Transforming Homeland Security: Intelligence Indications and Warning

Editorial Abstract: With the demise of the Soviet Union, many people believed that threats to the United States would diminish, but this has not necessarily been the case. Lieutenant Colonel Luikart proposes an indications-and-warning cell to support intelligence requirements related to homeland-security missions. The cell would provide more accurate information to senior decision makers.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrated that our national intelligence organizations continue to conduct business in the shadow of the Cold War. The failure to disseminate threat information to decision makers, lack of shared information between law-enforcement and national intelligence agencies, and ambiguity inherent in attempting to assess hostile intent and the adversary’s operational plans contributed to missed opportunities for thwarting the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Despite the urgency of improving our intelligence collection, assessment, and reporting processes, no significant changes in intelligence architecture have occurred to protect the homeland or correct significant intelligence shortcomings since the advent of the Cold War.

Today’s problem with intelligence support to the president and policy makers began with the downfall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Conventional wisdom held that threats to our nation would diminish after the Communist state crumbled; however, just the opposite occurred. Today’s strategic environment is more volatile than the one of two decades ago. With the demise of the Soviet Union, many of the stable intelligence factors used to determine an adversary’s courses of action disappeared, and numerous old hatreds resurfaced. Wars in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and the Persian Gulf area confirmed that global hostilities are likely to increase rather than decrease.

Moreover, the proliferation of weapons- especially nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons capable of inflicting mass destruction- affords countries with militarily insignificant conventional forces a greater ability to prey upon their weaker neighbors. The multifaceted nature of today’s proliferation threat makes it difficult for states to mount effective defenses against terrorist-launched chemical or biological attacks. Therefore, because of the proliferation problem and associated instability in the international system, we must assume that our nation will have to respond to persistent and ill-defined threats for the foreseeable future. This situation places an even greater burden on both civilian and military intelligence analysts to accurately predict hostile actions against our nation.

These problems will plague the newly formed Department of Homeland Security. In spite of countless attempts to "fix" our intelligence systems, they are lacking in their effectiveness at assessing specific threats to the United States.¹ The last discussion of reorganization, conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, occurred in 1992- it is time to renew the conversation about how best to organize intelligence support for national decision makers.

Three things remain broken. First, intelligence and law-enforcement agencies have failed to reach consensus on the specific nature of the threat. Most threat studies focus on foreign armed forces, often providing only cursory analyses of terrorists, drug lords, and rogue nations. This does not mean that strategic and operational intelligence agencies ignore nonstate threats, but such challenges receive less attention than do conventional military systems. Second, intelligence agencies have failed to formulate significant changes in the way they task, collect, analyze, produce, and disseminate intelligence information for decision makers. If this process misidentifies actual threats to our nation, defense efforts may concentrate on adversaries and capabilities less likely to hurt us in the near term while more lethal and subtle dangers operate more or less freely below the visual field of intelligence agencies and decision-making bureaucracies. Lastly, the intelligence architecture necessary to shape debate while incorporating all-source intelligence between national intelligence agencies and law enforcement doesn’t exist.²

Simply stated, our country’s decision makers- the president, National Security Council (NSC), and policy makers- should receive unbiased, nonparochial, all-source intelligence threat estimates based upon the president’s essential elements of information (EEI) (that is, what the president needs to know but does not know). Unfortunately, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and other intelligence organizations compartmentalize information, making effective synthesis difficult if not impossible. This practice results in poor information sharing, loss of continuity, and inadequate analysis of hostile forces’ intentions. Large intelligence institutions often analyze information wrongly or simply do not provide the analysis that policy makers need. Col John Warden, USAF, retired, notes that national-level intelligence agencies have historically missed the mark on long-range intelligence assessments. Poor performance on such assessments results from centralized, compartmentalized decision making and analysis by bureaucracies, study groups, and committees. Analysts, working in small groups or as individuals, have had more success in developing extremely accurate intelligence assessments.³ Although individual analysts provide their best assessments, we should have a system in place that allows them to compare notes, debate, and present their cases to other agencies.

