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Aerospace Power Journal - Summer 2002

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Partnering for Hemispheric Security

A Combined Regional Operations Center in Brazil

This article presents a proposal to facilitate multinational security cooperation in the heart of South America by providing arguments that support the establishment of an experimental combined regional operations center in Brazil. Led and hosted by Brazilians, this center would serve as a centerpiece for the coordination of intelligence sharing and operational responses to illegal overflights of the Amazon or other violations of national borders or sovereignty. Although this concept is not a comprehensive strategy alone, it provides promise for a productive, beneficial partnership with Brazil and other nations in the region.

Drugs, crime, and terrorism walk hand in hand. However, recent technological advances plus renewed efforts at cooperation with South American allies present unique opportunities to advance regional coordination in support of sovereignty and security issues. Brazil stands as a linchpin in South America because of its economic and political strength, strategic location, and emerging capability to monitor and control its borders in the Amazon frontier. Therefore, building on the opportunities for partnership and the utilization of modern technology, this article seeks to answer the question of how one might maximize the effectiveness of Brazilian surveillance efforts to achieve benefits and reach security goals for Brazil, its neighbors, and the United States. Toward that end, it briefly reviews the security situation and concerns of the Brazilian government; addresses Brazilian interdiction capabilities, particularly air interdiction, and outlines the concept of an experimental combined regional operations center; and concludes with a cost-benefit analysis, a sample concept of operations (CONOPS), and a discussion of the future potential for a regional operations center.

Security Issues

Important interests shared by the United States and South America- such as counter-narcotics, counterinsurgency, and anticrime operations; border enforcement; and state security- would benefit from more detailed and secure regional coordination. Although the United States has a history of working with South American countries in drug-interdiction programs, the tragic failure of the US-Peruvian process that occurred in April 2001 (see above) forces all nations in the hemisphere to review partnership options and evaluate possibilities to increase effectiveness and accuracy in intercepting narcotics and reducing transnational criminal activities.

Several US agencies coordinate with South American nations, but Brazil’s defense policy and the Brazilians’ unique capabilities for air control and surveillance operations are keys to stabilizing the Amazon Basin. As the largest, least populated, and centrally located frontier in South America, the basin is important for its strategic location, natural resources, and waterways.

Creating a partnering arrangement among Brazil, the United States, and selected neighboring states would further the objective of achieving collective security goals. Indeed, key directives made by the Brazilian government to implement its national defense policy include “contribut[ing] actively to the construction of an international order based on the rule of law which provides regional and worldwide peace, . . . contribut[ing] to the strengthening, expansion and consolidation of regional integration, . . . [and] expand[ing] exchange programs with the Armed Forces of friendly nations.”¹

The emergence of the Brazilian Amazon Surveillance System (SIVAM) project- a multifaceted, integrated control system coming on-line in 2002- presents an opportunity for cooperation and the creation of trust among regional neighbors, Brazil, and the United States. The goals of such a collaboration might include increasing border security; reducing drug, arms, black-market, and currency trafficking; inhibiting the movement of insurgents; and increasing regional stability to stem the illegal cross-border migration of civilians or guerilla combatants. Successful collaboration would encourage long-term regional stability, enhance transparency in knowledge sharing, improve security for participating states, and reduce drug and criminal trafficking in the region.

The security situation in South America is generally defined as a consequence of international crime. Terrorism, narcotrafficking, money laundering, and insurgent activities contribute to security concerns throughout the region. The largest, most visible partnership attempt to control some of these negative activities is Plan Colombia, the Colombian government’s counterdrug plan supported by the United States. However, this and other indigenous antidrug efforts in South America have caused both a migration of drug-transit routes to the Amazon area, particularly through western Brazil, and the spillover of Colombian insurgents (fig. 1).² The narcotrafficking situation not only raises concerns about national security and territorial sovereignty for the Brazilians, but also affects the security of neighboring countries.

