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Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2003

Who We Are and What We Do:

The Evolution of the Air Force’s Core Competencies

In the inaugural issue of his policy letter, The Secretary’s Vector, Secretary of the Air Force James Roche publicly debuted an evolving construct for the Air Force’s core competencies.¹ A similar statement by the Air Force chief of staff in an issue of the Chief’s Sight Picture closely followed this pronouncement.² Influenced by the corporate-management style of today’s Department of Defense (DOD) as well as his own experiences in the defense industry, the secretary helped explain the change to the service’s own assertion of its identity by saying that "just as our concepts of operations and capabilities continually evolve, so also does the way we articulate Air Force competencies."³

The new definition hinges on perceiving three new core competencies- developing airmen, adapting technology to war fighting, and integrating operations- as a deeper refinement of the fundamental elements that identify the Air Force as a service. Further rationale offered in support of the new definition notes the retention of the previous six core competencies but characterizes them as "distinctive capabilities." In fact, this definition points out that the three new underlying institutional core competencies make the six distinctive capabilities possible.

One of the underpinnings of the Air Force’s current war-fighting doctrine publications, as expressed in the keystone Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, is the delineation of six core competencies (now capabilities): air and space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, precision engagement, information superiority, and agile combat support.⁴ This set of core competencies, whose introduction coincided with the Air Force–wide invigoration of war-fighting doctrine and the establishment of the Air Force Doctrine Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, in the mid-1990s, lay "at the heart of the Air Force’s strategic perspective and thereby at the heart of the Service’s contribution to our nation’s total military capabilities," according to AFDD 1. They were a statement of functions "that can be accomplished only by air and space forces" and "that confer advantages to the nation when performed by air and space forces."⁵ Put simply, the Air Force intended its core competencies to encapsulate what distinguished the Air Force from the other services in terms of war fighting.

These evolving Air Force perspectives on the concept of core competencies and capabilities are more substantive than any codification of a definition of the service’s identity. The new intellectual course will manifest itself across the full range of efforts to "organize, train, and equip," and will affect budgets, force structure, operations, training, and command-level decisions. More specifically, the new definition could complicate the Air Force’s continuing search for optimum alignment of its organizations and structure for managing and employing air and space power. The first noticeable manifestation of the changed perspective on core competencies- tied to "developing airmen"- is the recent announcement of the new force-development initiative, which will fundamentally change the way the service prepares its future leaders and will include substantially increased resources devoted to officer development.⁶

With so much riding on the core-competency concept, such a course correction should be the topic of robust Air Force discussion, possibly conducted through the more formalized and accepted doctrine-development process of today, to ensure that the changes are well understood and used for maximum institutional advantage. This article represents one voice in the discussion of the new competencies by reaffirming the value and soundness of the basic idea behind core competencies and by remembering that the earlier Air Force work to define the six core competencies was visionary, contains much that remains valid, and passes the doctrinal test of "learned experience." Retaining the original six competencies as distinctive capabilities affirms their value as parts of a framework that (1) defines the key components of air and space warfare, (2) identifies unique Air Force contributions to war fighting, (3) assists the Air Force in managing the intellectual properties of air and space warfare, and (4) shapes the Air Force budget as well as plans and programs for the future.

To correlate the concepts of competencies with capabilities, the new definition goes to the very heart and soul of the Air Force. The service must understand that the new competencies are intuitively necessary but not necessarily unique to it. As defined, the core competencies have much that could apply to the other services. Thus, failure to fully grasp the new core competencies may result in a missed opportunity to help airmen understand the separate but interlocking components that comprise the conduct of air and space warfare and distinguish the Air Force’s contribution to joint warfare. In other words, the common language implied in the new core competencies enhances a larger DOD joint vision, but airmen must be articulate enough to merge the new language with the six capabilities to communicate airpower’s unique contribution to the joint force.

