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Air & Space Power Journal - Spring 2003

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Command and Control Doctrine for Combat Support

Strategic- and Operational-Level Concepts for
Supporting the Air and Space Expeditionary Force

Editorial Abstract: Air and space power planning processes have improved over the past decade to provide a more efficient joint capability to joint force commanders. These improvements have caused service and joint doctrine to evolve and communicate how best to employ air and space power. The authors argue that combat support (CS) doctrine has not achieved that same clarity. Instead, better integration of CS and operations planning and command and control (C2) represents a doctrinal growth area that should receive our focus as we transform the Air Force into an expeditionary, capability-based force. Approaching CS doctrine from the same campaign-based planning mind-set as force employment offers the key to eliminating the ad hoc and inefficient nature of sustaining and supporting Air Force combat power.

New command and control (C2) concepts have played a key role in helping to guide the evolution and development of recent Air Force (AF) expeditionary concepts and capabilities. Doctrine has kept pace with these changes and helped shape some of the new policies, technologies, and approaches to planning. Some concepts have stood the test of time, such as acting decisively within the enemy observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop, and are found in doctrine that is routinely used to guide air campaign planning activities.¹ Other concepts that have found their way into C2 doctrine include strategic campaign planning and the operational strategies-to-task framework.² Even more recently, the concept of effects-based operations has taken hold in campaign planning and execution.³ While doctrine continues to evolve and enable air-and-space-expeditionary-force (AEF) projection, more work is needed, specifically in the area of combat support (CS), where improved integration of CS capabilities and C2 of critical resources can better enable campaign planning and proactive decision making.

Joint and AF doctrine defines C2 as the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Specifically, C2 includes the battle-space-management process of planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations (OPS). Enabling a commander to exercise C2 across the range of military operations involves the integration of systems, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, information, and communications.⁴

Unfortunately, C2 doctrine for CS is not fully developed. For instance, C2 of CS is minimally addressed in Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, and AFDD 2-4, Combat Support. As a result, procedures for integrating CS considerations into operations-planning processes are not understood by large segments of operations and CS personnel. During recent conflicts, combatant commanders have employed ad hoc approaches to cobble together CS operational and administrative chains of command, processes, and procedures during contingency operations. This ad hoc approach delays the establishment of CS C2 organizations like the Air Force Forces (AFFOR) Logistics Directorate (A-4) and confuses the alignment of roles and responsibilities between other CS organizations such as the Air Force Combat Support Center (CSC) and the CS functional staffs of the commands providing forces. This delay and confusion results in campaign plans being developed with minimal CS inputs. The time it takes to follow the ad hoc approach to establish and accomplish CS functions and the differing approaches that result in each contingency operation are not consistent with AEF goals. This article offers suggestions for the development of CS C2 doctrine and discusses how it can improve AF campaign planning and execution.

Important additions to CS doctrinal concepts include relating CS process performance, resource levels, and constraints to operationally meaningful measures and capabilities; establishing CS control parameters and closed-loop reporting on CS process performance with indicators of potential system failures that could impact mission goals; and identifying what CS organizations will conduct specific C2 functions. Changes such as these will strengthen the capability of the AF C2 system in terms of the underlying C2 principles and tenets described in AFDD 2-8, Command and Control.⁵ For example, relating CS process performance and inventory levels to operational capability will enable commanders to understand the impact CS decisions might have on war-fighting capability, thereby providing an environment for more informed decision making.

Defining Doctrine

The evolution of CS doctrine has been slowed by a lack of understanding about doctrine and its purpose. In 1995, during the early development stages of AFDD 2-4, working groups contended with defining CS doctrine and struggled over the balance between simplicity and completeness, determining the target audience, and ownership of content.⁶ The environment for codifying CS principles into doctrine has not significantly changed. Oftentimes, the relationship between doctrine, concept of operations (CONOPS), instructions, policies, procedures, and techniques is not clearly defined or understood. To address this, we begin with a definition of doctrine and a short discussion on the relationship between doctrine and other formal AF publications.

AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, provides the following definition of doctrine:

Air and space doctrine is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs and war-fighting principles that describe and guide the proper use of air and space forces in military operations. Doctrine prepares us for future uncertainties and, combined with our basic shared core values, provides a common set of understanding on which airmen base their decisions. Doctrine consists of the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of the nation’s objectives.⁷

AFDD 1 goes on to describe the various levels of doctrine.

