Document created: 3 June 2002
Aerospace Power Journal - Summer 2002

COL ERIC ASH, COMMANDER AND PRESIDENT, COMMUNITY COLLEGE OF THE AIR FORCE

Transformation is a hot issue, but the one that really counts is the “perception transformation.” Since the dawn of military history, perception has been a paramount factor in both the cause and termination of war. It rules morale, determining one’s will to continue or discontinue the fight. Often more important than the reality it may or may not reflect, perception transcends rationality, influencing both genius and moron. It is key to deterrence and compellence, and it is the articulation of effects-based operations. Therefore, the ultimate strategy for any sea, land, air and space, joint, or coalition force is to transform the enemy’s perception.

That strategy begins at home with our own perception transformation. Of course this is nothing new- Sun Tzu’s advice in 500 b.c. was to know both the enemy and oneself. Proceeding further, however, we must transform our perception of the enemy as we also attempt to affect the enemy’s perception of us. Post-Cold War enemies are getting smarter, exploiting vulnerabilities by breaking the “rules.” The Air Force is also getting smarter about these enemies, realizing that for a vast percentage of the world, we are not the “good guys.” Tremendous sacrifice on the part of America and its coalition partners is wasted if the end result is the wrong enemy perception.

How is a perception transformation engineered into the enemy? Traditional airpower has done it either directly or indirectly. Kill the enemy, and he has no perception. Sometimes, however, direct application is impossible, or political objectives (linked to perceptions) require indirect methods. Consider the possible perceptions of B-52 bombing, a method of airpower that can be either direct or indirect. First, one could take such bombing to mean that the Air Force has turned “serious,” a common historical interpretation of the impact in Hanoi during the Christmas bombings of 1973. Or another perception could be that the Air Force considers the situation of minor importance and not worth risking more expensive aircraft, such as B-2 bombers. A third perception might be that the Air Force has run out of targets or has lost patience trying to bomb surgically. Finally, the enemy could even perceive that the Air Force is the evil tool of an enemy giant, employed to carry out indiscriminate punishment on innocents. We know better, but so what if we do, when the enemy has the wrong perception? As the Air Force gets better at fighting, it must equally improve its ability to transform perceptions.

A perception transformation involves not only our perception of the Air Force, but also our perception within the Air Force. Tunnel vision is the wrong perspective; it runs counter to integration. A transformed Air Force is a symphony of systems rather than a collection of soloists. Transformation normally conjures up thoughts of air and space, the Expeditionary Aerospace Force, information warfare, and sophisticated technologies, but the perception transformation means getting out of stovepipe perceptions and embracing integration in those and all areas. As General Jumper stated recently, “We are in ruts. . . . We have to bust some bureaucracies.”

Sometimes we must bust our thinking in order to fight as a team and transform enemy perceptions. As the lead article by Ben Lambeth shows, we have not always done that perfectly, and despite great success over Kosovo, we still need improved integration in suppressing enemy defenses. We must be willing to embrace uncomfortable but progressive ideas about organization and technologies, such as the future role of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)- the focus area of this issue. Next to space, UAVs represent some of the greatest challenges, not only to bureaucracies but also to the cultural keel of the Air Force. Another challenge, as the “Red Team” piece by Col Timothy Malone and Maj Reagan Schaupp points out, is to understand how important self-criticism is in effecting a perception transformation- not just in war gaming but in the service as a whole.

Prior to September 2001, terrorism had been around for a very long time. In one tragic series of events, however, America’s perception of terrorism transformed. Part of the Air Force’s transformation journey in the twenty-first century now involves a new focus on terrorism and homeland defense, but it must also include a perception transformation within our own service to embrace new thinking about new technologies. We must transform into a more effectively integrated team in order to fulfill the strategy of creating a perception transformation within the mind of the enemy.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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