Concerning our current NSC and supporting intelligence agencies, Amy Zegart observes that "the Cold War is long over, yet this Cold War organization remains undaunted and largely unaltered. Though American politics has a good handle on domestic-level organization, the field pays almost no attention to foreign policy. It is fair to say that American politics is the study of American domestic politics."⁴ Zegart notes the lack of a vibrant intelligence agency prepared to face the new challenges that 11 September brought to our nation, describing the "structural split" between the FBI and CIA as a "yawning communications gap. Why didn’t the FBI and CIA compare notes in the summer of 2001? The simplest answer is that they usually don’t. These two agencies have never talked to each other as well as they should."⁵

Chastising a "government that was ignorant and apathetic," William J. Lederer characterizes the typical US approach to politics and policy, together with its lack of understanding of world affairs, as "debilitating national ignorance, both official and unofficial."⁶ Similarly, Max G. Manwaring, writing about gray-area phenomena (e.g., terrorism, drug trade, etc.), observes that

Finally, former senator David L. Boren (D.-Okla.) sums up the problem of support for the director of Central Intelligence (DCI): "In short, despite all the rhetoric about DCI’s role as a leader of the Intelligence Community, I do not see a leader with clear responsibilities: or a leader with significant authorities over the Intelligence Community, either in law or in Executive Order; or a leader with sufficient wherewithal to effectively manage the U.S. Intelligence Community."⁸

What can we do to fix our outdated intelligence system? What is the feasibility of developing an analytical cell that supports the president and the Department of Homeland Security with all-source intelligence analysis? Finally, what type of indications and warning (I&W) system would directly support national decision makers with short- and long-range analyses of intelligence threats?

Defining Intelligence

Most intelligence failures occur when intelligence agencies prove unable to disseminate the right information to the right decision makers at the right time. Defining what we mean by intelligence will help us understand how to correct this endemic failure. The term can refer to a profession, a person’s ability to think, secretive information, or an organization. This article considers it the analytical "spin" put on information. Analysts and information handlers must understand that this process imparts value to the information they pass on to decision makers. Thus, one cannot overstate the importance of the differences in terminology, methodology, and emphasis that characterize intelligence support for law enforcement, antiterrorism initiatives, and conventional defense-intelligence efforts. These institutional differences erect barriers to synthesizing accurate and timely intelligence estimates from multiple-source intelligence data into accurate, coherent threat assessments. Thus, the proliferation of institutions prevents effective intelligence sharing because the institutional spin acts as both a filter and barrier between analyst and decision maker.

During the last 4,000 years of warfare, intelligence information focused on the physical characteristics, location, and movement of enemy forces. Spies observed the numbers of men marching and their equipment or geographic location.⁹ Intelligence analysis and reporting followed this template from ancient warfare to more modern times. As governments became more sophisticated at sending postal dispatches, organizations could intercept those dispatches in order to gain secretive information, as did the Depot of Military Knowledge, which served the British military throughout the 1800s. When most governments began to correspond by means of military courier, the former practice faded. Newspapers in the 1800s became known as "intelligencers," and "diplomats continued to speak of ‘political intelligence.’ "¹⁰

From the Civil War through World War I, intelligence agencies and their customers began to emphasize the collection and analysis of verbal message traffic. The development of radio and tactical field communications during World War I proved a valuable intelligence tool for field commanders, opening up the new field of signals intelligence. After the war, the United States, Britain, and Germany formalized the development of units for gathering signals intelligence.¹¹

During the evolution of intelligence tasking and collection, "intelligence face[d] two all-encompassing, never-ending problems. Both are ultimately unsolvable. . . . The first problem is how to foretell what is going to happen. . . . The second problem, as old as mankind, is how to get statesmen and generals to accept information that they do not like."¹² Both problems continue to plague modern intelligence analysts.

Testifying before the Senate Intelligence Committee in 1992, Gen Paul Gorman, USA, retired, explained that "intelligence remains information, no matter how adroitly collected, and no matter how well analyzed, until it is lodged between the ears of a decision maker."¹³ He went on to explain that it is the process of disseminating intelligence information that is at fault when either our nation or our commanders in the field suffer a strategic surprise. Poorly analyzed information or the failure of the recipient to heed sound intelligence warnings leads to a loss of credibility among intelligence agencies.¹⁴

Tasking, collecting, processing, and analyzing information create unique information-handling problems. But the dissemination of information, the manipulation of data, and the type of analytical spin put on information can create serious intelligence-support problems.