Basic doctrine states the most fundamental and enduring beliefs that describe and guide the proper use of air and space forces in military actions. . . . Because of its fundamental and enduring character, basic doctrine provides broad and continuing guidance on how Air Force forces are organized and employed.

Operational doctrine, contained in AFDD 2 series publications, describes more detailed organization of air and space forces and applies the principles of basic doctrine to military actions. Operational doctrine guides the proper employment of air and space forces in the context of distinct objectives, force capabilities, broad functional areas and operational environments. 

Tactical doctrine describes the proper employment of specific weapons systems individually or in concert with other weapons systems to accomplish detailed objectives. . . . Tactical doctrine is codified in Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-series manuals.⁸

Doctrine is designed to provide a set of principles to guide the further development of policy, instructions, procedures, and techniques. Each level of doctrine should guide thoughts, actions, and decisions of those charged with execution. For example, many CS decisions are concerned with the allocation of resources. Oftentimes, allocation decisions must be made when competition for limited critical resources exists. In this example, operational-level CS doctrine should provide guidelines for how those decisions should be made. For example, allocation of critical resources will be made based on an operations impact analysis that considers campaign objectives and Joint Staff–directed priorities. Associated tactical-level doctrine should delineate the process by which operations-impact analysis is accomplished. Following our example, a unit’s demand for resources will be submitted to the AFFOR A-4 and include statements of operations impact. AFFOR A-4 staff(s) will review the request, validate impact statements, and make allocation decisions when competing demands are between two or more organizations over which they have operational control. Otherwise, the request and associated impact statements will be forwarded to the Air Staff Combat Support Center.

Doctrine for CS is contained in AFDD 2-4, which “outlines the Air Force perspective on how best to rapidly deploy and support operational aerospace capabilities.”⁹ While it addresses the need for a capability to command and control CS resources, it fails to address how the core principles of C2 (e.g., unity of command, centralized control- decentralized execution, and informed decision making) apply in the context of CS. Best practices, such as the creation of an AFFOR A-4 rear-echelon function to execute CS reach-back responsibilities, were proven effective in Operation Desert Storm, Operation Noble Anvil, and Operation Enduring Freedom, but have not been codified in doctrine.

AFDD 2-4 fails to give CS personnel a framework in which to think about the art and science of providing CS. In this absence, AFDD 2-4 does not point us in the direction of ensuring CS planning is accomplished as an integral part of the air campaign plan, master air attack plan (MAAP), airspace control plan (ACP), and air tasking order (ATO) development- rather, current doctrine continues our current “reactive” method vice an integrated, proactive method.

Developing Doctrine for
Command and Control
of Combat Support

The concepts for C2 of CS relate directly to the mission needs associated with being an expeditionary force. Those needs and their correlating CS C2 requirements are identified in table 1.

Based upon the CS C2 requirements listed below and previous analyses of best practices, we developed concepts that could serve as a basis for modifying Air Force doctrine. The C2 capability envisioned should

• enable the CS community to quickly estimate CS requirements for force-package options and assess the feasibility of operational and support plans,

• quickly determine beddown capabilities, facilitate rapid force planning and flow development, and configure a distribution network to meet employment timelines and resupply needs,

• facilitate execution resupply planning and monitor performance,

• determine impacts of allocating scarce resources to various combatant commanders, and

• indicate when CS performance deviates from desired state and implement get-well plans.¹⁰

Concepts for Future Doctrine-
Principles of C2 for CS

At the strategic and operational levels, doctrine for C2 relates core principles to guide CS actions and decisions. The principles identified here represent a fundamental shift in the way CS is viewed, employed, and controlled, both to the CS community internally and to the consumers of CS resources externally.