Origins of the Air Force’s Core
 Competencies

In 1995 the secretary of the Air Force introduced the idea of core competencies to the service in an article published in Armed Forces Journal International; they appeared in their final six-item format in 1996 (table 1).⁷  

Table 1
Air Force Core Competencies:
Original (1995) and Present (since 1996)

One can also trace their origins to the Air Staff’s Strategy Division, directed by Maj Gen Robert E. Linhard during Gen Ronald R. Fogleman’s tenure as chief of staff.⁸ Additionally, germination of the competency concept was spurred by the Air Force’s internal intellectual debates on the service’s place in joint warfare, brought on by work of the Commission on Roles and Missions in the mid-1990s, as well as the first publication of the Joint Staff’s Joint Vision 2010 in November 1995. The concept’s development included efforts by both civilian and military agencies, coordinated with the secretary and chief of staff. Much effort, study, and thought went into the development of the core competencies, and even the current set underwent continual evaluation from within the Air Force. Introduction of the core-competencies construct also coincided with a concerted effort to invigorate the Air Force’s corporate focus, its understanding of war-fighting doctrine centered on the air campaign, and establishment of an Air Force Doctrine Center, mentioned above. Evolution of the core competencies spurred debate marked by inputs from a cross section of the Air Force and attracted senior-level involvement seeking to influence how the service thought of itself.

Business-School Definition of
Core Competence

The new Air Force definition draws upon "The Core Competence of the Corporation," an article written by professors C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel in the prominent business-school journal Harvard Business Review in 1990.⁹ At the time of its publication, many considered it a landmark article in the field of strategic management- and arguably one of the most influential published in the 1990s. Later reviews of its relevance were mixed, primarily due to questions about the long-term profitability of corporations held up as models, but generally the article had a strong effect on diversified organizations such as the Air Force. The entrance of the term core competency into the lexicon and the timing of its introduction suggest the article’s influence on the Air Force’s search to define its own core competencies.

Military professionals should use caution in applying lessons from the private sector (where profit is the driving motive) to government institutions, particularly when scholarly work appears to support one’s own beliefs. With that caveat in mind, after reading Prahalad and Hamel’s article, one is struck by how its examples, assertions, and conclusions could contribute to Air Force discussion and debate on the relationship between (obviously) competencies and capabilities, even though the authors do not specifically discuss capabilities.

Their central argument is that corporations should not view themselves as "bundles of businesses" that make products. Rather, companies must fashion themselves around a handful of specialized and unique talents at which they must excel. The authors maintain that top executives need to "identify, cultivate, and exploit the core competencies that make growth possible."¹⁰ Such unique specialties are neither the products they sell nor the production process for those products. Instead, these "core products" take the form of specialization in key and integral areas, including a full understanding of their advantages and limitations, coupled with deep insight into how these areas can be integrated with each other to produce new products.

A case study that compares corporate decisions by the electronics companies GTE (now Verizon) and NEC (originally, Nippon Electric Company) in the 1980s provides the point of departure for the article’s thesis. On the one hand, the authors acknowledge NEC’s wise corporate decisions, which articulate a strategic intent to "exploit the convergence of computing and communications," with success dependent upon acquiring competencies- particularly in semiconductors. NEC’s management made expertise in semiconductors the company’s most important core product and acquired the specialty of staying ahead of its competitors in fully comprehending semiconductors. On the other hand, Prahalad and Hamel chide GTE, saying that "no such clarity of strategic intent and strategic architecture appeared to exist at GTE."¹¹

By themselves, semiconductors were not the products NEC sold to consumers; however, the competency to produce and integrate them into the production of superior products such as TVs, telecommunications equipment, and computers was the core product integral to NEC’s overall business. Core competencies help exploit core products.

The new Air Force definition of core competencies clearly draws from the business example. Prahalad and Hamel define their core competencies as the "collective learning in the organization" (i.e., developing airmen); the ability to "coordinate diverse production skills" (i.e., integrating operations); and the ability to "integrate multiple streams of technology" (i.e., adapting technology to war fighting).¹²

Although one can apply many points of this NEC-GTE study to the Air Force and the idea of competencies rooted in air and space power, one must be careful about transferring a business/industry interpretation to the military case. As with NEC, the original Air Force concept used core competencies to help exploit core products. However, the difference now lies in the mix of the terms core products and core competencies, along with the entrance of the term capabilities into the dialogue. The Air Force has articulated six specialized capabilities for airmen to understand fully, cultivate, and exploit in their creation of the core product (i.e., applying air and space power to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives). The superiority of that product stems from the necessary and effective fusion of the six distinctive capabilities with the core competencies, which produces the Air Force’s ability to employ air and space power like no other air force in the world.

