Editorial Abstract: Colonel Hammock examines the generally favorable actions and views of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in response to the announced US strategy of preemption and the recent implementation of that policy in Iraq.

Iraq, Preemption, and the Views of Poland,
the Czech Republic, and Hungary

We’ll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.

- President George W. Bush

Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary see merit in many of the arguments supporting the announced US strategy of preemption and, particularly, the recent implementation of that strategy in Iraq. They would, nevertheless, have preferred to avoid "choosing sides" between the important countries and bodies involved in that discussion (i.e., the United States, individual European nations, the European Union [EU], the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], and the United Nations [UN] and its Security Council). However, when compelled to do so, Polish leaders emerge as the most supportive of US actions with the Czech and Hungarian leaders not far behind. Hungary, though, seems to be losing steam in the longer term. This article reviews the US policy of preemption, and the sequence of international political events relating to the application of that policy in Iraq; it then examines the views and actions of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

The US National Security Strategy
and Preemption

The words of President Bush, quoted in the opening epigraph and spoken during his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002,¹ were eventually integrated into the new National Security Strategy, which he signed on 17 September 2002. That strategy asserted that "we must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends" (emphasis added).² It also outlined three criteria- the inability to deter, the immediacy of the threat, and the magnitude of the potential harm- that when combined cause a situation to warrant "preemptive" action.³

Importantly, the new US policy can be triggered by either a capability or simply an effort to obtain a capability, when it is combined with a presumed hostile intent. This new standard is a significant relaxation of the long-standing, apparent requirement for such a use of force.⁴More to the point, it injects a fair amount of subjective judgment into an equation that had historically been more objective in nature.

Throwing Down the Gauntlet
to the UN

On 12 September 2002, President Bush addressed the UN General Assembly and detailed Iraq’s history of noncompliance and deception regarding previous Security Council resolutions; more importantly, he challenged the UN to become the full-bodied institution its founders intended and pledged the United States to work with the UN to that end. That said, President Bush made clear his resolve, that should the Security Council fail to measure up to the task, the United States would fill the resultant breach.⁵

Congressional Approval of
Use of Force against Iraq

On 16 October 2002, President Bush signed into law House Joint Resolution 114, which allowed force against Iraq.⁶ Although debate on the measure was fairly abbreviated, the resulting measure was comprehensive in both its scope and design.⁷ The resolution articulated a rationale for the United States to take preemptive action in self-defense, supported presidential efforts to work with and through the Security Council, and authorized the use of force in self-defense or to enforce Security Council resolutions.⁸ Finally, the resolution entrusted solely to the president any future decision to use force- requiring at that future time the president to determine that

In short, Congress provided the president sufficient flexibility to act in the nation’s defense with the caveat that force was the option of last resort, should be consistent with the larger strategic war on terrorism, and would be best accomplished by and through the Security Council.

UN Security Council
Resolution 1441-
Implementation and Aftermath

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution (UNSCR) 1441 on 8 November 2002, which, inter alia, held Iraq in "material breach" of its obligations under previous resolutions, afforded Iraq a "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations," required Iraq to declare all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and accompanying delivery systems, and provided for an enhanced inspection regimen.¹⁰ The Security Council warned Iraq of "serious consequences" in the event of continued violations and decided to remain "seized" of the matter.¹¹

During January–February 2003, public and often visceral posturing by Germany (one of the six nonpermanent members of the Security Council and whose representative served as its president during the month of February 2003) and the five permanent members of the Security Council caused deep divisions: first in the Security Council, then in the EU, and finally in NATO. Germany set the divisive process in motion on 22 September 2002 when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder "snatched victory from the jaws of defeat" for his Green Party through a rash, last-minute promise to not support or participate in any later action against Iraq. Chancellor Schröder compounded the divide further by convincing President Jacques Chirac of France to back out of his gentleman’s agreement with the United States- an agreement to not force a second UN resolution- in exchange for a power-play move that would permit France and Germany to dominate the European Council.¹² The issue that had initially separated the United States from three of the Council’s permanent members (France, Russia, and China) was their desire to allow the UN inspectors additional time. Britain also supported giving the inspectors "the time they need," but with Prime Minister Tony Blair’s caveat that he could foresee military action without a second resolution if such a resolution were vetoed "unreasonably" (i.e., in the face of a clear report from inspectors that Iraq was not cooperating).¹³