C2 of CS is accomplished through a fundamental process that integrates operations and CS planning in a closed-loop environment, providing feedback on performance and resources. Figure 1 illustrates the elements of this process, which can be applied through all phases of an operation from readiness, through deployment, employment, and sustainment, as well as redeployment and reconstitution. It centers on integrated operations and CS planning and incorporates activities for continually monitoring performance and dynamically making adjustments.¹¹

Some elements of the process, in the large box in figure 1, are accomplished in planning for operations. It is in this box that operations and CS personnel must share a common vocabulary. The measures of effectiveness by which the plan can be assessed must be developed and understood by both operations and CS planners. Certainly, the integrated plan they develop should be feasible from the CS standpoint. However, CS inputs should not only make it supportable, but they should seek the most efficient and effective approach for accomplishing the campaign plan. When a plan is executed, all elements of the process above are accomplished. A key element of the process template during planning and execution is the feedback loop that monitors how well the system is expected to perform (during planning) or is performing (during execution). That performance is compared to the predetermined measures of effectiveness and provides warning of potential system failures.¹² It is this feedback loop that enables the CS plan and infrastructure to be reconfigured as necessary to meet dynamic operational requirements during both planning and execution.

Figure 1. CS C2 Concept Process

Planning for employment of CS must be effects-based and operationally relevant. For the CS system to provide timely feedback to the operators, it must be tightly coupled with operations planning and execution processes. Feedback to operations planners should be in the form of options that will provide the same or better operational effect yet cost less in CS terms.

The transition to effects-based operations reflects a desire to be more effective in the employment of air and space power and a need to be more efficient in the use of resources. According to Maj Gen David A. Deptula, effects-based operations are replacing annihilation and attrition as determinants of success. In previous conflicts where annihilation and attrition determined success, CS resources were critical.¹³ With effects-based operations, where airpower is employed deliberately and orchestrated to achieve specific and precise target kills, CS must be tailored and strategically employed to enable the desired operational effects. Rather than stockpiling available munitions at forward operating locations and distributing aircraft parts based on a replacement-in-kind basis, munitions and parts must be allocated with the objectives of ensuring that specific weapons systems are mission capable and certain high-demand, low-density munitions are available when needed for a critical mission. 

To enable effects-based operations, CS must be applied using effects-based principles. In the past, CS planning was reactive, taking an operations plan and deriving CS tasks to execute the plan. This approach often resulted in an unnecessary agglomeration of CS resources to assure success or a delayed determination that logistics constraints rendered the operation plan unfeasible. In the current environment of constrained resources and frequent quick-response operations, neither of these planning results is acceptable. It is no longer sufficient to let CS inputs to operational planning be limited to statements of available inventories (e.g., numbers of bombs, gallons of fuel, available transportation, etc.). Rather than simply list available resources, CS planning must describe how resources will be configured, allocated, and used to accomplish mission objectives. Using the closed-loop process defined in figure 1, CS capabilities must be integrated with operations and translated to operational output throughout the entire planning process. Figure 2 examines this concept in relation to the operations planning cycle for employment of air and space forces.¹⁴ 

The planning activities reflected in figure 2 occur across the spectrum of operations. During day-to-day operations, planning supports programmed flying hours to achieve training objectives and prepare for combat. Planning products are flying schedules and air campaign plans for the operators, and for CS, depot maintenance repair plans, spares allocation plans, and war reserve materiel distribution to support the flying program and air campaign plans. On the installation support side, planning products center on infrastructure operation and maintenance, utility operations, and personnel service activities like billeting and dining. During wartime or contingency operations, combat execution is prepared in the crisis action planning process, with similar products and plans produced in a time-compressed environment. For both peacetime and wartime planning, the focus of CS should be production of installation support and sorties.

Figure 2. Operations/CS Integrated Planning (From James A. Leftwich et al., Supporting Expeditionary Aerospace Forces: An Operational Architecture for Combat Support Execution Planning and Control, RAND Report MR-1536-AF [Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002])

From readiness through redeployment and reconstitution, the core process remains the same, but individual information flows vary, and plans and assessments become more refined through each phase. For example, theater- and unit-capability assessments are first accomplished in peacetime and then continue to be constantly performed. The assessment results feed the budgeting and planning processes to allocate funds to programs and redistribute other resources as required for the AF to fulfill its Defense Planning Guidance responsibilities. In this example, the assessment results are at a global level and will be used to make strategic resource-allocation decisions. As a world situation develops, the relationship between CS and OPS capabilities feeds into the crisis action planning process and contributes to the development of a suitable course of action (COA). Based on new information (e.g., refined operations requirements, known threats, better-known theater capabilities), assessments are reaccomplished, the CS plan is refined, and infrastructure configured as necessary to support a new COA. As a result of the COA and these CS configuration actions, the relationship of CS capabilities to operations capabilities is again refined to feed into the development of the joint air operations plan (JAOP), MAAP, and eventually the ATO. The assessment capabilities and feedback loop enable iterative planning with operations.