Our service’s contribution of air and space power to an integrated, effective joint campaign by combining the six distinctive capabilities then becomes the service’s core product provided to the military "businesses." Continuing the analogy, these businesses include such entities as the combatant commanders of US European Command (EUCOM), US Pacific Command (PACOM), or US Central Command (CENTCOM). The creation of additional markets, customers, and products in the air and space power example involves the ability to conduct tailored operations across the spectrum of conflict to meet the combatant commanders’ requirements for varying contingencies and crises (e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations [NEO]; humanitarian relief operations [HUMRO]; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]; and interdiction). Similarly, air and space operations are also effectively integrated into joint operations as part of the overall US military effort. Put simply, air and space power is to a combatant commander what semiconductors are to televisions, telecommunications, and computers.

One can translate this relationship among core competencies, capabilities, core products, businesses, and end products discussed in the business example to the military air and space power example (figs. 1 and 2). One can use the corporate model, as represented in the Prahalad and Hamel article, to depict how the Air Force’s core competencies and capabilities are integrated in order to create the core product (air and space power), which is then made available to the combatant commanders. The ability of the Air Force to provide focused air and space power comes from the appropriate fusion of the six distinctive capabilities and is influenced by the core competencies. Focused air and space power- the core product provided to the combatant commanders- can be further tailored to necessary operations across the spectrum of conflict.

Figure 2. The Air Force Example. Core competencies are fused with the six distinctive capabilities and then applied to the creation of the core product: focused air and space power.

Different Interpretations of
Core Competence

The inclusion of the original six core competencies in current published doctrine is decidedly centered around air and space power, but the message can be externally focused to assist the Air Force in communicating the message of its unique contribution to our nation’s total military capabilities. Indeed, a major theme of today’s war-fighting doctrine defines for airmen and the public what the Air Force uniquely brings to the joint war-fighting capability of the United States through the employment of air and space power.

Nowhere was this message more noticeable than in the budget process. When the Air Force introduced core competencies in 1995, they were recognized for their value in communicating the service’s priorities to the body with the greatest influence over Air Force requirements: the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which decided whether Air Force requirements were valid. Core competencies were the vehicle for transmitting what the Air Force could bring to the joint table. Core competencies extend the template for the Air Force to plan and think about its future; however, they must now remain inseparable from the distinctive capabilities in any discussion of what distinguishes the Air Force from the other services.

Admittedly, AFDD 1 notes that the original six core competencies are not doctrine per se but "are at the heart of the Air Force’s strategic perspective and thereby at the heart of the . . . contribution to our nation’s total military capabilities." They are the "basic areas of expertise or the specialties that the Air Force brings to any activity across the spectrum of military operations." The document goes on to say that, because the core competencies are "not optional" for the Air Force, they serve as a mandate for its "organize, train, and equip" efforts and thereby guide key Air Force and DOD decisions on personnel, force structure, and operations.¹³

Correspondingly, the newly minted definition of core competencies has a more inward, institutional focus. That is to say, its three components- developing airmen, adapting technology to war fighting, and integrating operations- focus on how the Air Force internally develops its capabilities for joint war fighting. The new definition further reasons that, in fact, these "underlying competencies" make the six distinctive capabilities possible. In the new language, "these three [new] air and space core competencies form the basis through which we organize, train, and equip and from which we derive our strengths as a service."¹⁴

Airmen must become fluent in the relationship between competencies and capabilities so they can convey characteristics that distinguish the Air Force from other services, as well as communicate to the larger defense community areas in which the Air Force has chosen to excel. The best example is the first new competency, developing airmen, which is not particularly different than what all services must accomplish. It is definitely not an optional task; however, it is similar to feeding troops three times a day- something every organization must do. All of the services must recruit, train, educate, and retain competent and qualified personnel. The other services take similar actions to develop soldiers, sailors, and marines. One can debate how well the Air Force develops airmen, but the Air Force corporately decides the importance of doing it well at each step. If the Air Force wishes to thrive both today and tomorrow, then the importance of developing airmen is intuitively understood.

The other two new competencies- adapting technology to war fighting and integrating operations- have a similar internal focus, intuitive importance, and commonality to other services (although in their own service-unique forms). History’s respected military forces have placed great importance on developing new technology and speeding it to the war fighter. Similarly, the great captains of history have intuitively understood the need to integrate multiple aspects of operations efficiently and effectively.

There is no doubt about the importance of these three concepts to the Air Force. Yet, by themselves, these new competencies cannot provide all the clarity and vision needed for the priority of efforts. Because the competencies are so important, yet so woven through all that the Air Force does, they cannot become the sole source of the service’s answer to its own critical question, What are the priorities for the "organize, train, and equip" mission of the Air Force? In that regard, the six distinctive capabilities provide the priorities and guidance so the Air Force can frame its "organize, train, and equip" efforts around the ability to provide focused air and space power. If a new technology, initiative, or mission does not contribute to the distinctive capabilities necessary for war fighting, the Air Force would cast a very jaundiced eye on pursuing the resources necessary for implementation.

