility of warfare in space not only reshapes the traditional view of conflict, but also challenges national leaders and military commanders. Outlining the moral and ethical dimension of determining the right course of action in space, the authors consider the consequences of moral and ethical choices in the context of the appropriate and measured development of certain space weapons.

In combat today, United States military commanders face many difficult moral and ethical decisions. The nation has entrusted them with her most precious resource—her sons and daughters—to fulfill their obligation to protect and defend her vital interests. Commanders’ decisions have life-and-death consequences for Americans, allies, enemy forces, and, unfortunately, sometimes noncombatants. Without a doubt, these decisions are among the most difficult any human being could ever face.

The potential for warfare in space adds a new dimension to our traditional view of war and further challenges national leaders and military commanders. The debate over weapons in space continues to be vigorous and controversial; both sides are entrenched in their own positions, asserting that only their judgements are buttressed by “moral” and correct arguments. The purpose of this article is to highlight the moral and ethical challenges that surround space warfare in a way that helps clarify the issues for all who must examine these choices and make appropriate decisions in future combat situations. Ethics and morality issues are often not clear-cut, and future decision makers must be open to the possibility that the greater good—a means to measure the consequences of moral and ethical choices—may be served through an appropriate and measured development of certain space weapons.

The Dichotomy: Who is Right?

It would be a disaster for us to put weapons in space of any kind under any circumstances. It only invites other countries to do the same thing.

—Senator Tom Daschle, 2001

We know from history that every medium—air, land and sea—has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different.

—Report of the Commission to Assess
United States National Security
Space Management and
Organization, 2001

It is essential to first define the term space weapon and the nature of space warfare; doing so will clarify this discussion, since the number of definitions for space weapons is nearly as infinite as space itself. Many authors have defined the term using slightly different criteria. In general, the most significant difference between these definitions reflects the weapon’s basing mode; specifically, must the weapon be based in space to be a space weapon? If the answer is yes, then ground-based lasers or ground-based antisatellite (ASAT) weapons would not be considered space weapons. This article will, however, use a more inclusive definition.

Wulf von Kries, a member of the German Space Agency, addressed the difficult topic of defining space weapons at a Berlin conference in June 2002. He noted that “nothing can, might, and will stop the routine use of space for military activities.” Since the existing legal framework dates from and uses the body of knowledge that existed over 40 years ago, he suggested that “the discussion on space weapons should not be limited to deployment in space but include those weapons on Earth that can be directed into space.”¹ This article will follow his suggestion and use a broader definition of a space weapon, which is (1) a ground-based or space-based weapon that can attack and negate the capability of space systems on orbit or (2) a weapon based in space that can attack targets on the earth.²

The purpose for employing space weapons in space warfare is to achieve space superiority and, along with air and surface capabilities, establish a battlespace in which we can satisfy our national security objectives. Today, space capabilities are integral to the way our nation fights wars, and their enhancement of air and surface capabilities has given our nation’s military tremendous advantages in recent conflicts.

Joint pubs define space superiority as “the degree of dominance in space of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.”³ The Air Force Glossary adds that space superiority is the “degree of control necessary to employ, maneuver, and engage space forces while denying the same capability to an adversary.”⁴ Although neither of these space superiority definitions requires the development or deployment of space weapons, the ideas of space sanctuary and weaponization need further exploration.

Numerous think tanks, educational institutions, and individuals have put a great amount of thought and effort into defining the debate between space sanctuary and weaponization. In the winter 1998 issue of Airpower Journal, Lt Col Bruce DeBlois published an article that has become a lightning rod for debate on both sides of the issue. His article, “Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy,” argued that it was in the best interest of the United States to pursue a sanctuary strategy and that a strategy of weaponization was flawed in a number of ways. He outlined four strategy-implementation elements that he felt would best position the United States for dealing with the future challenges in space. Specifically, DeBlois argued that the United States should (1) pursue intense diplomatic efforts to develop treaties and agreements to preserve the sanctuary of space, (2) develop strategic alternatives to our current force structure to reduce our dependence on a relatively small number of critical space systems that inherently provide a vulnerability, (3) develop passive hide-and-seek protective measures to protect our critical space assets, and (4) maintain the technical ability to develop and deploy space weapons should the need arise, preferably beginning with “the lesser provocative earth-to-space weapons.”⁵

The Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, chaired by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, voiced a different view when it summarized America’s interests in space. Those interests are to (1) promote the peaceful use of space, (2) use the nation’s potential in space to support US domestic, economic, diplomatic, and national security objectives, and (3) develop and deploy the means to deter and defend against hostile acts directed at US space assets and against the hostile use of space toward American interests.⁶ This succinct statement is also in line with the 1996 National Space Policy developed under the Clinton administration and continued into the current Bush administration.⁷ This statement of policy clearly allows for the development of the space weapons necessary to meet those objectives—with no limitation on basing modes. In practical application, however, the United States has not aggressively developed a significant space weapon capability.⁸

One of the more overused statements—bordering on myth—in discussions of the current state of military space is that space has been militarized but not yet weaponized. Proponents of this argument contend that today’s military space force structure is postured to provide force enhancement effects on the battlefield; space has no weapons that directly impact targets—either in space or in the terrestrial environment.

The Taliban and Iraqi Republican Guard forces, who were on the receiving end of global positioning system (GPS)–guided weapons, likely have a different impression. Many of the targets attacked by today’s Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines are targeted using overhead space systems commanded through the use of space connectivity and guided by precision, space-based navigation systems. Space systems are an essential element of our current intelligence, command and control, and weapon systems inventory. This fundamental nature of modern warfare is a critical element driving the moral and ethical decisions regarding “space weapons.”

Although modern capabilities have developed over the past 50 years in a de facto sanctuary environment, the fundamental nature of space in modern warfare has not been lost on the sanctuary proponents like Bruce Gagnon, head of the Global Network against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space:

This is where conflicting principles of the moral and ethical beliefs held by various groups within our nation begin to create a dilemma. Many believe that preserving space as a sanctuary from weapons is in the United States’s and the world’s best interests. If, as President Bush said earlier this year, the United States desires to work with international partners—returning to the moon and then proceeding on to Mars—then it may truly be in America’s national interest to preserve the sanctuary. A contrary argument is based upon the US military’s reliance on space to achieve an asymmetric advantage, which increases its effectiveness and reduces its own casualties but creates the need for space superiority. Hon. James Schlesinger, former secretary of defense and secretary of energy, states that “we are dependent on public support to sustain an ambitious foreign policy. That public support is, in turn, dependent upon very low, if not zero, casualties, and a high degree, a very high degree, of effectiveness of our forces, an exemplary display of those conventional forces. And that, in turn, is dependent on space.”¹⁰ The conflict between moral and ethical principles revolves around whether, on the one hand, space should be held as a sanctuary from weapons or, on the other, whether our nation has a moral duty to furnish those it asks to go in harm’s way with the tools that will increase their effectiveness and reduce their casualties. Would the United States be willing to let its men and women in uniform fight in the future without that asymmetric advantage? Or, as a nation, do we believe that military space capabilities should be protected and developed further, expanding the asymmetric advantage that our nation’s fighting forces currently enjoy?

One example of asymmetric advantage can be found in a quick examination of the US special operations forces (SOF)—the troops that “own the night.” Through high levels of training in the application of night vision and other technologies, these forces have developed a capability that gives them enormous tactical advantage in the field. However, this advantage is increasingly being challenged by the sale of low-cost night vision devices that are available on the commercial market. Is this bad? Is it necessary for America to take every opportunity to apply technology to gain and maintain a battlefield advantage over potential adversaries? Or are there circumstances where it would be in the best interests of the United States not to pursue such an advantage?

Some might argue that vast advantages in capabilities make it easier to engage in an “electronic stay-at-home war,” neither suffering combat losses nor sharing sacrifice. A more level playing field, one that puts American forces at greater risk, might make the United States think twice before engaging in hostilities and having to pay that terrible price. It has been argued that shared sacrifice and the loss of untold lives on both sides of a conflict make for an easier peace at the cessation of hostilities. However, as evidenced by the conflicts of the twentieth century, shared sacrifice and loss have not made people more averse to war and have not made the world a “kinder, gentler” place. A lasting peace has been, and remains, elusive.