Mishandling Information

If analysts and decision makers misunderstand information, they can fail to see real threats that may exploit vulnerabilities or cause catastrophic attacks, such as those carried out by al Qaeda on 11 September. The acceptance of manipulated information as unquestioned fact may lead to threat inflation. A report issued by the Reagan administration in 1982 offers an example of miscalculating the Soviet threat. The report asserted that the Soviets produced more than 6,000 tanks a year, but DIA’s figure was only 3,000. Such threat inflation may have resulted from an honest mistake; however, the fact that the report asked the question "Has America become Number Two?" suggests the possible manipulation of intelligence information to guide US arms-procurement strategies in a preconceived direction. This episode illustrates that, although some information may be accepted as fact, the analysis may actually be either skewed or incorrect.¹⁵

History is filled with examples of commanders who manipulated intelligence to support their own notions of enemy capabilities and operational plans. For instance, prior to World War I’s battle of Passchendaele (31 July–12 November 1917), British general Sir Douglas Haig’s chief of intelligence, Brig Gen John Charteris, chose only "facts and figures" that supported General Haig’s battle plan. Charteris ignored and manipulated pertinent information concerning German morale and reserves. The ensuing battle cost the British 244,897 casualties.¹⁶

Prior to Operation Market Garden in September 1944, Maj Brian Urquhart, a British intelligence officer, found evidence of enemy tanks parked at British drop zones near Arnhem, the Netherlands. Major Urquhart rushed his evidence to Gen Frederick Browning, commander of the British Airborne Corps, and presented an argument for reexamining the plan of dropping paratroopers in the intended drop zones. Urquhart almost convinced the general, but Browning’s staff argued that the major was too "zealous" and "inclined to be a bit hysterical, no doubt brought on by overwork,"¹⁷ persuading him to ignore the information and place Urquhart on medical leave. In the ensuing operation, airborne forces suffered more than 17,000 casualties, in part because operational commanders and their staffs ignored critical intelligence information.¹⁸

Melvin A. Goodman, formerly an analyst at the CIA, reported the most damning evidence of information manipulation after conducting a critique of three intelligence-commission reports about the roles and capabilities of the CIA in 1996. He found that in the late 1980s, when the CIA lost its spies in the Soviet Union, the DCI provided the president of the United States information from KGB double agents: "CIA leaders provided phony information to the White House during the final years of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was coming apart at the seams. When the CIA misleads the president, it is time to start over."¹⁹

Why is this important to the development of a new homeland-defense I&W intelligence cell? The unique relationship between analysis and raw information is essential to producing useful intelligence. The dissemination or discussion of intelligence between analyst and user lays the groundwork for future operations and policy. Good intelligence, used appropriately by leaders, "shortens the struggle, sparing gold and blood. In peace it reduces uncertainty and so relaxes tensions among states, helping to stabilize the international system. These are the ultimate human goods of intelligence: these are the ways this servant of war brings peace to man."²⁰

Redefining the Threat to the
United States

During the past decade, policy makers and intelligence analysts struggled to redefine the threat to US national security. Prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, most intelligence agencies focused on that country as a system. Now, however, it is fragmented and, according to Angelo Codevilla, has become "a nuclear armed Lebanon." Codevilla, who describes modern-day Russia as a massive country with 11 time zones and dozens of ethnic groups,²¹ argues that intelligence analysts must understand how former Communist countries are coping with their newfound freedom. He cites Eastern Europe, China, East Asia, Mexico, Latin America, and the Middle East as hot spots that need continued intelligence interest.²²

Despite the need to redefine the threat, a rift exists between policy makers and intelligence analysts. Glenn P. Hastedt comments that the "disagreements over the proper relationship between intelligence and policy" are based on "linking together intelligence as information and policy."²³ He goes on to point out the measurably "different expectations" between analysts and policy makers, the latter expecting information always to be accurate and "threat information as self-interpreting." Intelligence analysts, though, use estimative processes to create some analyses, thus "artificially creat[ing] the future through the selection of starting assumptions and scenario creation."²⁴ As Walter Laqueur explains, intelligence "does not exist in a vacuum, even if its practitioners sometimes tend to forget this." If the users of the intelligence product- the president and senior policy makers- do not trust the validity of the assessment, then "even excellent intelligence is of little consequence."²⁵ Policy makers and intelligence analysts must overcome decades of misunderstanding and compartmentalization and then search for common ground in redefining the threat. To further complicate this endeavor, intelligence support to law enforcement, a third party to this cumbersome search for redefining the threat to our national interests, also requires attention.