Control of the CS battle space will be accomplished proactively to enable robust and efficient support for operations alternatives. As with the operations community, CS personnel must be able to quickly recognize, shape, and control their battle space. The CS battle space is multidimensional. As seen in figure 3, it exists within the air operations center; at beddown locations, continental United States (CONUS) support locations (CSL), forward support locations (FSL), and depots; and within the distribution network. Once combat operations commence, the CS battle space must be regulated to ensure continued support for dynamic operations. The C2 system controlling the CS battle space must monitor actual CS performance against planned performance. The performance parameters and measures of effectiveness established during execution planning should provide advance warning of potential system failure. When CS performance diverges from the desired level (because of changes in CS performance or operational objectives), the system must be able to detect the change, modify the original plan, develop a get-well plan, and reassess the modified plan’s feasibility. As discussed earlier, plan feasibility is assessed continuously and iteratively until it is determined that the modified plan will be able to support the operation. Operations-focused metrics of CS capabilities can provide warning of a pending inability to meet operational requirements. Key decision measures, such as the mission cost of CS performance shortfalls and CS cost of accomplishing mission objectives, should provide analysis to support operations/ CS trade-off decisions. The analytical ability to look ahead must address the long-range impact of near-term decisions from both an operations and a CS perspective. As the system monitors the performance of key CS demand indicators, it must recognize and notify decision makers when those indicators and CS measures are beyond planned thresholds and then facilitate the necessary planning to get well. When early warning of an impending failure to support operational requirements is received, the system should be able to drill down to the element or infrastructure component that is contributing to the general failure. While the CS battle space is being monitored at the higher level against key operational measures, the lower levels are monitoring the performance of component processes against the planning parameters and thresholds established during execution planning.

Figure 3. The Combat Support Battle Space

Concepts for Future Doctrine-
Organizing to Command and Control
Combat Support

To improve the performance of the existing process and make the necessary changes to implement the fundamental concepts and principles described above, modifications must be made to organizational responsibilities. Just as the principles for C2 of CS must be codified in doctrine, so too must the policy, training, and organizational architecture that will enable and execute CS C2. Gen John P. Jumper, Air Force chief of staff, put it simply:

Just as important to the expeditionary culture is the fundamental understanding that we organize, deploy, and employ using organizational principles based on doctrine, not ad hoc command arrangements. . . . In most cases we don’t even notice doctrinal negligence because our airmen are such superb operators- we’ll get the job done even in a lousy organization. We need to fix this for them. . . . Write it down and publish it.¹⁵

The following concepts can guide future doctrine development on C2 organizational responsibilities for CS.

The alignment of C2 responsibilities must be clearly defined and assigned to standard CS nodes. Table 2 reflects the roles and responsibilities of the organizational nodes in an organizational template for CS.¹⁶

This node template is a key element of the C2 operational architecture for CS. Specific organizations will be designated to fulfill the responsibilities of each of the nodes. The template allows for variations in organization assignments by theater, while retaining standard “grouped” responsibilities. It may serve as a guide to configure the C2 infrastructure that is based on the current requirements. Along with the template, having standing CS C2 nodes that operate in both peacetime and wartime can also ease the transition from daily to higher-intensity operations and allow us to train the way we intend to fight.

Standing organizations will execute CS C2. In the past, organization structures were established and responsibilities assigned at the start of a conflict. Responding globally to continuing threats places new demands on CS C2. First, continuing operations tempo is such that organizations seldom completely finish providing support after a contingency operation winds down, but instead, they transfer their focus from one conflict to another. Second, CS resources are continually consumed and reconstituted during and between contingencies. Many times, demands outpace supply, driving reallocation of resources from one theater to another in order to meet the most urgent demand. This requires a streamlined ability to arbitrate, allocate, and relocate these resources across and amongst the competing areas of responsibility (AOR). To accomplish the arbitration function, CS resource assessments and allocation management tasks need to be assigned to permanent organizational nodes dedicated to resource monitoring, prioritization, and reconfiguration. An integration function for all CS resource management will facilitate the incorporation of relevant resource data into capability assessments and raise the visibility and importance of these assessments in the eyes of the operational community.