Figure 1. Drug-Transit Routes and Insurgent Border-Crossing Areas in the Western Amazon Basin

Repeated violations of Brazil’s sovereignty by unauthorized overflights of its territory present a national security problem that the Brazilian government can respond to in one of three ways: (1) address the issue directly with international cooperation, (2) ignore the threat imposed on Brazilian sovereignty due to border violations, or (3) minimize the impact of such incursions through the unilateral use of military or police force. This situation is complicated by the fact that the majority of overflights involve narcotics and arms smuggling, as well as by the logistics and leadership of drug cartels and guerillas. Given the presence of transnational criminal activities, ignoring or minimizing their impact is not an optimal response. Indeed, this example of the globalization of crime affects many states and renders some frontier borders meaningless. Furthermore, the inability of neighbors to control sparsely populated border areas, except at specific entry points, makes the Brazilian situation even more difficult.

Although surveillance efforts are ongoing in the Amazon Basin, particularly along the border with Colombia, there is little transnational integration and insufficient real-time command and control (C²⁾ to interdict traffickers or other threats efficiently. Indeed, the lack of both C² and substantive cooperation among countries in the Amazon region is particularly apparent on the sparsely populated Colombian border and westernmost portion of the Amazon Basin. While Brazil attempts to secure its Amazon territory, the United States continues to support the $7.5 billion Plan Colombia with a contribution of $1.3 billion, as well as assist with intelligence sharing, radar-installations support, and surveillance in Colombia and neighboring countries. However, bilateral agreements with countries in the region, not multilateral coalitions or treaties, have dominated the conduct of US policy regarding the collective drug trade.³

The situation in Colombia, which involves refugees, internal unrest, rebellion, organized crime, and narcotrafficking, continues to concern the United States. Obviously, this instability also threatens Colombia’s neighbors. Brazil, the premier regional power with the largest economy in South America (and the fifth largest in the world), appears to be affected at its weakest point: the broad and largely unpopulated Amazon Basin frontier.⁴ Brazilians especially fear that Plan Colombia will cause Colombia’s guerillas, fueled by cocaine money, to spill into the Amazon territory.⁵ Moreover, Brazil’s size, population, influence, power, and location make it a critical partner with the United States in any successful regional counterdrug strategy over the long term.

In some respects, one finds a noninterventionist theme in Brazilian politics. Basing their views upon a historic tendency that eschews intervention in the affairs of other states, particularly military action, and upon a belief that state sovereignty is sacrosanct, many Brazilians oppose Plan Colombia and a US military presence in Colombia. This attitude also inhibits the Brazilian government from intervening in Colombian affairs, even to support the legitimate government of Colombia against rebels on Brazil’s borders. Moreover, even though Brazil fought alongside the United States in the Italian campaign of World War II, currently it is not extremely active either in peacekeeping or in supporting the United States militarily. Lastly, Brazilians are certainly concerned with the problems that narcotrafficking, other transnational threats, or territorial violations portend. A prevalent opinion among many Brazilians holds that US demand and consumption are principal drivers for the drug trade. Indeed, some Brazilians also suspect, unfortunately, that narcotics may mask sinister American intentions regarding Amazonian minerals, territory, and biodiversity.

This last concern- that America has an unstated objective of establishing a military presence in the Amazon- is apparent but not persuasive.⁶ Several Brazilian military and civilian personnel conveyed this sentiment directly although it is uncertain how many influential governmental officials really believe it. In any case, in the calculus of some Brazilian officials, their country requires a robust surveillance system; an increased, armed presence in the Amazon; and an aircraft carrier to protect their territory from all potential threats to its sovereignty.⁷

The Brazilian government’s first objective in national defense is “to guarantee sovereignty while preserving the Nation’s territorial integrity, heritage and interests.”⁸ Criminal or insurgent elements in countries neighboring Amazonia, however, threaten Brazilian sovereignty- not the United States. Currently, Colombian rebels use Brazil’s Amazon region for trade and as a rear-supply area. Peruvian drug traffickers have been known to transit Brazil’s borders to avoid capture because the 1,000-mile border with Colombia is largely uninhabited and uncontrolled. Moreover, criminal corruption and drug trafficking, which crosses the Brazilian border from Bolivia and Venezuela, create further concerns about regional instability that complicate the Colombian and drug situations. Furthermore, some Brazilians fear that US- trained Colombian troops pose a threat when they confront narcotraffickers and rebels close to Brazil’s border,⁹ rightly perceiving this threat as destabilizing. Finally, Brazil has its own burgeoning drug problems, especially those involving elements in Brazil that supply cocaine-precursor chemicals to Colombian drug-processing labs.¹⁰