Robert H. Johnson suggests that the current intelligence-analysis system be changed so that analysts with divergent views or hypotheses about threats to national security can "confront" each other and develop a "baseline for policy." This offers an outstanding way to "cross-pollinate" information by comparing notes in an environment that would force analysts to stand behind their work.²⁶ Furthermore, James Martin suggests that the attacks of 11 September will change the posturing of intelligence from offensive to defensive. He sees the attacks as a "watershed event" that will certainly change our current intelligence organization, perhaps resulting in legislation as important as the National Security Act of 1947.²⁷

Major Threats to Our
National Security

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) offers militarily weak adversaries a greater ability to prey upon weaker neighbors and strong states alike. The terror threat to the homeland and its accompanying nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological dimension have alerted the national consciousness to the potential for mass destruction or mass-casualty attacks (table 1). This places a great burden on civilian and military intelligence analysts to produce accurate assessments of potentially hostile actions against our nation.

Table 1
Major Threats to US National Security

1. Threat from Foreign Armed Forces

2. Economic Espionage

3. Weapons of Mass Destruction

a. Nuclear Devices

b. Chemical and Biological Weapons

4. Gray-Area Phenomena

a. Terrorist Organizations

b. Rogue States

c. Illicit Drug Trade and Narcoterrorists

A study of the number of intelligence reports compiled during the 1990s clearly shows that the intelligence community places more emphasis on foreign countries’ conventional armed forces than on WMD threats or on terrorist organizations with global reach (table 2). Our intelligence agencies are geared for supporting the world as it was in 1947- not today’s threat environment.²⁸

Gregory F. Treverton points out that any new intelligence reorganization will have to face a world that has many targets and a vast amount of information, including misinformation from the Internet. Treverton sees special-intelligence agencies such as the NSA, CIA, DIA, and so forth remaining intact. However, a change in the relationship among nations sparks a corresponding change in the face of the nation-state. Our foes will not attack our strength by "confronting American power symmetrically" but will attack us "asymmetrically" using WMDs.²⁹

In other words, our greatest enemy today does not have a country, will not come to the bargaining table, and has no government that will sue for peace. We face terrorists who launch attacks because it is their "business," rather than some political ideology. In order to protect ourselves from asymmetrical warfare, our intelligence agencies will have to reorganize and flesh out their analytical capabilities.

Development of an Indications
and Warning Cell

If a new intelligence I&W cell is created at the executive level of government, what attributes should it contain? Although the following list is not comprehensive, some attributes that could facilitate a more relevant and responsive intelligence analytical architecture seem obvious. First, the I&W cell should have a streamlined organizational structure. Analytical cells do not need top-heavy bureaucracies; instead, they should remain lean and flexible so information can flow efficiently between analysts and decision makers. Additionally, fiscal authority is essential; the organizational boss, a director of National Intelligence (DNI) or a DCI, will be ineffective without full control of the intelligence budget for all agencies. In other words, the DCI or DNI will need real authority to order or direct changes to the budget and management. Without such authority, the DCI or DNI will be powerless to make the changes necessary to meet new and fluid threat challenges. Most importantly, intelligence analysis does not survive numerous layers of bureaucratic meddling, which stymies free thinking and tends to force analysts to look for the "book" answer or the "politically correct" answer, rather than the "right" answer.³⁰

Second, the cell should be physically located near the users- close enough to the president, NSC, and policy makers to provide all-source intelligence analysis and short- and long-range threat warnings to decision makers in a timely manner. This is necessary because analysts get their marching orders from the leadership’s EEIs. Distance from intelligence customers delays analysis, risks its loss, and ultimately renders it irrelevant. The closer the analyst is, physically, to the user (i.e., the president, NSC, and policy makers), the better the analytical support.³¹

Third, most experts agree that "hot" intelligence is lost during the dissemination process. To fix this problem, we need to establish a clearinghouse for intelligence threat analysis- a forum for analysts from all agencies where they can present their cases before other agencies. We must encourage such analysts to staff and use this facility to test their models and theories of analysis. Results of this process should filter to user agencies as soon as possible. Threat warnings and information should be an ongoing process, free from bureaucratic parochialism and distraction from outside sources. Some testimony hints that the intelligence-community staff could serve in this function. Regardless of whether we utilize those personnel or a new clearinghouse for intelligence, analysts need a means by which a variety of agencies can present their analytical products for comparison and fusion.³²