To coordinate resource-level management, the operations support center (OSC) will act as a regional hub for monitoring, prioritizing, and allocating theater-level CS resources and be responsible for mission support, base infrastructure support, and establishing movement requirements within the theater.¹⁷ The OSC will be the theater integrator for commodities managed by inventory control points (ICP) discussed below. To be effective, the OSC must have complete visibility of theater resources and the authority to reconfigure these resources. It should receive commodity-specific information from commodity inventory managers, perform integrated capability assessments of the base and sortie production, and report those capabilities to the CS personnel supporting air campaign plan/MAAP/ATO production in the AOC. In this role, it will be able to make informed resource-allocation decisions when there are competing demands for resources within the theater. Finally, it must work closely with the joint forces community to assure that resources are allocated in accordance with global priorities. To do this, it must be capable of providing impact analysis to justify demands for critical resources in competition with other theaters. Just as prescribed in AFDD 2-8, the OSC could perform a reach-back function.¹⁸ It could incorporate mission, base infrastructure, and movement capability assessments into operational plans and support the deployed AFFOR A-4 staff during a contingency, which would minimize the number of personnel required to deploy forward. It would also alleviate problems associated with an undermanned numbered air force staff currently trying to perform the functions listed above, in addition to their roles under the unified command structure.

Commodity inventory managers called ICPs should be responsible for the management of supplying needed resources to the major commands (MAJCOM) and deployed forces. This is essential for the management and distribution of critical resources. For example, spares management should be accomplished, along weapon-system lines, by an ICP run by AF Materiel Command (AFMC). This existing AFMC C2 node would operate spares management along the continuum of operations, having immediate access to both the data and analytical tools needed to exercise capability assessments and manage distribution of resources to the MAJCOMs and theaters. The ICP would normally take direction from the OSCs; however, when demand exceeds supply, a neutral integrator at the Air Force level, called the global integration center (GIC), will provide the necessary direction. The GIC could be a virtual organization with cells at ACC, AMC, and SPACECOM. The spares ICP will be responsible for monitoring resource inventory levels, locations, and movement information, and use these data to assess contractor and depot capabilities to meet throughput requirements. The GIC would conduct weapon-system operational capability assessments and coordinate with the joint community and theater OSCs to prioritize and allocate resources in accordance with theater and global priorities. The integrated assessments can support allocation decisions when multiple theaters are competing for the same resources and can serve as the AF voice to the Joint Staff when arbitration across services is required. In light of the global nature of AEFs and US commitments, other commodities should be considered for management in the same manner.

At both the OSCs and the GIC, individual resource prioritization will be guided by a common set of rules: given a required operational capability, the OSC will calculate the CS resources needed to meet it. When there are multiple ways to achieve the same goals, this will be considered in resource prioritization. Resources will then be assessed and allocated to meet the operational capability requirements set at higher levels (e.g., the JCS, The National Security Strategy of the United States, Defense Planning Guidance). The allocation of these resources will be based on operational capability, rather than on an individual commodity basis.

Based on these assessments and allocations, the ICPs will direct purchases, repair operations, and the distribution of components and spares; the ICPs will then interface with combatant commanders and the joint community to direct the distribution of resources among theaters and coordinate intertheater airlift. Theater OSCs will provide advice about infrastructure capabilities, needed resources to implement plans, and the consequences of not improving capabilities. Then the theater joint command can prioritize needs and advise the Joint Staff and others of theater capabilities and issues. Ongoing capability assessments generated by the GIC and OSCs will be incorporated into a theater’s operational planning processes that are executed by combat support liaisons in the AOC.