An EU rift erupted on 30 January 2003 as the leaders of eight of its member countries (Spain, Britain, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) publicly endorsed the US position on Iraq in a written declaration published in newspapers in both Europe and the United States. Their action caught leaders of the EU, France, and Germany by surprise. In addition, the synergy of that action and Secretary of State Colin Powell’s address to the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003 helped prompt the "Vilnius 10" (the NATO-candidate and near-candidate countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) to publicly endorse the US position on that same day. Their action provoked an intemperate rebuke from President Chirac.¹⁴

NATO became divided on 11 February 2003 over Turkey’s request for defensive assistance in anticipation of retaliatory acts by Iraq for Turkey’s (expected) support of the coalition. France, Germany, and Belgium vetoed the measure, calling it "premature." Although this issue was later resolved, these countries did not relish the prospect of being pulled into conflict by their collective self-defense responsibilities (contained in Article 5 of the NATO treaty) to indirectly support US-initiated offensive operations that some felt were not sanctioned by the Security Council.¹⁵

In the midst of this posturing and in various public statements, President George Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made clear the United States’s intention to press forward in the face of continued Iraqi intransigence- with or without specific authority from the UN.¹⁶At about the same time, UN secretary-general Kofi Anan stated his view that a second UN resolution was a prerequisite for the legitimate use of force.¹⁷ Following the onset of hostilities, the United States publicly disagreed with this view.¹⁸ Within the context of this international backdrop, we turn our examination to the views and actions of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

Commonalty and Differences
amongst the Three Countries

Although there is much to make each of the three countries and their actions unique, there are also three historic events that they have in common. The significance of those events warrants their specific mention: the conflict in Kosovo, the Prague Summit, and the 30 January 2003 "Statement of Eight."

Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic entered NATO together on 12 March 1999, and within days, all three cast their first vote in the alliance to back the use of armed force in Kosovo. In Hungary and especially the Czech Republic, this vote came against a difficult domestic backdrop- given the long-standing ties with the neighboring region and the genuine risk of spreading the conflict. Nevertheless, their support was unequivocal, as NATO was viewed as the essential guarantor of each country’s future security.¹⁹ This was not only the first vote these countries cast, it was also the first "out of scope" action authorized by NATO- an interesting introduction to NATO.

Following the Security Council’s unanimous approval of UNSCR 1441, these three countries joined with the other 16 NATO countries at the Prague Summit on 21 November 2002 and unanimously endorsed that UN resolution. Their joint statement concluded with the following words: "NATO Allies stand united in their commitment to take effective action to assist and support the efforts of the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq, without conditions or restrictions, with UNSCR 1441. We recall that the Security Council in this resolution has warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violation of its obligations."²⁰

Finally, these three countries joined the Statement of Eight in supporting the US posture on Iraq. Of importance, however, is their collective view that the UN Security Council occupy the central and formative role in maintaining peace and security, as reflected in the statement’s concluding paragraph:

In short, the eight countries clearly share the US view on the apparent need for the use of force in Iraq, though they may not wholly share the US view on the legality of the use of such force absent specific UN authorization.

