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Aerospace Power Journal - Spring 2002

Between Two Worlds

Fodder for Your Professional Reading
on Global Reach and Air Mobility

Dr. David R. Mets

FOR SOME YEARS now, Aerospace Power Journal has published a series of articles designed to provide tools for Air Force mentors to employ in local efforts to stimulate professional reading and even writing.¹ Inspired by Col Roger H. Nye’s The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence (Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing Group, 1986), a classic work designed to achieve similar purposes for Army forces, each article is designed to provide a brief overview of the history and status of a particular area of the Air Force’s core competencies. Each one also includes a sampler list of books that might enhance the reader’s professional knowledge. Previous articles in the series have dealt with air superiority, strategic attack, airpower at sea, the Gulf War, and World War II in the Pacific. Here, we turn to the subject of air mobility- the connection between the logistical base in the homeland and the soldier on the battlefield.

The article begins with a summary of air mobility before Pearl Harbor and then takes a quick look at how the aerial movement of goods and people changed during World War II, noting the existence of a dichotomy in the culture of air transportation. In large part, this story involves the evolution of distinct subcultures into a single mobility culture that has aspired to incorporate both efficiency and combat effectiveness. One element concerned itself with the logistical use of air transport, and the other saw its primary role as the employment of airlift aircraft for the movement of forces directly into combat. These two cultures coexisted under Military Air Transport Service (MATS) and Tactical Air Command (TAC) through the Eisenhower years and beyond.

Before the end of the 1950s, however, a movement had begun- partly at the instigation of Gen William Tunner- to better distinguish military airlift from commercial aviation. Combat became the most important discriminator- airlift would go into dangerous, austere areas where commercial aviation had no desire to tread. This resulted in a blurring of the lines between tactical and strategic airlift in a long effort to merge the two under one command. The first step entailed the creation of Military Airlift Command (MAC) in the 1960s, followed by the initial transfer of tactical airlift forces from TAC to MAC in the 1970s. No one had given much thought to incorporating air-refueling functions into MAC in the early years. But the consolidation of lethal airpower in Air Combat Command (ACC) in the early 1990s resulted in the transfer of most tankers from the disestablished Strategic Air Command (SAC) to MAC- renamed Air Mobility Command (AMC) to account for the acquisition of the new air-refueling function. The article then addresses the status and future of air mobility at the dawn of the twenty-first century and closes with the customary sampler of books designed to enhance the professional study of air mobility.

 Mobility and the Air Corps

Even before the airplane became a practical proposition, dreamers envisioned movement through the air- and immediately discovered diverse purposes. From the beginning, they saw the airship in multiple roles. It promised to be much cheaper than a cruiser for scouting at sea and seemed to represent a new mode of transporting goods and people over long distances and all sorts of obstacles, quickly and at a low price. Even before the zeppelins came on the scene, people speculated that a new kind of warfare was at hand- bombardment from above at very long ranges. Aircraft attempted aerial resupply, with 50-pound sacks, at the siege of Kut in World War I, and Billy Mitchell had plans to deliver troops via parachute in 1919, but the end of the war prevented that- fortunately for the troops.²

In the American interwar context, the military did not do much with what has come to be known as air mobility. The Air Service successfully experimented with air refueling in 1923 and again in 1929.³ The Air Corps tried to develop organic airlift to support the mobility of its striking forces but did not get very far in that age of austerity. It also experimented with regular logistical runs by air to improve mission-ready rates and lessen the costs of inventorying high-value parts.⁴

World War II and the Roots
of Air Mobility

Before the onset of war, the Air Corps did most of the thinking about air transport- for the Air Corps. But after Pearl Harbor, two other major inputs emerged: mobilization by the airline people for wartime service, and our experience with the Luftwaffe’s airborne-assault units, which prompted us to take action.⁵ The former event laid the foundation for ATC, and the latter stimulated both the British and American armies to follow the Germans and the Russians into troop-carrier kinds of operations. Notwithstanding some giant fiascoes in the airborne experience and generally sound air-logistics operations, both modes of movement came out of the war with powerful followings.⁶ They led to two distinctly different cultures within the American airlift tradition.