Interdiction Capabilities

In an effort to control its borders, Brazil’s congress produced legislation in 1998 enabling the Brazilian air force, the Força Aérea Brasileira (FAB), to intercept and shoot aircraft that illegally enter Brazilian airspace. Although Brazil has neither ratified nor begun enforcing this law, unified C² and the cooperation of bordering governments will permit more efficient drug interdiction.¹¹ Colombia presently enforces similar shoot-down policies.¹² However, the previously mentioned downing of a civilian missionary plane by the Peruvian air force, resulting in the death of a woman and her child, has caused Brazilian political support for intercept-and-kill autho-rization to erode.¹³

Because of the vastness of the Amazon region, air is the most efficient medium for broad surveillance efforts, interdiction, or rapid insertion of ground forces. The controlling authority of FAB, a separate service maintained under the Brazilian Ministry of Defense, is the Comando da Aeronáutica (COMAer), which has three major commands (MAJCOM)- the Comando Geral do Ar (COMGAR), which protects Brazilian airspace and supports other military services and governmental agencies; the Comando Geral de Apoio (COMGAP), which controls logistics; and the Comando Geral de Pessoal (COMGEP), which controls FAB personnel issues- and four other MAJCOM-level organizations: the Departamento de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento (DEPED), which supervises research and development; the Departamento de Aviação Civil (DAC), the regulatory agency of Brazilian civil aviation; the Departamento de Controle do Espaço Aéreo (DECEA), which controls Brazilian airspace; and the Departamento de Ensino (DEPENS), which controls FAB’s schools and educational facilities (fig. 2).

Figure 2. FAB Organizational Chart (From “Aeronautica,” 12 November 2000, on-line, Internet, available from http://www.aer. mil.br/Conheca/index.htm. The commandant’s biography is also linked to this chart.)

COMGAR organizes its air assets into three air forces, a training command, and seven regional air commands. FAB, whose 800 aircraft make it the largest air force in South America, contains several Esquadrões (squadrons) assigned to task-defined groups.¹⁴ The largest of these include Grupo de Aviação (GAV- fight, attack, and rescue); Grupo de Defesa Aérea (GDA- airborne intercept); Grupo de Transporte (GT- airlift and air refueling); and Grupo de Transporte de Tropa (GTT- troop and airborne transport).¹⁵

Brazil has numerous aircraft available for drug interdiction as well as sovereignty-monitoring and -protection missions. Brazil uses the F-5F and Embraer AMX A-1 as primary fighters and the Super Tucano as the primary trainer.¹⁶ It also maintains various transport aircraft and helicopters suitable for use in and around the Amazon. Emerging capabilities- part of an initiative to modernize FAB- include eight recently ordered EMB 145 RS “remote sensing” aircraft that will comprise a capable airborne-surveillance system. The EMB 145 RS features a synthetic aperture radar that can provide 24-hour, all-weather ground surveillance,¹⁷ which will help expose drug traffickers and illegal miners in Amazonia.¹⁸ Additionally, five new EMB 145 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft provide onboard C², signals intelligence, and surveillance.¹⁹

The EMB 145 RS is part of Brazil’s most significant emerging capability- SIVAM, an ongoing series of civil and military instrumentation projects that integrate air, land, and river surveillance. The system is “considered to be primarily a surveillance project for use in curbing the trafficking of illegal narcotics.”²⁰ The System for the Protection of the Amazon (SIPAM), closely aligned with SIVAM, is an integrated Brazilian military C² program that leverages the SIVAM components. The key ground components of the SIVAM system include 19 fixed and six mobile radars intended to detect low-flying aircraft in Brazil.²¹ Brazil plans to use the EMB 145 AEW&C as a patrol aircraft and as a support aircraft for counterinsurgency missions.²² However, until the implementation of overflight and international agreements, integration of these systems will be restricted to Brazilian airspace.