Defining and Understanding
Competence and Capability

Another aspect of the discussion about the newly launched core competencies is simply the common understanding and context for using key words to shape the overall concept. The new definition clearly differentiates core competencies from capabilities, yet Air Force people must understand the inseparable but subtle relationship between the terms if they are to take maximum advantage of the possible internal and external messages they represent. In this regard, the Air Force may have more institutional work ahead to refine its own understanding of the concepts.

Here is why. If one uses root forms of the word (e.g., competent and capable) instead of variations and plural forms, a possible disconnect appears. This is particularly noticeable in understanding the term capabilities, a word widely used throughout DOD and one that may connote other ideas to individuals outside the Air Force. Analogies with sports and business can make the military usage easier to understand.

For example, one might say, "He is a competent quarterback" or "He is a competent weight lifter." What makes the player a competent quarterback? The answer is that he has certain capabilities that contribute to that competency. For instance, he is capable of throwing the football 60-plus yards, capable of avoiding the rush, and capable of running a 40-yard dash in 4.3 seconds to outrun defenders. Similarly, what makes a competent weight lifter? An individual who knows everything about training, nutrition, and equipment can be a talented, competent weight lifter but can still be only capable of lifting a certain number of pounds. Proper weight-lifting technique would be another capability required of this individual.

An assertion from these analogies is that a capability is bounded. It has elements of quantification, so one knows with some precision what exactly can be done. Another assertion holds that a competency involves a set of capabilities and that one can learn how to fuse those capabilities most effectively for a greater purpose. To use an Air Force analogy, one might say, "Air Mobility Command (AMC) is competent at the air-refueling mission" or "Air Combat Command (ACC) is competent at precision engagement." What makes AMC competent at the air-refueling mission? AMC is capable of refueling "X" number of aircraft, or, conversely, AMC is not capable of refueling every fighter in the Air Force at once. A KC-10 Extender is only capable of off-loading X-thousand pounds of fuel on one flight. Likewise, ACC is competent at precision engagement or the ability to deliver weapons to an intended target with great accuracy. The capabilities associated with precision engagement are defined by more precise measurements, such as circular error probable or by the precise accuracy and tolerances of the Global Positioning System.

In the air-refueling analogy, as in the sports example, a capability is bounded and can be measured and defined. Competency implies possessing a set of capabilities and a learned knowledge of how to use them effectively. The dictionary definition of competency describes having a "suitable or selective skill" (e.g., air refueling), but a capability is bounded by specific abilities. One does not say that a person has "unlimited competency" but that he or she has limited, or unlimited, or X amount of capability. For a corporation- such as the local power company- customers presume that it is competent to deliver power to them, but its capability can be measured by the number of megawatts of power it can generate.

Examples of the importance of definitions distinguishing competency from capability include the annual programming and budgeting decisions. In the more common vernacular of everyday usage, the Air Force knows what competencies it must have to prosecute air and space warfare, regardless of resource constraints. However, faced with finite resources, it must prioritize and then decide how much of each capability to buy. For each particular competency, the service needs several associated capabilities. For instance, the concept of rapid global mobility requires multiple capabilities, such as aerial refueling, airdrop, and en route structure. Information superiority requires capabilities in such areas as computers, electronics, and telecommunications. Service leaders and airmen at all levels must translate the new language of competency and capability for each other and for the joint community. They must understand that a competency uses a set of capabilities; it is not overtly based on a set of capabilities.

Competency describes what one must be able to do in a certain specialized area, while capability indicates the bounded limits of what can or cannot be done. Also, specific capabilities could change but not the requirement for the competency. For example, information superiority, rapid global mobility, and agile combat support (previously defined as core competencies) will always be critical to the Air Force’s success, yet the capabilities comprising those competencies may undergo changes, either in technology advancements or resource availability.