Air Transport and Troop Carrier

One can place much of the blame for the wartime airborne fiascoes upon the inferior technology of gliders. The helicopter made a few appearances in the war, but not many people foresaw its great utility in tactical air mobility.⁷ Most airmen felt that conventional aircraft optimized for airborne delivery would provide the most practical solution; for example, the C-123 started out as a glider design to which engines were added. This line of thinking led to the organization of dedicated troop-carrier units assigned to TAC, entrusted with the primary mission of airborne operations and aerial resupply and the secondary mission of logistical support.

Meanwhile, the other line of thinking resulted in the organization of what came to be known as a strategic airlift force- MATS. It grew out of the wartime Air Transport Command (labeled “Allergic to Combat” by troop-carrier wags) and assumed the stereotypical burden of being just another airline. Within a month of the creation of MATS (from merging the old ATC and the Naval Air Transport Service), the Berlin airlift commenced, adding a great deal of prestige to the logistical use of air transport. Tunner, then a major general experienced in the logistical world of the Hump operation, deployed from MATS to Europe about a month after the blockade began. He came home with the major share of credit for the success of the airlift, which had become an exercise in scheduling and air-transportation efficiency among well-developed air terminals.

The Emergence of Military Airlift

The Berlin airlift led to the notion that sometimes the nonlethal forms of airpower could directly achieve national objectives, which helped greatly with the building of MATS in its early years. The troop-carrier function remained a part of TAC during those years but only as a secondary mission in a command dominated by fighter pilots and some light-bomber crewmen. This force competed with MATS for funding and other support. In those days, MATS flew the C-54, C-97, C-118, C-121, and finally the C-135, all of them designed for airline or air-transport operations. The exception was the C-124, designed for Army mobility but flown by many other commands (including troop-carrier units) as well. Thus, the airline industry, feeling that its profits were being undermined by the military flyers, became another source of competition for MATS.⁸ Meanwhile, TAC acquired a number of airplanes optimized for airborne and assault operations, including the C-82, C-119, C-123, and, above all, the C-130 Hercules, built to TAC requirements at a time when its design could benefit from the lessons of the Korean War.⁹

General Tunner spent the early and mid-1950s in important assignments outside the air-transport world but returned as the commander of MATS in 1958. He had a hand in stimulating the change of the institutional culture from air transport to airlift, highlighting the notion that the functions of military airlift- particularly its important combat element- were distinct from those of civilian airlines. The military also moved away from modified airliners to specialized airlifters quite different from commercial craft- specifically, the C-141, followed by the C-5 and then the C-17. All three exceeded the capability of commercial aircraft in terms of going into harm’s way and operating in austere environments. The turboprop C-130 already had many of the design features of its jet-powered counterparts, but the latter retained the advantage in terms of size and range. To a degree, these aircraft merged the air-transport and troop-carrier cultures, but that was far from complete. The new craft also reduced the anxiety of the commercial airlines and won important support from the US Army.¹⁰

The establishment of CRAF in the 1950s reduced the cost of military airlift and at the same time also diminished the concerns of the airlines. Since the government could not afford to build an airlift fleet sufficient to meet national emergencies, only to have much of it remain on standby during peacetime, it entered into an agreement with the airlines. This arrangement held that, in return for providing additional airlift in emergencies, the airlines would receive favored status in the awarding of government contracts during routine operations. CRAF served only as insurance for many years until it first mobilized for the Gulf War, during which it provided vital service.¹¹

However, civilian airlines might opt out at crucial moments- witness the final evacuations of Vietnam in 1975. Near the end of the war, the Federal Aviation Administration’s reclassification of South Vietnam as a dangerous combat area had the effect of canceling the insurance of any civil aircraft operating there. That, in turn, caused the airliners to withdraw from the operation, and the entire load then fell upon military aircraft and helicopters. In the Gulf War, insurance concerns also limited CRAF’s activities in-theater- the airliners could not operate at nighttime in areas threatened by Iraq’s Scud missiles, for example.¹²

The Consolidation of Strategic
and Tactical Airlift

General Tunner retired in 1960, and a struggle ensued in the next decade and a half regarding the command and control (C²) of tactical and strategic airlift. In general, the strategic airlifters controlled MAC, the successor organization to MATS, and they seemed to focus on the efficiencies that centralization of like functions under one national command might achieve. Their opponents generally consisted of people associated with the old troop-carrier culture and TAC. Tactical airlifters and their theater commanders seemed to focus on the effectiveness that arose from centralizing the command of all kinds of airpower at the theater level. This organic airlift, added to the usual airpower order of battle, thus would give theater commanders everything they needed for the task of winning.