The United States has not always pursued an asymmetric advantage. Although America recently celebrated the centennial of the Wright brothers’ first flight, it should be remembered that just 15 years after that American first, the air forces of every other major nation that participated in the First World War were numerically and technically superior.¹¹ In 1904 an American, Benjamin Holt, implemented the first use of Caterpillar tracks; his application was for farm machinery, but it was the British who applied his innovation to armored vehicles.¹² Both the airplane and the tank eventually helped break the stalemate and mass slaughter of trench warfare—few have questioned the morality and ethics of incorporating these new technologies.

On the other hand, the First World War also saw the first widespread use of chemical weapons. International abhorrence to their indiscriminate nature later resulted in a ban on their use—a repudiation that, with a few notable exceptions, has been observed by the international community ever since.¹³ Although chemical weapons were a new technology, they did not lead to a significant advantage for either side. Their employment relied on favorable atmospheric conditions for success, an element over which neither side had any control. A global ban on the use of chemical weapons has not deprived any country of a significant advantage with respect to its adversaries.

There have been numerous proposals at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament to expand the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to ban all types of space weapons.¹⁴ But space is different. For all the goodwill that might result from an agreement to ban weapons in space, the United States would be disproportionately affected by the loss of a key asymmetric advantage.

The bottom-line issue that remains for our nation’s leadership is, Should America, when it calls its sons and daughters to arms, ensure that they have every advantage in the field so that they may prevail? From Greek fire to the longbow, technological advantages have not stayed home or been unilaterally set aside when armies have gone to battle. Should we agree to limit ourselves to a “fair” fight? Losing space superiority could put our nation on a level playing field with our adversaries. This diminished capability can also have consequences beyond the combatants involved. Even after leveling the playing field and after thinking twice, there will still be situations where our national interests require that we enter into combat. Without space-based, war-making capabilities—intelligence gathering, providing improved situational awareness, networking forces using secure space communications capabilities, and enabling precision-guided munitions (PGM) to enhance fire superiority—Baghdad today might resemble Grozny. While the objective of capturing both cities was the same, technology and overwhelming advantage spared the noncombatants and structures of Baghdad the massive casualty tolls and destruction that were seen in Chechnya.

Engaging an enemy in conflict and contesting each other’s use of space is new in modern warfare. In fact, the enemy’s use of space in the recent conflicts of Operation Allied Force (OAF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has presented us with a direct challenge to our space superiority. There are space-warfare lessons that can be learned from dealing with the challenges of those engagements.

Operation Allied Force. The Serbs, under President Slobodan Milosevic, used satellite television to provide command and control, among other means, to transmit propaganda. Col Konrad Freytag, NATO spokesman, reported on 23 April 1999 to the world press that “last night, NATO continued to disrupt the national command network and to degrade the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s propaganda apparatus; our forces struck at the regime leadership’s ability to transmit their version of the news and to transmit their instructions to the troops in the field prosecuting their campaign of repression and destruction in Kosovo. . . . The building also housed a large multipurpose communications satellite antenna dish.”¹⁵ News reports from three days before had stated that “Mount Zlatibor, a ski resort 120 miles south of Belgrade, was hit by eight explosions. . . . Hilltops in Yugoslavia are often sites for communications links. The news agency also said NATO had fired four missiles at a satellite ground station in Prilike near Ivanjica.”¹⁶

NATO military planners could not know if civilians would be in the target area when the Ivanjica satellite ground station was attacked; therefore it is not clear if, or how many, civilian casualties occurred, but the possibility certainly existed. Although arguments about whether this was a legitimate target continue to this day, NATO attacked this target with the best precision weapons available, ensuring the target was eliminated while minimizing, but not eliminating, collateral damage.¹⁷

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Satellite communications were again a target for allied forces during OIF, and the enemy, for the first time, attempted to employ GPS jammers to deny coalition forces the use of GPS-enabled precision weapons. The methods for countering each of these threats provide interesting lessons.

One of the coalition’s countersatellite communications objectives in Iraq was to get the Iraqi state-run television off the air to keep Saddam Hussein from communicating instructions to his forces and providing propaganda to the world. The Washington Times reported the following:

The mission was similar to the one against Ivanjica during OAF, but different methods were chosen, reflecting a desire to minimize collateral damage. The effect in Iraq, however, was not as complete as it had been in Serbia. The Iraqi regime had learned from OAF and built redundancy into all its communications, which included its satellites’ ground infrastructure. That made it much more difficult for allied forces to eliminate the ground segment of their space capability.