Why are these definitions so important? Communication and language are based on the shared understanding of words. Writers of the original Air Force definition of core competencies were truly visionary in their understanding of the opportunity to explain "who we are and what we do," not only to an Air Force audience, but also to the larger DOD. The new definitions represent an attempt to refine the original vision. As the Air Force embraces the new language, a more complete institutional understanding of the meaning and relationship between competencies and capabilities must evolve so that the service’s message to both the users of its core products- the combatant commands- and the public understand air and space power’s unique contribution. The Air Force, therefore, should not discount the valuable service that today’s six distinctive capabilities perform by communicating to both an internal Air Force audience and larger DOD audiences the specialized contributions made by air and space power to the American way of war.

Aligning Air Force
Organizations and Structure
with Intellectual Properties

The concepts behind the new distinctive capabilities also perform another important role, based on their ability to communicate the message of "who we are and what we do." The Air Force (as do all the services in their own ways) constantly evaluates itself to improve its expertise in air and space power. It does so by making decisions that align organizations and structures to develop, nurture, and care for the intellectual properties (e.g., missions, roles, tasks, functions, concepts, capabilities, technologies, etc.) of air and space power. Even with the newly minted six distinctive capabilities, the existing alignment of Air Force organizations and structures with the intellectual properties of air and space power deserves further attention.

Prior to the new definition, the Air Force had six core competencies, seven programming-function concepts of operations (CONOPS) that did not correspond to the core competencies, and seven Air Force–wide battle labs that did not match either the core competencies or the seven CONOPS. Further interspersed within the Air Force are 17 defined air and space power functions (ideas) and several warfare centers (organizations). These intertwined organizational structures, competencies, CONOPS, and so forth also do not necessarily align with the existing major commands (MAJCOM), several of which are functionally oriented (table 2).

As the Air Force institutionalizes the new definition of the core competencies, it must realize that the competencies could complicate the service’s pursuit of optimum alignment of its organizations and structures with the intellectual properties of air and space power. Adding three new core competencies to the mix could increase pressures to focus an additional or a disproportionate share of resources on the new competencies themselves, even though they are intuitively necessary for the Air Force. Doing so could potentially lead to a loss of focus on the critical components necessary to construct the air campaign.

Table 2

Current Air Force Organizations/Structures Related to 
the Intellectual Properties of Air and Space Power

If one accepts the idea that the key contribution of the Air Force to joint war fighting is the ability to apply airpower to a broad range of strategic, operational, and tactical challenges, then it follows that the newly defined distinctive capabilities are the necessary components for that campaign. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to explore the connections and alignment of the 17 air and space power functions under the six capabilities. In fact, these capabilities may actually be better focal points for the programming and budgeting cycles than the relatively new CONOPS. In any case, the three new competencies by themselves may not be able to contribute to a better organizational scheme to manage these relationships.

Use of the
Doctrine-Development Process

If the Air Force is to embrace the revised definition of its core competencies, its current doctrine publications, as well as other public documents, will need revision. The concepts behind the six redesignated distinctive capabilities have proved valuable, and the capabilities themselves have held up well since their original introduction as competencies. Indeed, they remain in a variety of publications, such as AFDD 1 (which is awaiting revision), where they are prominently discussed, and they appeared as recently as 2002 in the Air Force Posture Statement. Even more recent publications, such as 50 More Questions Every Airman Can Answer, include the six core competencies.¹⁵ They have gained institutional acceptance and influence by the doctrinal definition of "knowledge gained primarily from . . . experience."¹⁶

The Air Force appears poised to institutionalize the revised definition of core competencies without having used an institutional vetting process and a public-information campaign to allow for discussion, debate, and earned acceptance by the larger Air Force community. If it does so, it will have bypassed the current doctrine-development process that has taken time, effort, and command focus to establish. Assurance and validation of widespread acceptance of such a conceptual idea require that vetting within the air and space power community take place. We must remember that the original set of Air Force core competencies developed over a period of time with myriad inputs, albeit without today’s formal doctrine development.

Since the introduction of the core-competency concept in the mid-1990s, the Air Force has adopted a more formal and mature doctrine-development process that utilizes continuous evolution to develop, deploy, and employ air and space power doctrine, as well as clarify the service’s positions on joint and multiservice doctrine. Lessons learned through corporate Air Force experience over time are key components of this process, which entails intellectual investigation as well as practical application. It employs a variety of mechanisms to develop Air Force doctrine, including the academic resources of the service’s educational system and the operational experience gained in the field through actual operations, exercises, war games, and periodic assessments.