Poland is a nation committed to NATO, the UN, and a multilateralist approach, while at the same time it supports philosophically and substantively the US response to the changed world condition after the events of 11 September 2001.²² Additionally, Poland’s leaders offer constructive insight and "ways ahead" for progress. Mr. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Poland’s minister for foreign affairs, has been at the forefront of urging a structural reexamination of the concept of preventive action in response to emerging, and not just imminent, threats- the latter having long served as justification for preemptive action. On 6 March 2003, in an address in New Zealand, he intimated that change was necessary and that the Iraq crisis could serve as the catalyst for producing that change. In that forum, he invited UN members to create a new basis for a global security system and to squarely address one of the most important security issues of the day:

On 19 March 2003- the eve of hostilities as Mr. Bush’s ultimatum to Iraq was running out- the Polish Council of Ministers issued a statement endorsing the president of Poland’s request to commit military support to the coalition forming against Iraq. That statement emphasized several important points: force as an option of last resort in international relations, and the failure to take action to disarm Iraq in this situation would be a serious political and military mistake. The Council approved the president’s request, while capping participation at 200 soldiers, noting that

Poland had already made a significant contribution to the larger international war against terrorism. That included the deployment of combat engineers and logistics forces to Bagram, Afghanistan, where they cleared over 4,000 square meters of land, and the deployment of a special operations unit, as well as a logistics support ship to US Central Command (CENTCOM) for its use in maritime and leadership interdiction operations.²⁵It was one of only 11 countries whose contribution to the coalition was singled out by President Bush in a 27 March 2003 speech to the CENTCOM troops at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida:

During my in-country conversations with Polish officials as well as Christopher R. Hill, the US ambassador to Poland, several of the above points were expanded. In short, the Polish position not only supported the United States, but also intellectually supported its rationale.

Ambassador Hill noted that the Statement of Eight was a genuine reaction of those nations- not a US brainchild- to what they viewed as the French and Germans speaking out of turn on Iraq during the celebration of the Elysee Treaty’s 40th anniversary. As Ambassador Hill noted, this prompted Chancellor Schröder to place a nasty call to Prime Minister Leszek Miller of Poland to complain bitterly about not being consulted. President Miller aptly noted in response that Poland had not been consulted prior to the French and German statement.²⁷

Mr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the former minister of national defense for Poland, made clear his view that preventive war was a necessary option for the United States to retain. In support for his position, he noted that in 1934, Poland had urged France to pursue preventive military action against Germany. His concern was that it was important that the United States flesh out the criteria for its use- what would be the exception, and what would be the norm. He noted that countries developing WMDs served as a good tripwire. Mr. Onyszkiewic also expressed concern that the United States had not thoroughly thought through its preemption policy and as a consequence, could not accurately anticipate the potential and probable consequences emanating from it.²⁸

The Czech Republic, although understanding the necessity of preventive action in certain situations- particularly involving WMDs- is a nation committed to seeing that when force is used in international relations, it is done so under the rubric of the UN. If Poland’s cardinal rule is "First do no harm to NATO," then the Czech Republic’s corollary is "Please don’t make us choose between being pro-Atlantic and pro-Europe."²⁹ The republic’s "straddle" position was exacerbated by the gap between the end of the term of President Vaclav Havel- a staunchly pro-US figure- and the 7 March 2003 inauguration of Vaclav Klaus- a brilliant, if less enthusiastic, ally.³⁰

In official statements, the Czech Republic consistently advocated that the UN adopt the US view on Iraq. On 5 February 2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that

Officially listed as a member of the "Coalition of the Willing," the Czech MFA’s statement on the eve of war was a tepid endorsement of the coalition’s effort. It also delimited its military contributions to a nuclear, biological, and chemical protection battalion in the event of WMD use or reasonable suspicion of its use against civilians or coalition forces. At the same time, the MFA signaled its willingness to provide humanitarian assistance during the war and to aid in the postwar reconstruction effort.³² The Czech Republic made significant contributions to both the effort in Afghanistan as well as to the then looming conflict in Iraq.³³ That support included stationing country representatives at CENTCOM, providing basing and overflight permission, deploying 251 personnel to Kuwait for combating the effects of possible WMD employment, donating military uniforms to the Afghan national army, deploying a 150-man hospital unit to Bagram, and providing air transport support to NATO for early warning missions- support that earned President Bush’s public recognition.³⁴ Finally, the Czech Republic promptly expelled the Iraqi chargés d’affaires just days after the United States asked all countries to take such action.³⁵