Fourth, whether the new I&W agency is designed within the CIA or the National Military Intelligence Center, as Adm Bobby Inman has suggested, "All warnings would be directly reported to the DCI as opposed to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense,"³³ a procedure that makes a great deal of common sense. The DCI should be the boss. Simply put, in our current 1947-style intelligence agencies, the DCI does not have the authority or the wherewithal to manage the large, bureaucratic intelligence system; controls neither the management of these agencies nor their purse strings; leads without power (a figurehead without authority); and must supervise an old and outdated intelligence bureaucracy without the commensurate tools to do so.

The new I&W organization should integrate with the new Department of Homeland Security. Moreover, law-enforcement agencies will have to learn some new tricks of the trade, such as developing order-of-battle files. They must revamp their internal-intelligence support and increase their analytical manpower to handle the sheer volume of information. In a speech at the Georgia Air and Army National Guard Joint Commanders Conference in 2002, Col Jeff Mathis stated that, in its struggle to integrate some 40 agencies, the new Department of Homeland Security will establish an "intelligence infusion capability, but must work out details of how to pass information down to the Governors and State Headquarters" but must upgrade its "distribution technology."³⁴ Furthermore, not only are the intelligence agencies, FBI, and NSC looking at reorganization, but also the "Defense Department itself must re-examine its relationship in support of Homeland Defense."³⁵

For instance, there "is no National Guard, or Reserve, representative at the JCS level."³⁶And no "combatant commander" exists for homeland security, although North American Aerospace Defense Command’s combatant commander exercises authority over the new Northern Command. The biggest problem arises between situational awareness at the federal level as opposed to situational levels of the 50 states- that is, a disconnect exists between the federal and state programs. Many states have an emergency operations center and their own unique statewide intelligence-collection-and-analysis capability. The following issues warrant consideration: how do the states merge that capability with the federal effort? Who brings all of this information together in an all-source intelligence clearinghouse? Would this be a job fit for a new executive-level intelligence support cell? Moreover, what will be the relationship among Northern Command, the governors of the states, and the executive branch of the federal government?³⁷

Lastly, many states are reorganizing their emergency operations centers. Georgia, for example, has taken a look at its computer infrastructure and is working hard to tie the Army and Air National Guard Internet systems together, with some success. Georgia also has organized its Homeland Security Task Force and revised its Department of Defense "strategic plan" to include a terrorism focus area.³⁸ Furthermore, most states accept that homeland defense is one of the National Guard’s missions; it is not, however, the only mission.

Conclusion

In retrospect, one can easily identify intelligence failures. Most of them stem from breakdowns in dissemination processes. The best way to fix this problem involves locating the I&W cell next to the user- placing it closer to the president and Congress. Second, the I&W cell should be lean at the top, with no layers of bosses and subbosses between the analyst and the user. Bureaucratic meddling and political correctness will kill good analysis. Third, the I&W cell must redefine order-of-battle files and threats to our national security and national objectives, reflecting the full range of conventional and nonconventional challenges. Law-enforcement agencies will have to change the ways they handle information about hostile threats and, in so doing, may find that they also have to alter their approaches to fighting crime. Changes in threat identification and information sharing will be necessary in organizing a new I&W cell at the executive level.

Every analytical question begins with the leader’s EEI. Leaders will always have questions about things for which they have no answers. Although policy makers and intelligence analysts will not always be on the same page, it is important to note that a good analyst can make the job easier by providing policy makers the best guess at what hostile forces threaten our national objectives. The policy maker must understand that the analyst is guessing. Even more importantly, the president, NSC, and policy makers should understand that poor analysis results from bureaucratic pressure, distractions, and manpower shortages. Budget constraints should not become an excuse for not fully manning intelligence-analyst positions. The information explosion requires completely staffed intelligence agencies to handle the volume of data to be analyzed. We need an executive-level forum where analysts can compare notes as well as test and defend intelligence hypotheses. It can be located either inside the intelligence-community staff or in a new clearinghouse.

It is long past time for an overhaul. Our intelligence agencies, born out of the 1947 National Security Act, sustained defense efforts during the Cold War. The events of 11 September 2001, however, revealed that the institutions which served national security well during the Cold War need to adjust to an emerging threat environment. The old-style "combat files" and order-of-battle files need expanding, changing, and revising. New threat alignments will force a redefinition of order-of-battle files. What was important in 1989 may not be as important in 2003.