Meanwhile, the increasing use of helicopters to do what tactical airlifters and gliders used to do at the battlefield end of the process diminished the potency of the troop-carrier argument. This issue came to a head in the middle of the Vietnam War (1966) with an Army/Air Force agreement. In the future, the Air Force would concede most helicopter functions to the Army, and the Army would get out of the fixed-wing tactical-airlift business by transferring its C-7 Caribous to the Air Force.¹³ Since the Caribous did not last long in the Air Force and since they were not replaced with new planes, the transaction represented another step away from the battlefield for the troop-carrier tradition.

All of this maneuvering made orphans of the tactical airlifters, especially the C-130s. Theater commanders wanted them for their combat and logistical utility; MAC wanted them for the sake of consolidating functions. But they were not the primary systems in either command. When ACC came on the scene in the early 1990s, the tactical-airlift units wound up there but soon returned to AMC, which now wielded a functional unity of command over all fixed-wing air movement- except for some C-130 units assigned to theater commanders for the task of contributing to deterrence and winning the theater battle.¹⁴

The Age of Air Mobility

Over time, the heyday of the strategic bomber passed as ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles became more practical and as the Soviet threat eventually disappeared. But the tanker portion of SAC remained as vital to theater air warfare as it had been to the bomber force- and even to the airlift force itself by extending the range of C-5s and air-refuelable C-141s and thus overcoming the diminishing access to en route stations overseas. Finally recognizing the imbalance, in the early 1990s the military created US Strategic Command, modified the bomber force to better handle conventional air-attack missions, and established ACC to prepare for all theater air-warfare functions. But what about the tankers?

Most of the tankers were assigned to MAC, now AMC, in order to include air refueling in that command’s functions. But a new problem arose on the way toward merging the old air transport and troop-carrier cultures. Having resided in SAC for many years and having become fully assimilated to it, the tanker community now had to meld its culture into AMC’s- and that took time. Sometime during the process, the old designations of strategic and tactical airlift increasingly fell into disuse and were supplanted by intertheater and intratheater airlift.

At least for the time being, creation of a two-hatted position provided a solution to the old C² problem. The Gulf War of 1991 included a director of mobility forces (actually known as the commander of airlift forces although the later director did not actually command and also had responsibility for tanker forces), a position that seemed to work. In the Gulf War, that leader came from MAC sources but worked directly for the joint force air component commander for the duration of the campaign. The Air Force tried the same position again in the air war over Serbia. This time the director of mobility forces was collocated with the theater air commander at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and worked for him, encountering little difficulty (although one should remember that neither of these campaigns involved a long, drawn-out land battle).¹⁵

It fell to the director of mobility forces to integrate the efforts of the strategic airlifters with the tactical-mobility units. The functional duality of the tankers further complicated the job. Some of them were dedicated to building an air bridge from the United States to the combat theater. The shooters would deploy along that bridge, refueling in midair on the way. Other tankers had to be dedicated to a tactical task, that of providing prestrike and poststrike fuel to the shooters and extending the on-station time of low-density/ high-demand assets such as airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and joint surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS) aircraft. The tanker airlift control center at Headquarters AMC controlled air refueling along the air bridge. But in the air war over Serbia, the combined air operations center in Italy under the combined force air component commander planned and controlled the tanker force assigned directly to combat support. Partly due to the uncertain duration of the campaign, tanker planners of insufficient numbers and rank attempted to keep up with the process. Ultimately, a tanker colonel deployed to provide “top cover” for the hands-on refueling planners and to serve as the tankers’ representative to other elements. The planners, assigned to work for the air operations center’s combat plans division or combat operations division, developed a process that was working relatively smoothly at the end of the campaign. Recommendations emerged to make this tanker process a part of doctrine, but some doubters argued that it violated doctrine applied only in circumstances like Kosovo.¹⁶

The mobility task became even more complicated with the growth of the C-17 force, which had a foot in both the strategic and tactical worlds. It proved a mighty supplement to the force, deploying units from the States to the theater and at the same time participating in such in-theater operations as the movement of Task Force Hawk to the Balkans. Its direct-delivery mode brought it closer to the battlefield, a capability that seemed successful as of the end of the air war over Serbia. As always, though, the test was not definitive because that conflict proved more permissive to airpower, of far shorter duration, and presumably less stressful to intertheater air-mobility forces than a major theater war might be.