During the in-country conversations with Czech officials, our team did not develop any real insights into how the Czech Republic views the US policy of preemption. However, in an extended informal exchange with the top lawyer in the republic’s Ministry of Defense, he commented that he had been asked to issue an opinion on the legality of the Coalition of the Willing in light of the provisions in the UN charter. His elicited opinion was that no such authority existed; that opinion was returned with the request that he study the issue further.³⁶ In sum, the Czech Republic sees the UN as the only vehicle for collective action, but it also seeks to fully support US actions, as long as that does not compromise its basic worldview. Successfully maintaining a political posture such as this requires careful parsing, which was much in evidence in the words and actions of the Czech Republic.

The US deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Budapest noted that the Hungarian government signed the Statement of Eight, then immediately backtracked.³⁷ Perhaps, this is due to Hungary’s own discordant public opinion and the conflict inherent in her foreign-policy goal to improve relationships with the United States, Russia, and her neighbors. It’s noteworthy that the issues surrounding the Iraqi crisis received scant attention on the Web site of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or that of the Embassy of the United States in Budapest.³⁸

Hungary’s apparently quixotic support is prompted by the realization that its support for the coalition might produce an undesired security risk. More to the point, Hungary agreed to allow the United States to use Taszar Air Base to train some 3,000 Iraqi exiles for possible postwar administrative roles.³⁹ Hungarians- who were opposed to a war with Iraq and were opposed to the training at Taszar by figures of 80 and 60 percent, respectively- fear that these actions risk sparking terrorist action against Hungary.⁴⁰In some sense, Hungary’s after-the-fact hand-wringing mirrors problems encountered in integrating its military with NATO. A dominant theme that emerged during our meetings with Hungarian counterparts was that Hungary was asked to commit resources to NATO without first fully understanding what that commitment actually entailed.⁴¹

Hungary does understand- even with its reservations- that 11 September 2001 changed the world’s political equation. If the Czech Republic’s concern is "Please don’t make us choose between being pro-Atlantic and pro-Europe," then the Hungarian offshoot is more fatalistic- it is that "No matter what we do, we will be seen as disloyal to France and Germany, or to the US."⁴² Hungary is supportive of US preventive action in striking against terrorism- particularly against nonstate actors, which are not easily influenced by UN Security Council action. Notwithstanding, Hungary believes that there must be international consensus on the desired end state of a military campaign and the political goals to be realized.⁴³ Given the lack of such consensus, Hungary has stepped forward and taken on the role of fence-mender between the members of NATO. This is partially explained by Hungary’s historical orientation towards Germany and France, and its friendship with Britain and the United States. In this regard, Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy of Hungary was the first European leader to be received in France’s Elysee Palace following President Chirac’s intemperate remarks; this is consistent with his fence-mender’s role in smoothing over differences of opinion in the transatlantic alliance.⁴⁴ Remaining consistent with this policy, Hungary permitted the United States and Britain to use Hungarian airspace and designated airports for its war in Iraq, while it threw "a diplomatic bone" to France by refusing to expel the Iraqi chargés d’affaires as requested by the United States.⁴⁵ In short, Hungary appears to be actively engaged in working both sides of the street, with the hope of reducing the differences between NATO members, and the expectation of having friendly relations and being welcomed by both sides.

Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the United States share common values and a common understanding that the use of force is a necessary- if undesirable- tool in preserving peace and security, as well as earning and maintaining one’s freedom. When they were reluctantly compelled to take sides in the case of Iraq, each sided with the United States- each with varying amounts of reservation as to the road ahead, but with the hope that the normal order of international relations will once again turn to multilateralism through the auspices of the UN, NATO, and, in the future, the EU. These countries share multiple borders and view robust collective security organizations as the guarantor of a more certain future for themselves individually and for Europe at large. In many ways their stance mirrors that of our Congress- they support the military action but state a preference for action under the mantle of UN authority. All of these three countries emerged from the Iraq matter with- to some degree- a foot in each camp and can now serve as effective "bridge builders" in smoothing over bitter feelings between some members of the UN and NATO and help both institutions achieve greater importance and attain a more robust character.

1. President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 28 January 2002, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.

2. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C., 17 September 2002), 14, on-line, Internet, 16 June 2003, available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ nss.pdf. Pay special attention to the word threaten- the policy now targets nascent capabilities.

4. On 7 October 2002, Sen. Arlen Specter restated, in the well of the Senate, the long-standing international norm with respect to preemptive action. He noted: “In evaluating the time when preemptive action may be used, Secretary of State Daniel Webster, in dealing with the so-called Caroline incident, in 1837, when British troops attacked and sank an American ship . . . made a point that an intrusion into the territory of another State can be justified as an act of self defense only in those: [C]ases in which the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming and leaves no choice of means and no moment of deliberation” (emphasis added). Senate, Delegation of Congressional Authority, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 7 October 2002, S10004, on-line, Internet, 17 June 2003, available from http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate.cgi? WAIS docID=85668724316+1+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve.

5. President George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President in an Address to the United Nations General Assembly,” United Nations Headquarters, New York, N.Y., 12 September 2002, on-line, Internet, 17 June 2003, available from http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html.

6. President George W. Bush, remarks made when signing House Joint Resolution (H.J.R.) 114, White House, Washington, D.C., 16 October 2002, on-line, Internet, 17 June 2003, available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/2002 1016-1.html.

7. Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.J.R. 114, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 16 October 2002, was enacted as Public Law 107-243, 116 Stat 1498-1502, on-line, Internet, 17 June 2003, available from http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f: publ243.107.pdf.

8. Ibid. The resolution noted, inter alia, that in his address to the UN, President Bush committed the United States to “work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge” posed by Iraq.

10. UN Security Council Resolution 1441, “The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait,” 8 November 2002, especially paragraphs 1–3 and 5–7. Note that 1441 referenced 11 of the 25 prior resolutions regarding Iraq. On-line, Internet, 18 June 2003, available from http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/ iraqres.pdf.

11. Ibid. See paragraphs 13 and 14. “Seized” is a diplomatic term denoting intense interest in and continued oversight and direction of a particular issue or problem. Conversation with Mr. Earle St. A. Scarlett, Department of State advisor to Air War College (AWC).

12. William Safire, “Bad Herr Dye,” New York Times, Thursday, 23 January 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from "http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/23/opinion/23SAFI.html".

13. Glenn Kessler, “Verdict Unclear; UN Divide Is Not: Diplomats Find Justifications for and against Iraq Invasion,” Washington Post, Tuesday, 28 January 2003, A13, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ articles/A52076-2003Jan27.html.

14. Editorial, “United We Stand,” Wall Street Journal, Thursday, 30 January 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110002994; Glenn Frankel and Keith B. Richburg, “8 Leaders in Europe Back Bush on Iraq,” Washington Post, Friday, 31 January 2003, A16, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.washington post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3685-2003Jan30.html; the text of the Vilnius Group Statement is on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.bulgaria-embassy.org/!/02052003-01.htm; and David R. Sands, “Continental Divide,” Washington Times, Sunday, 9 February 2003.

15. Steven R. Weisman, “US Demands Iraq Show Cooperation by This Weekend,” New York Times, Monday, 10 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.ny times.com/2003/02/10/international/middleeast/10DIPL.html; and Richard Bernstein with Steven R. Weisman, “NATO Settles Rift over Aid to Turks in Case of a War,” New York Times, Monday, 17 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/17/international/europe/ 17IRAQ.html.

