Document created: 1 June 03
Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2003

Air and Space Power Journal

Flight Lines

COL ANTHONY C. CAIN, EDITOR


The Transformation of Air and Space
Power in Operation Iraqi Freedom

HOW CAN WE know that a transformation is occurring or has occurred? The realization does not always come crashing down on the observer like a 2,000-pound precision munition. Sometimes transformational effects subtly erode accepted practices, just as sandpaper smoothes rough surfaces on wood to reveal a true masterpiece. When transformation occurs, there may be a moment when commentators cannot process what they witness. But when the moment passes, they recognize the new effects as "normal." It’s as if they had always known such things were possible but had never decided to try them. Unfolding events in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom bear witness to a transformation in air and space power that is simultaneously dramatic and subtle. If we don’t take time to reflect on the nature of this transformation, we might miss its significance. 

First, operations did not begin with the decapitating strikes, nor with the much-touted "shock and awe" bombing campaign, nor with the multipronged thrust into Iraq by British, Australian, and US ground and special operations forces. The foundation for every success that the coalition has enjoyed to date stems from an intense information-gathering campaign that relied on air and space power, human intelligence, and intelligence-gathering efforts by special operations personnel. The precision strikes against strategic and operational targets during Iraqi Freedom stand as evidence of predictive battlespace awareness (PBA). This unprecedented capability to fuse intelligence data from various sources and make it useful to combatant commanders is one of the cornerstones of the transformation of air and space power. 

Because of investments in technology and, more importantly, in doctrine and forward-thinking operational concepts, coalition planners are able to develop a strategic assessment of the enemy’s plans, force structure, and capabilities that is unprecedented in its accuracy and timeliness. This predictive awareness is such a pervasive capability for US forces that we now have changed our perceptions about the precision and flexibility that have always characterized air and space power. As a result of this transformational capability, we can now speak about the effectiveness of air and space power with greater authority and certainty. After Operation Desert Storm, analysts described the closing of the gap between air and space power’s technological limits and its potential. In the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have witnessed a conceptual and organizational transformation that redefines how we think about employing air and space power to achieve national strategic and operational goals. Using air and space power’s PBA capabilities, we can alter the character, pace, depth, and scope of operations to suit our timing and objectives. 

Second, operations in Iraq reveal a seamless integration of air and space power’s capabilities with those of other components. In the past,  we thought of joint operations as cobbling together a tactically—or even an operationally— effective force from various service components. In Iraqi Freedom, the interservice conflicts that accompanied former joint efforts have not occurred. Air and space power doctrine, organization, and employment now occur within the context of mature joint structures and operating concepts. The result is a complex, integrated, and synchronized campaign that allows coalition commanders to outthink and outfight enemy commanders and their forces. The difference between the capabilities displayed by coalition forces and those of the Iraqi military is comparable to the difference that would occur if a US Civil War–era force suddenly found itself confronted by the Allied forces in Europe near the end of World War II. The Iraqi military’s inability to compete against the coalition’s seamless operational and tactical integration renders it tragically clumsy and impotent. 

Finally, air and space power will ensure that the stunning effectiveness that characterizes combat operations will carry over into war-winning, post-hostilities operations. The humanitarian crisis that many analysts expected has not occurred, largely because the precision-strike capability inherent in air and space power has limited the destruction that normally accompanies large-scale combat operations. To be sure, the destruction inflicted upon Iraqi armed forces from all coalition components exceeds the power brought to bear in previous conflicts. What is different— and transformational—about this campaign is that coalition leaders have unflinchingly taken the war "downtown" without fear that civilian populations would suffer equally alongside enemy combatants. This decision sends a clear message to the Iraqi people: "We make war against an immoral regime, not against you." The same precision, timeliness, and reach that allow us to deliver stunningly accurate bombs on targets also allow us to deliver humanitarian supplies to people who would otherwise starve or die of thirst and disease. 

During the buildup toward war, we often heard that the outcome was not in doubt. The transformation of air and space power, in part, guarantees that outcome. We could no more imagine fighting this war, or any future war, in the same way that we approached Desert Storm than we could apply the same organizations and methods used in Vietnam or World War II. Whether we realize it or not, a decade of intense thought, organizational change, combat experience, and preparation has placed us in the midst of a true air and space power transformation. The task now is to look around us to understand how the results of that transformation will affect future capabilities and operations. More importantly, we must ask ourselves how to prepare air and space capabilities to generate the next transformational wave.


Disclaimer  

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.


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