As this cycle works in the full development and understanding of the three new core competencies, we Air Force members can reasonably expect to witness discussion of the relationships between competencies and capabilities. We should consider the impact on possible programming and budgeting decisions; compare the new competencies to the originals and discuss the differences, as well as determine if there are advantages to the new definitions; and take the new language to the joint community and gauge its reaction for new insights. But, above all, we must use the intellectual rigor of the educational and doctrine-development vetting processes to make sure the Air Force "has it right" for this stage in its evolution.

Conclusions and
Recommendations

No matter how the evolution of the Air Force’s core competencies proceeds, they remain a significant influence on today’s service, as well as on tomorrow’s. There is no doubt that the three new core competencies are essential and intuitively necessary for the success of the Air Force. Institutional understanding of the symbiotic relationship between competencies and capabilities will also have an enormous impact. Taken together, these concepts will remain integral to the ability of the Air Force to employ airpower- the service’s central contribution to joint war fighting. Therefore, people affiliated with the Air Force and air and space power must understand this relationship.

Does the new evolutionary construct for core competencies and capabilities offer complete understanding of the Air Force’s identity? No. Does it raise additional, important questions? Yes. Nonetheless, the articulation of today’s new core competencies, combined with further acknowledgement of the value of the concepts behind the six redesignated Air Force distinctive capabilities, takes advantage of an opportunity to frame the contributions of air and space power to joint warfare. Together they help explain air and space power to the war-fighting combatant commanders. For airmen, they provide a sensible construct whereby the components necessary for employing airpower are identified and fused. They also help reveal the core of institutional foundations that are intuitively necessary for the Air Force and all the services. The Air Force should continue to embrace the important concept of core competencies. The early sound byte that touted their institutional value still applies. The core competencies truly contribute to the definition of "who we are and what we do." 

Notes

1. Dr. James G. Roche, secretary of the Air Force, The Secretary’s Vector, 14 January 2003.

2. Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the Air Force, Chief’s Sight Picture, 15 January 2003.

3. Roche, 1.

4. For a more complete definition of the current Air Force concept of core competencies and an explanation of the six core competencies, see Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, September 1997, 27–35.

5. Ibid., 27.

6. Gordon Trowbridge, “Shooting for the Stars,” Air Force Times, 11 November 2002.

7. Sheila Widnall, secretary of the Air Force, “Beyond the Drawdown: U.S. Air Force Is Prepared to Support the National Military Strategy,” Armed Forces Journal International, September 1995, 43–45.

8. Maj Steven G. Seroka, “In Search of an Identity: Air Force Core Competencies” (thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., June 1997), 10.

9. C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, “The Core Competence of the Corporation,” Harvard Business Review 68 (May–June 1990): 79–91.

10. Ibid., 79.

11. Ibid., 82. Interestingly, GTE surpassed NEC in terms of profitability throughout the 1980s and 1990s. By the mid-to-late 1990s, NEC found itself struggling after it replaced its chief executive officer (who championed NEC’s “core competence”) and the new one steered the company away from its core competence in attempts to regain profitability.

12. Ibid., 81–83.

13. AFDD 1, 27.

14. House Armed Services Committee, Posture Statement of the Honorable James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force, and General John P. Jumper, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, before the 108th Congress, House Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 27 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 17 April 2003, available from http://armed services.house.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/ 108thcongress/03-02-27airforce.html.

15. Frederick L. “Fritz” Baier, 50 More Questions Every Airman Can Answer (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Force Doctrine Center, distributed by Air University Press, April 2002), 12–13.

16. AFDD 1, 1.

Col Chris J. Krisinger (USAFA; MA, Webster University; MA, Naval War College) is chief of the Doctrine and Policy Division, Directorate of Plans and Programs, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Illinois. A command pilot with more than 3,300 hours of flight time, primarily in the C-130 Hercules aircraft, he has served flying tours at Pope AFB, North Carolina, and Little Rock AFB, Arkansas, as well as an exchange tour flying C-130s with the Canadian Forces at CFB Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. His staff assignments have included tours as an action officer at Headquarters Military Airlift Command, Scott AFB; chief of plans, Joint Contact Team Program, US European Command, Stuttgart, Germany; deputy chief of the Strategy, Concepts, and Doctrine Division, Air Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.; and military advisor to the European Bureau, Department of State, Washington, D.C. A resident graduate of Squadron Officer School and Armed Forces Staff College and a distinguished graduate of the Naval Command and Staff Course at the US Naval War College, he also studied as a National Defense Fellow at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University. Colonel Krisinger is the author of numerous articles on air-mobility topics.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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