16. President Bush, State of the Union; Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, briefing at the Foreign Press Center, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 22 January 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm; and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, remarks to the United Nations Security Council, United Nations Headquarters, New York City, 5 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from "http://dod.mil/news/Jan2003/t01232003_t0122sdfpc.html".

17. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, comments delivered by Lakhdar Brahimi to the Thirteenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 24 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.un.org/News/ Press/docs/2003/sgsm8616.doc.htm.

18. The State Department’s top lawyer, William Howard Taft IV, stated that clear UN authority for the use of force was derived from UN Security Council Resolutions 678, 687, and 1441. Also, Mr. Taft noted that the United States could proceed under the theory of self-defense. Peter Slevin, “U.S. Says War Has Legal Basis- Reliance on Gulf War Resolutions Is Questioned by Others,” Washington Post, Friday, 21 March 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A1332-2003Mar20.html.

19. Fred Coleman, “NATO Newcomers Plunged into Conflict,” USA TODAY, Wednesday, 23 April 1999, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/ kosovo//koso396.htm.

20. Prague Summit Statement on Iraq, Prague, Czech Republic, 21 November 2002, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.czechembassy.org/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id= 15683&ido=10094&idj=36.

21. Editorial, “United We Stand,” Wall Street Journal, Thursday, 30 January 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from "http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110002994".

22. Mr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Poland’s minister of national defense, said that their adaptation of the “Hippocratic Oath” is “first do no harm to NATO” in comments to US AWC contingent at the Polish Armed Defense Forces Headquarters, Warsaw, Poland, 3 March 2003.

23. Mr. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Poland’s former prime minister and current minister for foreign affairs, “Poland in the Changing International Environment at the Dawn of the 21st Century,” lecture, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, New Zealand, 6 March 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from "http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php".

24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, “Statement of the Council of Ministers,” Warsaw, Poland, 19 March 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from "http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php".

25. US State Department Fact Sheet, “International Contributions to the War against Terrorism,” 14 June 2002, on-line, Internet, 20 June 2003, available from http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/ pol/terror/020815contribute.htm.

26. President George W. Bush, remarks made at Headquarters CENTCOM, MacDill AFB, Fla., 27 March 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from http://www.usinfo.pl/docs/cc_ transcript.htm.

27. US Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, remarks to AWC contingent, US Embassy, Warsaw, Poland, 3 March 2003.

29. Mr. Ivan Pocuch, deputy director of security policy for the Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), remarks to AWC contingent at the MFA, Prague, Czech Republic, 6 March 2003.

30. US Country Team, remarks to AWC contingent, US Embassy, Prague, Czech Republic, 6 March 2003.

31. Czech Republic MFA, Statement on the UN Security Council Meeting of 5 February 2003, MFA, Prague, Czech Republic, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from http:// www.czechembassy.org/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id=16585&ido= 6569&idj=2.

32. Czech Republic MFA, Statement on the Situation Concerning Iraq, MFA, Prague, Czech Republic, 19 March 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from http://www.czech embassy.org/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id=17669&ido=6569&idj= 2&amb=1.

33. US State Department Fact Sheet, “International Contributions to the War against Terrorism,” Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 14 June 2002, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/020815 contribute.htm.

35. Czech Republic MFA, Statement of the Expulsion of the Iraqi Chargé d´affaires,” MFA, Prague, Czech Republic, 24 March 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from http://www. czechembassy.org/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id=17724&ido=6569&idj=2&amb=1.

36. Czech Republic Ministry of Defence attorney, conversation with AWC contingent, informal social gathering, Prague, Czech Republic, 6 March 2003.