Air Mobility in the New Century

At the outset of the twenty-first century, air mobility had come a long way since bundles were dropped at Kut in World War I. A new technology had evolved that was unique to air refueling and to both the strategic and tactical forms of airlift. Accompanying doctrine had also developed through the decades, and an organization to apply these things to war had matured. According to Eliot Cohen and Thomas Keaney, the Gulf War demonstrated that the United States led the world in air-combat technologies, but many other countries also had fighters and missiles competitive with America’s. But no one else had C² systems like our AWACS and JSTARS, space systems, and especially our airlift and tanker assets. Keaney and Cohen assert that many years, even decades, will pass before any state can hope to build up a complete airpower system including air mobility and C² assets that will rival that of the United States. That superiority, they argue, may empower the United States to sustain a period of international peace and prosperity longer than any in the past.¹⁷

However, many people also argue that America must take especial care to sustain the mobility part of the system. The Army will advocate robust ground forces,¹⁸ the Air Force will certainly continue to favor combat aircraft and space systems, and the Navy will sponsor national power at sea. But only one Air Force major command serves as the advocate of air mobility- it is not the top priority for any of the services. True, its commander is also commander in chief (CINC) of US Transportation Command, but that does not seem to carry as much weight as do the geographical CINCs or service chiefs. Congress does keep a wary eye on these capabilities for various reasons. Still, the tanker fleet is nearly a half century old, and a new aircraft is barely on the horizon.¹⁹ 

The bulk of the tanker fleet consists of highly modified KC-135s, a design of the 1950s, but the reengining that produced the KC-135R makes it much more capable than the earlier versions. Although the fleet of KC-10s is of much more recent design, these aircraft are relatively few in number. Because of the KC-10’s size and impressive cargo-carrying capability and range, during the Gulf War we utilized many of them in the strategic airlift role rather than in air refueling.²⁰ Thus, in a major theater war, we might feel compelled to put the newest and largest tankers into the airlift effort, leaving the air-refueling function to the older KC-135Rs. However, two events in the fall of 2001 combined to add urgency to a tanker-replacement program and at the same time make it more feasible. 

First, the terrorist attack on New York and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 changed attitudes in Congress toward defense spending. Moreover, it further depressed the market for new airliners, which had the potential effect of lowering the unit price of replacement Boeing 767s configured as tankers. At the same time, the Air Force was contemplating a dual-track program to use the same airframe to modernize platforms for its airborne intelligence gathering and C² systems. Second, Lockheed-Martin won one of the largest contracts in acquisition history for the development of its F-35, the joint strike fighter, which further reduced the potential workload for the Boeing plants and threatened to increase unemployment in their vicinities. Simultaneously, the first campaign of the war on terrorism began in Afghanistan, whose distance from the United States and scarcity of airfields complicated the problem. That situation obviously increased the strategic need for both tankers and airlifters, adding to the impetus. Consequently, many congressional delegations renewed their interest in implementing an early tanker-replacement program- and in increasing the C-17 buy (also built by Boeing). Japan’s and Great Britain’s contemplation of new tanker programs and Italy’s commitment to one might also lower the unit cost for new Air Force 767s. The combination of all these factors may make it possible to replace the tanker fleet and add to the C-17 fleet at a lower cost than would have been possible a year earlier.²¹

The addition of the C-17 gave the strategic airlift fleet a big boost in the number of ton miles it can produce in a given day; indeed, one C-17 is as productive as two C-141s. But the commander of AMC himself has testified that this reduces flexibility (e.g., one C-17 cannot be in two places at one time, but two C-141s with the same aggregate payload can operate on different continents).²² This becomes a factor because of the drastically curtailed US presence overseas, the reduced numbers of en route bases, the new Air Force doctrine of air expeditionary forces, and the new Army emphasis on lighter formations that can be transported to overseas trouble spots by air. All of this increases the demands on the mobility part of the force, making it ever more difficult to move lethal forces to the scene of conflict on time and in shape to halt aggression before it establishes too firm a foothold. Seldom mentioned in the debates surrounding the mobility function is the fact that the C-130 design is as old as the tankers’ and that no new airframe is on the horizon. In its direct-delivery mode, the C-17 can certainly pick up part of the load formerly known as tactical airlift, but, again, the limited number of C-17s, compared to the total number of aging C-130s and C-141s, limits flexibility- especially at the theater level. Furthermore, the C-141s will completely disappear from the Air Force inventory by 2003.²³