In addition to the capabilities described above, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense has made a considerable commitment to protecting Brazil’s sovereign territory. The FAB plans to spend $3–5 billion to purchase new fighter aircraft, particularly the Embraer AMX, and it will refurbish 100 combat jets. Brazil also has a ground complement of 22,000 troops (of its total of 220,000) permanently stationed in the Amazon; furthermore, it has dedicated 180 police officers, 18 patrol boats, two airplanes, and a helicopter to securing the Colombian border.²³ The Brazilian government’s substantial efforts in the Amazon indicate the high priority of territorial integrity as well as internal and regional stability. However, little precedent exists for the sharing of near-real-time information among comprehensive international military or law-enforcement alliances, or for executing time-critical actions against criminals or insurgents.

Unfortunately, Brazil’s approach- investing heavily in the SIVAM/SIPAM projects and attempting to secure its borders from within- is necessary but not sufficient to assure long-term sovereignty. Because of the lack of regional linkage among Brazil and its neighbors, efforts to control vast borders and reduce criminal, drug, and refugee flows are uncoordinated. Perhaps the tradition of limited security cooperation with other states in the region is a matter of trust. However, the emerging SIVAM capability and ongoing US partnering arrangements in South America may provide an entrée to a Brazilian-hosted operations center for monitoring and integrating counternarcotic, counterinsurgent, and law-enforcement efforts.

At present, the United States provides military advisors, training, and equipment- including radars, communications gear, weapons, and helicopters- to Colombia. Modest US assistance also goes to Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil. The United States provides technical support to several countries in Latin America through radar-surveillance assistance and airborne-warning flights, and C² through the Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-East) for counterdrug assistance. However, comprehensive counternarcotics and security efforts are not regionally coordinated in real time through a single command center or a single agency in any one country. The limited, bilateral approach to law-enforcement, counterdrug, and counterinsurgency efforts, therefore, is not as optimized or efficient as a more integrated approach.

Since no combined regional operations center exists to assist in data fusion and C² from the SIVAM system or other surveillance efforts throughout the region, benefits of SIVAM/SIPAM to the Brazilians and spin-off benefits to regional neighbors and the United States are abridged. Therefore, since the United States already interacts with nations in the region for air and counternarcotics surveillance and interdiction efforts, a new strategy of cooperation with the Brazilian government may increase the efficiencies and productivity of established efforts. A new regional strategy yields a recommendation that the United States should support the Brazilians in the establishment of a combined regional operations center and forge agreements to conduct and coordinate real-time, multinational drug and security efforts through that center.

Its large air force and robust surveillance capability put Brazil in a unique position to provide regional coordination for integrated, international counterdrug interdiction and territorial security. With US support, regional cooperation based upon integrated defenses may achieve buy-in and increased efficiency. For example, in November 2001 the Colombian government inaugurated a $25 million radar, built under Plan Colombia, to intercept drug flights in rebel-held areas. This is the fifth such radar in Colombia, manned by US-trained Colombian personnel.²⁴ Given the outstanding potential of the SIVAM/SIPAM radar system, particularly if used cooperatively with other radars and C² systems in neighboring countries, and given a program of combined operations for air interdiction and narcotrafficking, the achievement of lasting regional effects may indeed be possible.

The Brazilian government has already approached Guyana, Suriname, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Peru to discuss information exchanges, anticipating that SIVAM/SIPAM will become operational in July 2002.²⁵ The concept outlined here moves a step further than information sharing, however, in that it includes an integration effort using an Amazon regional operations center in Brazil, based upon combined air operations center (CAOC) models in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Italy.