37. Ms. Janet E. Garvey, remarks to AWC contingent, US Embassy, Budapest, Hungary, 11 March 2003.

38. There was only one mention of Iraq on each Web page. The first reads as follows: “Prime Minister of Hungary and leaders of Britain, Spain, Portugal, Italy, the Czech Republic, Poland and Denmark call for Europe and [the] United States to stand united.” Hungarian MFA Web site, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/Templates/ CikkSablonAlt.aspx?NRMODE=Published&NRORIGINAL URL=%2fKulugyminiszterium%2fEN%2fissues%2firaq%2ehtm&NRNODEGUID=%7b95D0625D-E625-45BF-B57E-6 D061716F536%7d&NRCACHEHINT=NoModifyGuest; the other statement- informative, vice positional- was issued following Secretary Powell’s address to the UN on 5 February 2003. Laszló Kovács, Hungarian minister for foreign affairs, statement on Iraq, Budapest, Hungary, 5 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from http://www.kum.hu/Szovivoi/2003/02/ spok0205.htm.

39. Adam LeBor, “Government Decision on Taszar Sends a Message to the World,” Budapest Sun, 23 January 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from http://www.budapestsun. com/full_story.asp?ArticleId={CCC2D4052AF142018C8895CC0E768440}&From=News%20-%20Editorial.

40. Eszter Balazs, “Taszar Fears Run High,” Budapest Sun, 23 January 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from http://www.budapestsun.com/full_story.asp?ArticleId={378EA18D58D74050B166DF9A47482AC9}&From=News; and Tamas Kiss, “First Iraqi Volunteers Touch Down in Taszar,” Budapest Sun, 6 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from "http://www.budapestsun.com/full_story.asp?ArticleId={996D24ABE94D45BD8708E598AB6D2A96}&From=News".

41. Hungary’s complaint was that once it had committed to providing certain types of forces to the alliance, NATO then explained what the requirements for such forces were.

42. Eszter Balazs, “PM Dismisses Chirac Outburst as ‘Mistake,’” Budapest Sun, 27 February 2003, on-line, Internet, 24 June 2003, available from http://www.budapestsun.com/full_story.asp?Article Id={AE10B03F701D46BD8BDC09700CA26E3E}&From=News.

43. Gyorgy Rabai, administrative assistant, Hungarian minister of defence, to AWC contingent at the Ministry of Defence in Budapest, 11 March 2003.

44. Eszter Balazs, “Chirac Assures PM of Continued EU Support,” Budapest Sun, 13 March 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www.budapestsun.com/full_story.asp?Article Id={7A773B3DC78B45348BF262B7B0CB655A}&From=News.

45. Eszter Balazs, “Iraq Airspace Decision,” Budapest Sun, 20 March 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http:// www.budapestsun.com/full_story.asp?ArticleId={8D0E14F3FF1B43CD9E096B40FCB315BB}&From=News; and idem, “Hungary Rejects US Iraq Embassy Request,” Budapest Sun, 27 March 2003, on-line, Internet, 19 June 2003, available from http://www. budapestsun.com/full_story.asp?ArticleId={87DF900F0DEF4C1BAAF9658F8D8CDED4}&From=News.

Col Gordon R. Hammock (BA, Virginia Military Institute; JD, Washington and Lee University, School of Law; MSS, Air War College) is the staff judge advocate at the 18th Wing, Kadena AB, Japan. He has previously served in that capacity at the 39th Wing, Incirlik AB, Turkey; 437th Airlift Wing, Charleston AFB, South Carolina; and Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. He has also served in numerous other legal positions, including that of deputy staff judge advocate; chief, military justice; area defense counsel; chief, adverse actions and civil law; and legal intern. Colonel Hammock is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College. He is also an Air War College graduate with academic distinction.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Iraq, Preemption, and the Views of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary

The US National Security Strategy and Preemption

Throwing Down the Gauntlet to the UN

Congressional Approval of Use of Force against Iraq

UN Security Council Resolution 1441- Implementation and Aftermath