As noted above, efforts are afoot in Washington to do something about the overall ton-miles-per-day shortfall by increasing the C-17 purchase yet again.²⁴ But that helps the flexibility problem only at the margin. Some defense contractors are looking at possible designs for a new theater airlifter,²⁵ but as yet no serious government program exists to bring one on-line. As of February 2001, the Air Force had plans to purchase 168 of the new C-130J aircraft, a dramatic improvement over the older Hercules but with a basic design that still harkens back to the 1950s. Furthermore, the first of these has gone to the weather-reconnaissance mission, and others will replace some of the oldest C-130Es flown by the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.²⁶ The KC-10 could pick up some of the airlift load in emergencies and could occasionally release C-17s for work in direct delivery, but, as mentioned previously, we have only a limited number available. However, Gen Charles T. Robertson, former commander of AMC, recently observed that foreign object damage (FOD) could limit the utility of C-17s in direct delivery.²⁷ He also cited the C-5’s unreliability as a continuing problem, arguing that reengining that airplane would improve its mission-capable rate and relieve some of the pressure on the C-17 force.²⁸ 

The issue of pilot retention creates pressures in the air-mobility force, especially AMC, whose airlift and air-refueling crews are proficient in flying aircraft similar to those used by the airlines.²⁹ Commercial operators, now in a growth mode, pay much higher salaries than those earned by aircrews in government service. That concern, combined with the high operations tempo in the mobility force (part of which is not included in the air expeditionary force’s scheme to control that tempo), makes the situation rather serious. However, the decline in airline travel caused by the terrorist attack in September 2001 may change that.

The picture is not altogether bleak, however, for the AMC commander averred even before Afghanistan that the command could repeat its performance in Operation Desert Storm, notwithstanding the limited number of airframes and the difficulty in retaining pilots.³⁰ There is much more to the system than just planes and pilots, important though they may be. One such matter is increasing capacity.

Technology has enabled a global situational awareness that underlies the centralization of C² for all air-mobility forces in the tanker airlift control center at Scott AFB, Illinois, thus inducing efficiencies and increasing mobility capacity.³¹ Too, the new air mobility operations groups at McGuire AFB, New Jersey, and Travis AFB, California, can field a C² capability as well as other services on the other end of the system- at austere locations and other places almost anywhere in the world. This can occur on very short notice, adding flexibility to the system. The Global Air Traffic Management System, another gain under way through software and hardware technology, provides for accurate navigation; collision avoidance; and automatic, instant position reporting anywhere in the world. That system, in turn, permits a freedom of routing and direct flight from departure to destination, with enormous savings in both time and costs. It also compensates somewhat for the limited number of both airlifters and tankers.³² 

One of the most distressing concerns in Operation Desert Shield had to do with tracking cargo. The incompatibility of information systems for supply and transportation and the loss of in-transit visibility of cargo led to major confusion at the airfields in the Gulf region.³³ Some progress in these areas has resulted in improved in-transit visibility with commensurate savings in airlift and air refueling because of a reduced need to reorder parts and other goods.³⁴ All of that, combined with hopes of eliminating the transshipment that used to occur at the interface between strategic and tactical airlift, could result in major improvements. If the C-17 can indeed do everything and more than the C-141 could in the logistical end of airlift and if it can replicate the C-130’s accomplishments on or above the battlefield, then the Air Force will enjoy enormous savings. We achieved some good results in Albania during Operation Allied Force, but, admittedly, those fields were not the most austere imaginable. As noted, General Robertson has expressed concern about FOD to C-17 engines³⁵ that undoubtedly would worsen if the aircraft were heavily used at even less-developed fields, such as those used by C-130s and C-123s in the Vietnam War. Conceivably, the Air Force may pursue yet another follow-on to the C-130. A new tactical airlifter presumably would be smaller and less vulnerable to FOD than the C-17. We should also have a sufficient number of them, at an affordable cost, to give mobility commanders the flexibility they need to complement the limited numbers of C-5s and C-17s as the C-130 fleet diminishes.