In this conceptualization of a combined regional operations center, a Brazilian general officer would command a Brazilian center. Representatives from partnering neighbors as well as US interagency representatives and technical advisors could contribute by working together at the central data-fusion location (fig. 3). Initially, non-Brazilian colleagues could be liaison officers, with an option to move forward to a truly integrated operations center in the out-years. As host, Brazil would provide access to the command facility, and an existing SIVAM/SIPAM regional integration station could host the first combined-operations-center experiment. Other resources would reside in the already planned SIVAM/SIPAM program, except for communications links with neighboring countries and the United States. The latter could assist with financing and provide some equipment and training for the operations center, as well as coordinate with the JIATF-East for interdiction activities. United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) could further contribute by temporarily assigning personnel to the operations center and by coordinating with other agencies to assign advisors.²⁶ Indeed, the United States could offer outstanding CAOC experience, most recently from Operation Enduring Freedom, to facilitate a combined regional operations center in Brazil.

Figure 3. Example of Combined Regional Operations Center Staffing

Various US agencies, including the State Department, Drug Enforcement Agency, and USSOUTHCOM are already actively involved in counterdrug operations throughout the region in an attempt to foster stability in the affected countries during periods of internal stress caused by narcotrafficking.²⁷ These American efforts involve diplomatic, economic, and military strategies. Regarding Colombia and other bordering countries, objectives of the US counternarcotics policy provide for enhancement of the Colombian government’s (host country) intelligence capabilities; eradication of coca, amapola, and heroin and development of alternative crops; interdiction; and strengthening of Colombian (host country) law-enforcement agencies and the administration of justice.²⁸ The US military’s involvement in counterdrug actions presently includes assisting with surveillance, training, advisors, and intelligence sharing; providing interagency assistance; and making selected foreign military sales.

After initial agreements with Brazil, in order to move forward with a regional cooperation effort, the US government might encourage reciprocal regional overflight and other cooperative security agreements among participating countries. An ideal regional interdiction alliance for the Amazon would require overflight, pursuit, and perhaps shoot-down/ force-down coordination in an antidrug operations charter. The combined regional operations center would provide the C² and data fusion to enable effective interdiction operations in the Amazon. An international Counternarcotics Oversight Council, chaired jointly by US and Brazilian representatives, could negotiate rules of engagement and organize operations-center establishment efforts; it could also be expanded to include further cooperative regional-security issues.²⁹ This council could provide oversight for the establishment and conduct of the center’s operations. A Brazilian FAB general would command the proposed combined multinational center while Brazilian officers, US technical advisors, contractors, and multinational representatives would assist in staffing. Hot phones and, eventually, data links would connect the center to the partner governments to exchange knowledge and provide rapid resolution and confirmation of pursuit or intercept status.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

The benefits of investing in an Amazon international regional operations center under Brazilian command include increased regional cooperation, integration of diverse interdiction efforts, and enhanced regional stability. Increased cooperation would facilitate transparency and regional integration of interdiction activities. Spin-off effects would include the encouraging of dialogue among participating countries through legitimate military efforts under the control of civilian governmental agencies, as well as improved trust among nations in South America. Additionally, emphasizing US teamwork rather than a perceived imperialistic, American-led effort might cause pátria and national pride to increase domestic Brazilian support. Finally, the United States would offer partnership- not intervention- in Brazil, which might serve to reduce Brazilian concerns over US participation in Colombia.

Risks to the regional-operations-center approach include misuse or proliferation of US technology, possible affronts to national sensitivities, and domestic/regional power struggles. Indeed, combined-operations-center technologies are expensive and subject to misuse if regional infighting occurs (an unlikely event) or if corruption creeps into the information-sharing system. Moreover, regional or internal power struggles may affect negotiations, but any integration provides a positive step in a regional effort and supports potential expansion in the future. However, proper diplomatic and technical agreements might mitigate these challenges.

Concept of Operations

The CONOPS includes detection, decision/interception, and action phases. First, the SIVAM/SIPAM system, either through an airborne or ground sensor, detects an illegal flight or suspected drug trafficker. Second, the surveillance asset relays the target’s location and other pertinent details to the operations center. Brazilian commanders, US advisors, and regional representatives coordinate a real-time strike. Airborne assets scramble to intercept the flight or helicopter/ground/ riverborne assets converge at its landing point. If assets are beyond communication range, AEW&C relays orders to a forward strike team, interdiction riverboat, or forward aircraft. Third, the operations center can direct Brazilian fighter planes to follow or force the target aircraft to land. If it lands in Brazilian territory, airborne assets fix the location. If the illegal flight attempts to evade the interceptors, the center may authorize them to destroy it. If the illegal flight crosses into a neighboring country, Brazilian fighters can pursue the aircraft to mark the landing spot (depending upon treaties), or the illegal flight will be passed to controllers in the neighboring country, who then vector their own interception (fig. 4).