Lastly, change will have to come from the top down. The battle among the president, Congress, and myriad agencies that currently "own" the assessment process will be brutal and bloody. Perhaps the early years of the twenty-first century will go down in history as those during which the United States redefined itself as a great nation. This task will not be easy, and the road to intelligence reform will be long and tedious. But this is the path our nation must be prepared to follow in order to defeat future threats to its national security.

1. Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. 2198 and S. 421, 1–46.

3. John Warden, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), 24–27.

4. Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 5.

5. Amy B. Zegart, "Spy vs. Spy: Two Agencies, Two Turfs, and No Communications," 26 May 2002, on-line, Internet, 29 May 2002, available from http://www.ebird.dtic.mil/May2002/ s20020529spy.htm. According to Zegart,

In the face of this new terrorist threat, Bush should take a lesson from another president who faced daunting new challenges to this nation’s security: Harry Truman. In 1947, at the dawn of the Cold War, Truman created a radically new national security apparatus that included the CIA, the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. The fight was fierce, and the result was far from perfect. But it was a dramatic improvement over what had existed before. Truman’s efforts got him no votes and made him no friends in Congress or his own executive branch. He did it anyway: He knew the country needed it.

6. William J. Lederer, A Nation of Sheep (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1961), 11–15.

7. Max G. Manwaring, Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 63.

8. David L. Boren, Hearings before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 102 Cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. 2198 and S. 421, 169.

9. David Khan, "An Historical Theory of Intelligence," Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (autumn 2001): 82.

10. Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 14–15.

13. Paul Gorman, USA, retired, Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 102 Cong., 2d sess., S. 2198 and S. 421, 1992, 262.

15. Andrew Cockburn, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New York: Random House, 1983), 279.

16. Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 163. In his book The Battle for Germany (New York: Scribner, 1969), Hubert Essame writes, "In misappreciation of actual situation at the end of August and the first half of September, Allied intelligence staffs sank to a level only reached by Brigadier John Charteris, Haig’s Chief Intelligence Officer at the time of the Passchendaele Battles in 1917. . . . [He] selected only those figures and facts which suited his fancy and then issued hopeful reports accordingly" (13).

19. Melvin A. Goodman, "The Road to Intelligence Reform: Paved with Good Intentions," 1996, on-line, Internet, 15 January 2002, available from http://www.us.net/cip/digest.htm.

21. Angelo Codevilla, Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century (Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1992), 55–56.

23. Glenn P. Hastedt, ed., Controlling Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 10–11.

25. Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 71.

26. See Robert H. Johnson’s comments in "Discussion by the Intelligence Advisory Board and Invited Experts," 22 April 1996, on-line, Internet, 15 January 2002, available from http://www.us.net/cip/digest.htm.

27. James Martin, "Intelligence in the Interstices," Military Information Technology 6, no. 1 (2002): 17.

29. Gregory F. Treverton, "Intelligence Crisis," Government Executive, November 2001, 18–20.

30. Adm Bobby Ray Inman, USN, retired, Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 102d Cong., 2d sess., S. 2198 and S. 421, 1992, 226–27.

32. "Testimony of Bob Inman: Hearings of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community," 19 January 1996, on-line, Internet, 15 January 2002, available from http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testinma.htm.

34. Col Jeff Mathis, "Homeland Defense," speech to the Georgia Department of Defense Joint Commanders Conference, Macon, Ga., 12 April 2002.

38. Maj Gen David B. Poythress, adjutant general, State of Georgia, speech to the State Department of Defense Joint Commanders Conference, Macon, Georgia, 12 April 2002.

Lt Col Kenneth A. Luikart, Georgia ANG (BS, Regents College), is director of support and mission-support flight commander for the 165th Airlift Wing (Air Mobility Command), Georgia Air National Guard. He has served as an intelligence specialist, air intelligence officer, air technician detachment air intelligence officer, and senior intelligence officer. He has supported the following operations: Team Spirit in Korea; Badge Torch in Thailand; Coronet Oak and Volent Oak in Panama; Provide Promise, Joint Endeavor, and Joint Forge, flying missions into Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Support Hope, flying humanitarian missions into Rwanda and Zaire. Colonel Luikart is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.