As we have seen, another improvement has to do with doctrine. During the Cold War, we had one principal enemy- the Warsaw Pact, a well-defined threat- and we forward-based major forces to face it. Air-mobility forces were important to Cold War strategies, to be sure, but a certain stability led to permanent basing and a well-defined route structure, doctrine, and organization. With the end of the Cold War, all of that changed.

As the attack on the World Trade Center certainly demonstrated, the new threat is uncertain, even its character- more entities than just states are now possible adversaries. Threats to our national security are diminished but still present, and our important interests face many challenges, their natures and locations uncertain. A huge drawdown in the force structure followed the end of the Cold War, and many of those remaining forces withdrew to the homeland, where their upkeep is less expensive and where they are kept ready for deployment in any direction.³⁶ But uncertainty, combined with the reduction in forces, leads to great turbulence in the lives of those who remain in service and causes great difficulties in retention- not just among crew members. Doctrine responded by reorganizing the Air Force along expeditionary lines (as opposed to permanent forward deployment), a move clearly beneficial to lethal combat air forces since their deployments would become much more predictable. However, this action places considerable strain on mobility forces.³⁷

The lethal air forces are divided into 10 air expeditionary forces (AEF) and arranged in a schedule for deployments that will send two forces forward at a time (if needed). Each consists of fighters, bombers, and C² aircraft as well as other support platforms. Many of AMC’s tankers and C-130s are permanently identified with each of these AEFs. This is not true of the strategic airlifters, however, which will have to support all of them as the need arises. For AMC the situation becomes especially complicated because of its heavy dependence upon Reserve forces. Both reservists and their civilian bosses have a good record of responsiveness, but they can be pressed too far. AMC does realize some benefit, especially among the tanker and tactical-airlift units, in that their attachment to specific AEFs makes life much more predictable. For the time being, the workload for much of the remainder will remain heavy, but ultimately that will level out and yield a more stable lifestyle for units not attached to AEFs.³⁸ 

So far, American mobility forces have successfully developed the technology, doctrine, and organization to cope with all challenges, from Pearl Harbor right down to the present. They have never enjoyed a top priority but have sustained the flexibility they needed to succeed in both wars and crises. The geographic CINCs and all the service chiefs have come to realize that they cannot succeed without the global reach of mobility forces. Hopefully, that will lead to a balance that enables our armed forces to get to the scene of trouble in time and with a force sufficiently large, capable, and sustainable to underwrite our foreign and security policies.

Ever since World War II, mobility forces have shouldered the burden of living between the worlds of logistics and combat. The favored children of neither, they had to adopt characteristics of both. From the beginning, the leadership of mobility forces has faced the challenge of devising ways to prevent the strategic-airlift culture from overwhelming the troop-carrier tradition. It has sought to build in as much air-transport efficiency as possible yet preserve the traditional troop-carrier desire for combat effectiveness. That tension goes all the way back to the conflicting demands of George Patton’s Third Army, which wanted C-47s to haul its gasoline, and of the First Allied Airborne Army, which wanted them to deliver its troops directly to the field of battle. One needs to remember the imperative of cultivating the combat character of mobility forces, which occurred when MATS transitioned into MAC. It is also important to take the same view of the air-refueling culture. Both cultures need to be absorbed and nourished, not overwhelmed, by the mind-set of long-range airlift. Only in this way can AMC sustain itself as something distinct from and more important than mere air transportation.

As with all the other fodder articles in this series, we close with a sampler for the air warrior/scholar- this one a list of 10 books on air mobility. Two books provide an overview of the subject, and the others should help readers add “depth and mastery,” to use the words of Col Roger Nye, the man who inspired the series. I do not mean to imply that the list constitutes a definitive bibliography on air mobility- only that it provides a starting point for building a personal, professional reading program. This assumes especial importance for air mobility, which has attracted very little attention in either the media or academia; it is not even a favored subject of the official history structure. Unfortunately, we have yet to assemble enough literature on mobility to lay a foundation for solid doctrine and strategy making.³⁹  

Notes

1. As with the previous fodder articles, I have benefited greatly from the advice of experts in this field, including C-141 pilot and scholar Lt Col Peter L. Hays, C-130 pilot Maj Joseph S. Mets, tanker pilot Lt Col Peter Wangler, and C-17 pilots Lt Col David Allvin and Maj Adam J. McMillan. Any flaws are wholly mine.