This organizational structure and companion processes outlined above offer three important strengths. First, they enable planners to use theater and global priorities and capability estimates (based on operational capability assessments) to allocate resources. This enables a more informed distribution of CS capabilities, allows the movement of resources in a predictive way before requests are made, and reduces the distress of filling emergency requests. Second, this structure considers the complete spectrum of CS resources. Each resource influences operational capability in some way, and hence must be prioritized and allocated in conjunction with the others. By codifying CS capability assessments, capability becomes a commodity, which can be managed like any other, with a single set of decision makers. While this management is ultimately broken down into the movement of individual resources, these resources are not managed individually, but rather in an integrated manner. Third, by establishing nodes to perform designated tasks, this structure is a consistent framework for decision making throughout all phases of operations. Because the standing nodes are devoted to the monitoring, prioritization, and reconfiguration of all CS resources, they are equally capable of addressing long-term weapon-system development considerations, peacetime training, or crisis-action planning and execution.

Although these responsibilities can be performed by different organizations in different theaters, the grouping of the tasks, the information required to complete them, and the products resulting from each task should not change from one theater to the next. Predefining the organizations to perform each task will ensure ownership of tasks, clear lines of communication, and a smoother transition as the level of operations expands and contracts.

Summary

With AEFs the Air Force has fundamentally changed the way it presents forces. However, that creates significant new challenges to the current CS structure. To meet the AEF’s stated objectives, the CS community has undertaken the challenge to completely reexamine its current support system. Since the AEF is the “way” the Air Force has structured itself to conduct operations and since doctrine represents the “how,” then appropriate CS doctrine must be developed that reflects the expeditionary mind-set and provides the appropriate guidelines. Evolving Air Force doctrine that incorporates the guiding C2 of CS principles highlighted in this article can be the necessary catalyst to enhance CS training, education, information systems, and decision-support tools. That doctrine should emphasize the importance of the C2 for CS, describe the basic objectives, functions, and activities of a CS C2 system, and define organizations to perform these functions and activities.

Once Air Force doctrine has guiding principles in place that describe C2 of CS, current processes can be revised to integrate Air Force CS and operations planning. Resources can then be allocated according to required capabilities and, with the creation of closed-loop planning and execution functions, better and more informed plans can be created. This revised process will enhance combatant command and Joint Staff–level planning.

Existing C2 organizations, each with their well-defined responsibilities, information flows, and clear chains of communication, are best positioned to facilitate CS planning and execution processes. The combination of these guiding principles and organizational structure will ultimately provide the means for effects-based CS. 

Notes

1. John R. Boyd, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing” (unpublished collection of briefing slides, Air University Library Document No. M-U43947, Maxwell AFB, Ala., August 1987).

2. John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988); and David E. Thaler, Strategies to Tasks, RAND Report MR-300-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993).

3. Brig Gen David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare (Arlington, Va.: Air and Space Education Foundation, 2001), on-line, Internet, 30 January 2003, available from http://www.aef.org/pub/psbook.pdf.

4. Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, on-line, Internet, 30 January 2003, available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/ jp1_02.pdf.

5. AFDD 2-8, Command and Control, 2001. This document defines the principles and tenets of C2 as unity of command, centralized control/decentralized execution, and informed decision-making. 

6. Lt Col William T. McDaniel Jr., “The Doctrinal Challenge: A Rebirth of Logistics Thought,” Air Force Journal of Logistics, winter 1986.

7. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1 September 1997.

8. Ibid.

9. AFDD 2-4, Combat Support, 22 November 1999.

10. James A. Leftwich et al., Supporting Expeditionary Aerospace Forces: An Operational Architecture for Combat Support Execution Planning and Control, RAND Report MR-1536-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002).

11. Elements of these concepts are described in the Air Force C2 CONOPS, vol. 3, and the AFMC C2 CONOPS; Raymond Pyles and Robert S. Tripp, Measuring and Managing Readiness: The Concept and Design of the Combat Support Capability Management System, RAND Report N-1840-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1982); and Leftwich et al.

12. Leftwich et al.

13. Deptula.

14. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 13-1AOC, “Operational Procedures- Air Operations Center,” vol. 3, July 2002.

15. Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff, US Air Force, Chief’s Sight Picture, subject: The Culture of Our Air and Space Expeditionary Force and the Value of Air Force Doctrine, 5 August 2002, on-line, Internet, 31 January 2003, available from http://www.af. mil/lib/sight.