Figure 4. Example of Operations Center CONOPS

Potential for the Future

Beyond counternarcotics interdiction, a combined regional operations center can provide a model for a future data-fusion command post that addresses multiple-agency concerns. For example, integrating available sensors can leverage existing technologies to fight a more regionally focused and efficient drug war. However, as the concept of the center develops beyond the immediate concern of narcotics trafficking and security operations, possible ancillary uses include the integration of future orbiting or airborne environmental sensors in Brazil, cartographic uses for sensors on Embraer aircraft, and border refinement and mapping. Indeed, either Brazilian sovereignty or an interagency antinarcotics effort could provide the impetus for the detailed mapping of the Amazon itself, in addition to its usefulness as a scientific endeavor. The center could foster regional cooperation, enhance Brazilian leader-ship, and encourage more unity in the Western Hemisphere- the possibilities are tremendous for international cooperation through the exploration of advanced data-fusion applications.

Conclusion

Mutual interests and modernized C² efforts in Brazil may open a window of opportunity for partnership with the United States. The concept of a combined regional operations center discussed in this article provides an avenue for experimenting and building trust, as well as fighting real transnational threats such as narcotrafficking, criminal activities, border violations, and insurgent activities. As a confidence-building measure and regional-security cooperation effort, establishing such a center promises to be a win-win situation that advances the interests of both Brazil and the United States and strengthens hemispheric security. 

Notes

1. F. H. Cardoso, “Brazilian National Defense Policy- Brasilia: Presidencia da Republica, 1998,” in Documentos da Presidencia da Republica (Brasilia, 1999), 11.

2. There are also ground and river dimensions to this drug-transit problem throughout the Amazon Basin. The migration of drug trafficking through the sparsely populated regions of Amazonia is documented in multiple sources.

3. For further information on Plan Colombia, see US Department of State, Office of International Programs, “U.S. Support for Plan Colombia,” on-line, Internet, 26 September 2001, available from http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/ wwwhpcus.htm.

4. Justin J. O’Brien, “The SIVAM Project: Brazilian National Defense, International Politics and Power in the Amazon,” on-line, Internet, 10 October 2001, available from http://www.american. edu/ted/SIVAM.html.

5. Helio Contreiras and Claudio Camargo, “Brazilian General Discusses US Strategy for Amazon Region,” Sao Paulo Istoe, 23 October 2000, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) document LAP20001023000063, 3. See also Peter Muello, “Brazilian Border Backwater Gears Up in Fear of Drug War Spillover,” Los Angeles Times, 28 August 1998.

6. Contreiras and Camargo.

7. Brazilian personnel and congressman, conversations with (and briefings to) the author, Brazil Regional Security Studies trip, National War College, 9–11 May 2001.

8. Cardoso, 8–9.

9. “Brazil: Use of Colombian Troops Trained by US May Create Dangerous Instability,” 20 October 2000, in FBIS document LAP20001020000064, version 1.

10. Larry Rohter, “Latest Battleground in Latin Drug War: Brazilian Amazon,” New York Times, 30 October 2000, on-line, Internet, 2 November 2000, available from http://www.nytimes. com/2000/10/30/world/30BRAZ.html.

11. Gustavo Faleiros, “Experts Say Security, Intelligence Structure Faulty,” Sao Paulo Valor, 12 October 2001, in FBIS document LAP20011012000001.

12. “Colombian Defense Minister Interviewed on ‘Plan Colombia,’ ” Rio de Janeiro Gazeta Maercantil Latinoamericana, 23 October 2000, in FBIS document LAP20001023000081.