2. Michael Fricano, “The Evolution of Airlift: Doctrine and Organization” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1 April 1996), 4, 5; and Roger G. Miller, “The U.S. Army Air Forces in Air Transport on the Eve of Pearl Harbor,” in Air Mobility Symposium, 1947 to the Twenty-First Century (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), 3.

3. Richard K. Smith, “Invisible Men, Invisible Planes: In-Flight Air Refueling,” in Air Mobility Symposium, 59–63.

4. Miller, 1, 4; and Fricano, 7.

5. Jack E. King Jr., “The Air Transport Command: The Strongest Link in the Chain,” American Aviation Historical Society Journal 43 (Summer 1998): 82; and Fricano, 9, 12.

6. By war’s end, ATC alone had more than 3,000 aircraft and over 200,000 people assigned. King, 87.

7. Edgar F. Raines Jr., “The Army and Organic Tactical Air Transport,” in Air Mobility Symposium, 85; and Fricano, 12.

8. This had been a concern of airline people as early as World War II. King, 90; and Fricano, 15. One result was that MATS and MAC were prohibited from transporting military dependents within the United States.

9. Fricano, 21.

10. For an authoritative discussion of these matters, see Col Robert Owen, “The Rise of Global Airlift in the United States Air Force, 1919–1977,” draft, awaiting publication by the Air Force History and Museums Program; it will likely become a foundation stone of the literature on air mobility. For the Army dimension of air mobility, see Christopher C. S. Cheng, Air Mobility: The Development of a Doctrine (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994).

11. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 155–58; and Maj William G. Palmby, Enhancement of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet: An Alternative for Bridging the Airlift Gap (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, March 1996).

12. Thomas G. Tobin et al., Last Flight from Saigon, USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, vol. 4, monograph 6 (1978; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1985), 66; and Keaney and Cohen, 158.

13. John Schlight, The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965–1968, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988), 237–39.

14. John A. Tirpak, “Local Lift,” Air Force Magazine 81 (September 1998), on-line, Internet, 7 January 2002, available from "http://www.afa.org/magazine/0998lift.html".

15. Lt Gen William J. Begert, “Kosovo and Theater Air Mobility,” Aerospace Power Journal 13, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 16–18; and Lt Col Richard Simpson, “Command of Theater Air Mobility Forces during the Air War over Serbia: A New Standard or a New Data Point,” Airlift/Tanker Quarterly 8 (Summer 2000): 11.

16. Begert, 21. For one doubter’s view, see Simpson, 10–13.

17. Keaney and Cohen, 220.

18. The Army’s requirements for airdrop capabilities and transportation of outsized cargo have frequently affected the design of Air Force aircraft- witness the C-130 and C-124. Although support of the Army’s own equipment acquisition usually takes a higher priority, there is increasing support for the C-17. John G. Roos, “Is the Army Set to Press the Case for More C-17 Transports?” Armed Forces Journal International, November 2000, 2.

19. Gen Charles T. Robertson, “CinCTRANS Congressional Testimony,” Defense Transportation Journal 55 (June 1999): 27.

20. Keaney and Cohen, 155.

21. Patricia J. Parmalee, “Refueling Tankers Eyed,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 155 (5 November 2001): 17, on-line, Internet, available from ebhostvgw10.epnet.com/fulltext.asp; John D. Morrocco, “Bidders Vie for RAF Tanker Services Deal,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 155 (9 July 2001): 41, on-line, Internet, available from ebhostvgw10.epnet.com/fulltext.asp; James R. Asker, “Washington Outlook,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 155 (3 December 2001): 21, on-line, Internet, available from ehostvgw10.epnet.com/fulltext.asp; “Because of Canceled Boeing,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 155 (26 November 2001): 26, on-line, Internet, available from ehostvgw10.epnet. com/fulltext.asp; Bruce Rolfsen, “Air Force 767s Closer to Reality, Political Climate May Shorten Time Frame for Getting Craft,” Air Force Times 62 (19 November 2001): 32, on-line, Internet, available from ehostvgw10.epnet.com/fulltext.asp.