The Iraqis also understood that the PGMs that were using GPS guidance provided the allies with a big advantage; they attempted to jam the GPS signal, hoping to force allied airpower to use other weapons that would not be as effective. Their extremely crude attempts were easily identified and destroyed. As reported by Maj Gen Victor Renuart, USAF, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) director of operations at the time,

It is interesting to note that the Iraqis actually used, or at least tried to use, a space weapon (by the definition arrived at earlier in this article) against the US GPS system, attempting to deny the allies the use of their precise-navigation capabilities.

The method chosen to gain space superiority in recent conflicts has been a lethal attack on the enemy’s ground stations and/or ground systems. What will be our preferred method to establish our control of space in the next conflict? The answer to this question must include more than the perspective of just what is most effective. Leaders and planners must also consider the moral and ethical issues of asymmetric advantage and their effects on the idea of space sanctuary.

What kind of military response would allied commanders prefer? The traditional answer is to respond with lethal force against ground targets in a way that eliminates an enemy’s access to space and preserves the sanctuary of space. However, this is fraught with many problems, as evidenced in the previous examples.

First, attacking the ground system will not guarantee the desired effect on the battlefield. Today, before a conflict begins, enemies can implement redundancy into their infrastructure, making it difficult to destroy the network’s ability to function; the Iraqis built in infrastructure redundancy and preserved access to their satellite communication network during OIF. Although coalition forces identified and destroyed, with little collateral damage, what they believed to be the Iraqi satellite system’s critical antenna, the Iraqis stayed on the air; Saddam Hussein continued to communicate propaganda to the world and directions to his army, putting our forces at risk. Another risk was illustrated by the OAF example previously discussed in this article: no matter how good the intelligence and how careful the military planning, the employment of lethal force runs the risk of inflicting collateral damage and causing noncombatant civilian casualties. The political fallout from those casualties—lost domestic support, lost international support, split coalitions, legal complaints, and so forth—may be more damaging than the possible gains that would accrue from a successful attack.

That attack on the satellite ground station near Ivanjica is, in fact, one of a number of events cited in a war-crimes complaint filed with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at The Hague. That complaint was filed by a group of lawyers from several countries; half of them are residents of Canada while others, one each, live in Argentina, France, Nicaragua, Spain, and the United States. It targets the political leaders of the NATO countries along with their military commanders and is based on the additional protocols to the Geneva Convention that are concerned with the protection of civilian populations.²⁰ Those protocols prohibit “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”²¹ Although it is unlikely that anything will come of this complaint, the fact that an attack on a satellite ground station was included in a “war crime” complaint emphasizes the need to limit collateral damage, even when attacking targets of this kind. The military commanders that were involved in OAF have stated in discussions that they would have preferred to have eliminated that satellite ground station’s capability without using traditional blast and fragmentation weapons—if a capability had been available that would have given them as high or higher a probability of succeeding. Although not available to commanders during OAF in 1999, in 2004 the Air Force will begin to test and evaluate a new capability for subsequent operational use—the Counter Communication System (CCS).

The CCS is a ground-based deployable system designed to deny a potential enemy the use of a satellite communications system with effects employing temporary and reversible methods. It will be classified as a space weapon, using the same definition that was applied to the Iraqi GPS jammer; however, it will likely be much more effective.

When the CCS becomes part of the operational inventory, a military commander will be able to consider both lethal and nonlethal methods for accomplishing the same effect. However, since the CCS will have some operational limitations and does not have a guarantee for mission success, that decision will not be as straightforward as it might have first appeared. Depending on the circumstances, commanders may once again be forced to resort to lethal options to accomplish the mission. The CCS also opens the theoretical possibility for further space-control options, which include different basing modes that will address newer threats and mitigate operational limitations.

Unfortunately, the events of the last few years clearly demonstrate that war and conflict will be with us for some time. The current American way of war is heavily dependent on controlling space and establishing space superiority. In seeking a moral and ethical high ground, we could assert that our nation should needlessly risk neither the lives of its sons and daughters nor the lives of noncombatants. We have seen how an asymmetric space advantage improves our effectiveness, reduces our casualties, and helps us satisfy the intent of the Geneva Convention’s principle of proportionality by precisely targeting and guiding weapons, thereby avoiding most collateral noncombatant casualties. In light of these observations, can this nation, as Colonel DeBlois has suggested, embrace a national security strategy that maintains space as a sanctuary free of weapons?