13. CNN.com, “Peru Air Force Downs U.S. Missionary Plane,” 21 April 2001, on-line, Internet, 11 October 2001, available from http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/04/21/peru.us.plane. 01; and conversations with author during Brazil Regional Security Studies trip (see note 7). “US Embassy officials say the Peruvian military pilot apparently mistook the plane for a drug-running aircraft.”

14. Rudnei Dias da Cunha, “Introduction, History of the Brazilian Air Force,” Historia da Forca Aerea Brasileira, on-line, Internet, 26 October 2000, available from http://www.mat.ufrgs.br/ ~rudnei/FAB/eng/historia.html.

15. Rudnei Dias da Cunha, “Organization and Structure of the FAB,” Historia da Forca Aerea Brasileira, on-line, Internet, 26 October 2000, available from http://www.mat.ufrgs.br/~rudnei/ FAB/eng/estrutr.html.

16. Rudnei Dias da Cunha, “Northrop F-5,” Historia da Forca Aerea Brasileira, on-line, Internet, 26 October 2000, available from http://www.mat.ufrgs.br/~rudnei/FAB/eng/F-5.html; idem, “AMX International A-1,” Historia da Forca Aerea Brasileira, on-line, Internet, 26 October 2000, available from http://www.mat.ufrgs. br/~rudnei/FAB/eng/a-1.htm; and “Embraer- Defense Aircraft-  Super Tucano,” on-line, Internet, 2 November 2000, available from http://www.embraer.com/english/produtos/conteudo_ produtos_02_04.asp.

17. “Embraer- Defense Aircraft- EMB 145 RS,” on-line, Internet, 2 November 2000, available from http://www.embraer. com/english/produtos/conteudo_produtos_02_02.asp.

18. Paul Mann, “Brazil Shelters Strategic Amazon,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 7 June 1999, on-line, Internet, 1 November 2000, available (by subscription) from http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/awst.htm.

19. “Embraer- Defense Aircraft- EMB 145 AEW&C,” on-line, Internet, 2 November 2000, available from http://www.embraer. com/english/produtos/conteudo_produtos_02_01.asp.

20. O’Brien; and “SIVAM/SIPAM: Already It Is a Reality,” on-line, Internet, 12 October 2001, available from http://www. defensa.gov.br/Noticias.

21. Rohter.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. “Colombia, US Radar Aims to Catch Drug Flights” (Tres Esquina, Colombia: Reuters, 29 November 2001), on-line, Internet, 30 November 2001, available from http://msnbc.com/ news/173509.asp.

25. “Neighboring Countries Want to Participate [in] the SIPAM,” on-line, Internet, 12 October 2001, available from http://www.defensa.gov.br/Noticias.

26.  JIATF-East personnel may detail the operations center, for example. USSOUTHCOM may source personnel from USSOUTHCOM, US Southern Command Air Forces (USSOUTHAF), the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the State Department, among other organizations.

27. “Colombian Threat to Regional Stability Cited,” 4 April 1999, in FBIS-LAT-199-405.

28. Gabriel Marcella and Donald Schulz, Colombia’s Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1999), 26.

29. Ministerio da Defesa, “Declaration of Manaus,” 21 October 2000, on-line, Internet, 26 October 2000, available from http://www.exercito.gov.br/Defesa/decmanausin.htm. The Declaration of Manaus, 21 October 2000, promotes these democratic concepts as well as multilateral support for the “struggle” against illicit drugs.

Lt Col Merrick E. Krause (USAFA; MAS, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; MA, School of Advanced Airpower Studies; MA, National War College) is Senior Military Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Previous assignments include F-4E aircraft commander and flight leader, Moody AFB, Georgia, and Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina; F-15E instructor and evaluator pilot for the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing, Seymour Johnson AFB; mission commander during Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Desert Resolve; test project officer, chief of weapons, Strike Eagle test flight commander, and instructor and evaluator pilot at the Air Warfare Center, Nellis AFB, Nevada; and chief of aerospace campaign strategy and the CENTCOM/ SOUTHCOM team, Checkmate Office, Air Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. A command pilot with more than 2,800 flying hours and 216 combat hours, Lieutenant Colonel Krause is also a graduate of the USAF Fighter Weapons School.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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