16. Leftwich et al.

17. With today’s communications and computer technology, it can be argued that analysis cells of the virtual GIC at Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, and SPACECOM could assess and provide worldwide support for weapons systems that are combat, strategic lift and tanker, and space related, respectively. This would reduce the responsibilities of the OSCs to providing beddown support and transportation priorities among sites within the theater. Doctrine currently calls for the combatant commander to take support responsibilities for forces that are chopped to them for operational control. This was not followed during Operation Enduring Freedom, when AMC retained support responsibilities for some KC-10 and KC-135 units. Mission-capable rates for units that were engaged in-theater, but remained under AFMC’s support control, were higher than those that were supported by the combatant commander. This doctrine needs to be revisited. We have, however, assigned the assessment and control function to the theater OSC in this article.

18. AFDD 2-8, 31.

Maj Gen Terry L. Gabreski (BA, Louisiana State University; MPA, Golden Gate University) is the director of logistics, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, and the chief operating officer for the depot maintenance and supply management mission areas. She directs command-related issues in field maintenance and munitions, logistics plans, supply, transportation, and logistics data-system requirements fielding and sustainment. General Gabreski previously served as the director of maintenance for the deputy chief of staff for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters USAF; and as the director of logistics, Headquarters United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE). During her USAFE assignment, she also served as the logistics director for the commander of air force forces in support of the joint air component commander in Joint Task Force Noble Anvil and Operation Allied Force. General Gabreski has commanded three maintenance squadrons and a logistics group, and holds a master aircraft-maintenance badge and basic parachute rating. She is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, US Army Command and General Staff College, and Air War College.

Mr. James A. Leftwich (USAFA) is a staff member at RAND, where he has participated in AF research projects to evaluate alternative combat support postures. He has led research efforts to evaluate policy options for improving wing-level logistics and improving command and control of combat-support operations. He has also held management positions in industry. Mr. Leftwich served in the Air Force as a logistics plans officer at base, major command, and Air Staff levels, culminating as the chief of deployment policy, Headquarters USAF. Mr. Leftwich served on the battle staff of US Central Command’s Air Forces Rear during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He has several refereed publications in the field of logistics.

Col (Dr.) Robert Tripp, USAF, retired (BS, MS, Michigan Technical University; PhD, University of Minnesota), is a senior staff member at RAND. He has led Army and Air Force research projects to evaluate alternative combat-support postures. During the last several years, he has led research efforts to evaluate how support policy, practice, and technology options impact the effectiveness and efficiency of air and space expeditionary forces. Dr. Tripp has held corporate officer positions in industry, and he has served in the Air Force. Before he retired at the rank of colonel, he served in numerous logistics positions that included program manager of two large logistics information systems. Dr. Tripp has taught graduate and undergraduate courses in logistics, production management, management sciences, and management information systems at the Air Force Institute of Technology and the University of New Mexico. He chaired the Management Science and Management Information Systems Department at the Robert O. Andersen Schools of Management at the University of New Mexico. Dr. Tripp has numerous refereed publications in the fields of logistics and information systems.

Dr. C. Robert Roll Jr. (BA, University of California, Berkley; MA, PhD, Harvard University) is the director of RAND’s Project Air Force (PAF) Resource Management Program. He helps develop the PAF research agenda and manages Air Force–sponsored research programs. He served as the principal deputy director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, from 1983 to 1987. Dr. Roll was a faculty member of the RAND Graduate Institute and served in the Air Force. His active duty assignments included serving as a Chinese linguist with the Air Force Security Service and as a systems analyst in Strategic Air Command. He was awarded the Defense Distinguished Service Medal. Dr. Roll has numerous refereed publications in the fields of economics, logistics, and manpower and personnel.

Maj Cauley von Hoffman (BS, Vanderbilt University) is deputy chief of the USAF Logistics Management Agency’s Maintenance and Munitions Division. She has previously served as a fighter squadron flight commander for sortie generation, fuels management, and supply. Major von Hoffman orchestrated the logistics aspects for several Air Combat Command Blue Flag numbered air force, command-and-control exercises. She was the USAF logistics project officer for the first three expeditionary force experiments that tested and evaluated the emerging command-and-control technology and processes. She also led several studies on USAF logistics issues, including aircraft cannibalization and modeling the fidelity of command-and-control war games and exercises. Major von Hoffman is a graduate of Squadron Officer School.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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