22. Robertson, 26.

23. They will remain in the Reserve until 2006.

24. Frank Wolfe, “Mobility Plan Insufficient to Meet Military Strategy, Draft Study Says,” Defense Daily, 24 October 2000, 5, on-line, Internet, 1 November 2001, available from "http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct2000/s20001024mobility.htm" .

25. See Lt Col David W. Allvin, Paradigm Lost: Rethinking Theater Airlift to Support the Army after Next, CADRE Paper no. 9 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, September 2000); and Lt Gen Ed Tenoso, “Air Mobility: Thoughts for the Future,” RUSI [Royal United Services Institute] Journal 143 (August 1998): 58–60.

26. Bill Sweetman, “A Rising Imperative: More Demands for Airlift,” Jane’s International Defence Review 31 (February 1998): 28; and Seena Simon, “Air Force Gives C-130J Low Marks,” Air Force Times, 26 February 2001, 16–18, on-line, Internet, 2 March 2001, available from ebhostvgw18epnet.com/fulltext.asp.

27. Perhaps AMC could learn something from Alaska Airlines on this point. That organization has operated Boeing 737-200s successfully on gravel strips in northern Alaska for a long time with relatively simple technical and procedural methods for avoiding FOD. One element, a simple blower system that utilizes bleed air to direct the gravel down and away from the inlets, seems to work quite well. Careful use of power during takeoff and reversing on landing also helps. Joseph Mets, Fort Richardson, Alaska, to author, E-mail, 7 November 2000.

28. Robertson, 27; Sweetman, 23; and Gen Walter Kross, “Readiness, Preparedness, Improvement- Themes for the Next Century,” Airlift/Tanker Quarterly, Special Convention Issue, Fall 1997, 28.

29. Robertson, 27.

30. Ibid.

31. “The TACC & M2K: Real Time Mobility Command and Control,” Airlift/Tanker Quarterly 8 (Fall 2000): 26–28.

32. Sweetman, 22; Gen Charles T. Robertson Jr., “Mobility 2000: The Way Ahead,” Airlift/Tanker Quarterly 8 (Fall 2000): 23; and John L. Cirafici, Airhead Operations- Where AMC Delivers: The Linchpin of Rapid Force Projection (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 82.

33. Keaney and Cohen, 178, 198; and Fricano, 33.

34. Col David E. Todd and Lt Col Phil Bossert, “Viewing Rapid Global Mobility as a Revolution in Military Affairs,” Defense Transportation Journal 55 (October 1999):16, 50–60.

35. Robertson, “CinCTRANS Congressional Testimony,” 26.

36. Lt Col Gregory Cook, “Watchwords of Change,” Airlift/Tanker Quarterly 8 (Summer 2000): 14. 

37. “EAF: Dawn of a New Era,” Airlift/Tanker Quarterly 8 (Winter 2000): 12–20; for a summary of the AEF, see John A. Tirpak, “The Long Reach of On-Call Airpower,” Air Force Magazine 81, no. 12 (December 1998), on-line, Internet, 24 December 2001, available from "http://www.afa.org/magazine/1298airpower.html".

38. “EAF: Dawn of a New Era,” 18.

39. The sampler contains only published sources. In addition to Colonel Owen’s unpublished dissertation (note 10), see the following: John Douglas Harrington’s two worthy studies: “United States Strategic Doctrine and the Evolution of Military Airlift” (master’s thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1987); and “Neglected U.S. Military Missions: Contending Theories of Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Culture and the Case of Airlift Mobility” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 1996). Both are in the Air University Library; they are also available through the Defense Technical Information Service.

Dr. David R. Mets (USNA; MA, Columbia University; PhD, University of Denver) is a professor at Air University’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies. He studied naval history at the US Naval Academy and taught the history of airpower at both the Air Force Academy and West Point. During his 30-year career in the Navy and Air Force, he served as a tanker pilot, an instructor navigator in strategic airlift, and a commander of an AC-130 squadron in Southeast Asia. On another tour there, he was an aircraft commander for more than 900 tactical airlift sorties. A former editor of Air University Review, Dr. Mets is the author of Master of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz (Presidio, 1988) and three other books.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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