That question will be addressed using Colonel DeBlois’s four elements of a space sanctuary strategy as a framework:

Conclusion

Clearly, the world would be a much better place if the causes of war could be abolished. War is a nasty business, and leaders should always choose it as a last resort. Sadly, however, various world problems seem to arise on a fairly regular basis that only the use of military force can solve. We must be successful when we choose to use military force, and our nation has made space essential to that success. Space superiority is now critical to the American way of war, but the United States should proceed very carefully down any path to develop space weapons. America clearly has a desire to continue its exploration of space for peaceful purposes. An international approach that preserves the sanctuary as much as possible would facilitate the nation’s efforts to return to the moon and proceed on to Mars. Nevertheless, our leaders must balance sanctuary considerations with the critical contribution that the control of space makes to the security of the United States and the effectiveness of our economic, diplomatic, and military elements of national power when threatened by adversaries around the world.

A national debate is needed to examine the merits and trade-offs between our various objectives: winning the nation’s wars with the fewest casualties, fighting those wars with the greatest possible effectiveness, following a Geneva Convention principle of proportionality that helps protect noncombatants, supporting space as a sanctuary free of weapons, and fielding and using space weapons. That debate will influence future decisions such as developing capabilities like the CCS, answering the question about whether or not our military commanders, charged with removing an enemy’s space capability, should have a nonlethal means to accomplish that objective, even if that capability would be classified as a “space weapon.” Would it be better, more moral, for that commander to be limited to the use of air-deliverable lethal weapons, potentially causing many more noncombatant deaths? In many of today’s cases, the use of space weapons and systems provides a better moral and ethical choice for military commanders because those systems can potentially provide him or her with better options for fighting and winning the nation’s wars while reducing collateral damage and noncombatant deaths.

Will this one step necessarily lead to the employment of weapons based in space and space weapons with lethal capabilities? Not necessarily. The same moral and ethical arguments that have been discussed in this article can be used to help evaluate future requirements. If and when the United States moves weapons into space, the desired effects should once again be temporary and reversible, and space basing should be required only if ground basing cannot handle the threat. Upon resolution of the conflict, the “sanctuary” of space, or more appropriately the commons of space, can then be restored. Likewise, permanent lethal effects would be required only when terrestrially based solutions cannot effectively meet the needs of the military and the nation.

This article has outlined the moral and ethical challenges facing the country as it decides the right course of action in space. The weaponization of space does not necessarily mean crossing a “big, red line”; neither is it “immoral, illegal, and a bad mistake.” The appropriate, measured development and use of certain space weapons will allow the United States, in circumstances where the nation is forced into war, to conduct warfare in ways that increase combat effectiveness while at the same time limiting collateral damage here on Earth—a more moral and ethical decision.

1. Regina Hagen, “Space Weapons Ban—How Can It Be Achieved? Report on a Workshop Held in Berlin on June 10–11, 2002,” International Network of Engineers and Scientists against Proliferation (INESAP), Bulletin 20 (Proposals for a Space Weapons Ban), http://www. inesap.org/bulletin20/bul20art09.htm.

2. John E. Hyten, “A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space,” Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) Occasional Paper, April 2000, “Introduction,” http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage_docs/pubs_docs/ PDF_Files/Hyten%20OP%20Folder/dreamweaver/ contents/intro.html.

3. Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 9 August 2002, GL-6, http://www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf.

4. Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, Air Force Glossary, 26 February 2004, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/ Main.asp.

6. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, pursuant to Public Law 105-65 (Washington, DC: The [Space] Commission, 11 January 2001), vii, http://www.defense link.mil/pubs/space20010111.html.

7. National Science and Technology Council, “Fact Sheet, National Space Policy (Washington, DC: The White House, 19 September 1996), http://www.ostp.gov/ NSTC/html/fs/fs-5.html.

8. In recent decades the United States has pursued a few limited capabilities. During the 1980s the United States developed the F-15-launched antisatellite (ASAT) system, which delivered a kinetic energy interceptor into low Earth orbit. The Army developed, but never fielded, a kinetic energy ASAT in the 1990s. The Air Force is currently developing and fielding a Counter Communication System, which will use temporary and reversible effects to deny an adversary satellite communications. It is also using temporary and reversible effects in the development of its Counter Surveillance and Reconnaissance System, which will negate the enemy’s ability to perform those missions using satellite systems. It is scheduled for delivery in the latter part of this decade.

9. Leonard David, “Space Weapons for Earth Wars,” Space.com, 15 May 2002, http://www.space.com/business technology/technology/space_war_020515-1.html.

10. “Required Reading: Center Issues Summary of Roundtable Discussion on the U.S. Requirement for Space Dominance,” press release no. 98-P 16 (Washington, DC: Center for Security Policy, 23 January 1998), http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section= papers&code=98-P_16.

11. Richard P. Hallion, “America and the Air and Space Revolution: Past Perspectives and Present Challenges” (address, National Aeronautical Systems and Technology Conference, Dayton, OH, 13–15 May 2003), http://www.asme.org/gric/engineeringpolicy/Aviation/ HPNDIAAmer&Air&SpaceRevMay03DoD cleared.pdf.

12. Drew Bennet, “Green Fields Beyond,” Military Review 90, no. 1 (January–February 2000).

13. Julian Perry Robinson and Jozef Goldblat, “Chemical Warfare in the Iraq-Iran War,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Fact Sheet, May 1984, http:// projects.sipri.se/cbw/research/factsheet-1984.html.

14. Robert Evans, “China, Russia Call for a Ban on Space Weapons,” Reuters, 1 August 2003, http://www. abc.net.au/science/news/stories/s915183.htm.

15. Col Konrad Freytag and Jamie Shea, NATO briefing on Operation Allied Force, 23 April 1999, http://www.usembassy.it/file9904/alia/99042327.htm.

16. “Heavy Night of Bombing in Serbia,” Emergency.Com, Emergency Response and Research Institute (ERRI), Special Serbian Crisis Report-43, 20 April 1999, http://www.emergency.com/1999/serbia43.htm; and NATO photo of the Ivanjica satellite ground station, 9 May 1999, http://www.nato.int/pictures/1999/990509/ b990509f.jpg.

17. Richard Norton-Taylor, “Serb TV Station Was Legitimate Target, Says Blair,” Guardian Unlimited, 24 April 1999, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/ 0,2763,206975,00.html.

18. Rowan Scarborough, “Hovering Spy Plane Helps Rout Iraqis,” Washington Times, 3 April 2003, http://www. washtimes.com/national/20030403-10514696.htm.

19. Jim Garamone, “CENTCOM Charts Operation Iraqi Freedom Progress,” DefenseLINK, American Forces Information Services, 25 March 2003, http://www.defense link.mil/news/Mar2003/n03252003_200303254.html.

20. A request from Prof. Michael Mandel et al., to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, that the tribunal’s prosecutors investigate named individuals for violations of international humanitarian law and prepare indictments against them, 6 May 1999, http:// jurist.law.pitt.edu/icty.htm.

21. Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Article 51, Protection of the Civilian Population Protocol, addition to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 8 June 1977, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/0/f6c8b9fee14a 77fdc125641e0052b079?OpenDocument.

22. “Government Use of Commercial Satellite Capacity,” Satellite Industry Association online briefing slides, http://www.sia.org/agenda/government/Multi-Year% 20Service%20Contracting.pdf.

Col John E. Hyten (BA, Harvard University; MBA, Auburn University) is the director of the Commander’s Action Group, Air Force Space Command. Previously he served in a variety of Air Force space-related engineering and acquisition positions, unified commands, joint positions in the Army, and commanded the 6th Space Operations Squadron, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. Colonel Hyten also served on the senior staff of the Air Force Secretariat where he worked sensitive technology programs and was a member of the 1992 Air Force Blue Ribbon Panel on Space. He is the only military recipient of the prestigious William Jump Award for outstanding public service. Colonel Hyten is a distinguished graduate of both Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College and served as an Air Force National Defense Fellow at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Dr. Robert V. Uy (BSE, University of Michigan; BA, University of Canterbury; MS and PhD, California Institute of Technology [Caltech]) is a member of the Institute for Defense Analysis’s research staff and was previously the RAND intern, Commander’s Action Group, Air Force Space Command. He has 14 years of experience with civil, commercial, and military space programs. Dr. Uy has authored and coauthored numerous RAND publications and other technical articles.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.