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Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2002

Review Essay

The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment by Barry Watts. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (http://www.csbaonline.org), 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW, Suite 912, Washington, D.C. 20036, 2001, 130 pages, $20.00.

On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power by Steven Lambakis. University Press of Kentucky (http://uky.edu/University Press), 663 South Limestone Street, Lexington, Kentucky 40508-4008, 2001, 365 pages, $39.95.

Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age by Everett C. Dolman. Frank Cass Publishers (http://www.frankcass.com), 5824 NE Hassalo Street, Portland, Oregon 97213-3644, 2002, 208 pages, $24.50.

Space Weapons, Earth Wars by Bob Preston et al. RAND Corporation (http://www.rand.org), 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138, 2002, 201 pages, $25.00.

Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower by M. V. Smith. Forthcoming, Air University Press (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress), 131 West Shumacher Avenue, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-6615, on-line, Internet, available from http://research.au.af.mil/papers/student/ay2001/saas/smith.pdf.

No doubt Arthur C. Clarke would appreciate the fact that 2001 saw the emergence of five major works on military-space issues. The interrelationships between space and security remain a critical issue even though right now our collective subconscious would be more likely to contain nightmarish visions of airliners, buildings, and bombing rather than dreams of bones morphing into space planes and space stations to the accompaniment of Richard Strauss’s Thus Spake Zarathustra. Coming on the heels of the congressionally mandated Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (Space Commission) of 11 January 2001, chaired by the once and future secretary of defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, these publications afford a lofty vista from which to assess both narrow issues such as the implementation of the Space Commission’s recommendations and many broader concerns. The five publications are also highly complementary in the sense that each focuses primarily on one of the three determinants of defense policy: (1) technology and operations (Watts, Preston, and Smith), (2) domestic politics (Lambakis), and (3) world politics (Dolman). Cumulatively, they give us one of the best opportunities in many years to reassess America’s vision for space. In the end, however, when it comes to the interrelationships between space and national security, the nation still faces many more questions than answers.

Barry Watts’s The Military Use of Space is must reading for any serious student of military space. It is an outstanding assessment of how the use of space is likely to affect US national security through 2025; in many ways, it is the most comprehensive and nuanced of the five publications. Watts is a retired Air Force F-4 pilot and an experienced defense analyst who has written extensively on a variety of topics, including measures of effectiveness, military innovation, Clausewitzian friction, and airpower doctrine. In addition, he coauthored the “Effects and Effectiveness” part of the 1993 Gulf War Air Power Survey. He formerly directed the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center and currently is director of program analysis and evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Watts’s monograph uses the comparative-analysis style of net assessment developed by his mentor and former boss Andrew W. Marshall, the Pentagon’s director of net assessment since 1973: “In Marshall’s view, net assessment is a discipline or art that relies, above all else, on genuine understanding of the enterprise or business involved rather than sophisticated models, complex systems analysis or abstract theory” (p. 5).

The major findings in Watts’s technologically informed assessment are carefully derived and merit close attention even though they are unlikely to excite the mainstream; furthermore, they undoubtedly will be attacked by hawks and doves who believe the United States should be doing a lot more or a lot less in space. This centrist position is undoubtedly Watts’s main message: the United States has its priorities about right in military space; it should continue to upgrade its ability to provide actionable, real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data directly to war fighters; and it is unlikely that force application will become a more important space mission than force enhancement before 2025. Watts’s specific key judgements include the following:

• The United States has continued and will continue to derive far more military capability from space than any other state, but these significant, space-derived capabilities also create substantial risks and potential vulnerabilities in projecting American military power. 

• During the 1990s, the United States began transforming its space-derived ISR from primarily preconflict support for central nuclear war to real-time ISR enhancement of ongoing, nonnuclear conflicts, but it still probably has not realized more than a small fraction of space’s potential for force enhancement.

• Growth in commercial and dual-use space technologies is likely to make it harder for the United States to sustain its relative military advantage derived from access to space systems.

• There is a better-than-even chance that force enhancement will remain the predominant military use of space through 2020–25, but it is also not difficult to imagine both trigger events and more gradual paths toward space-force application.

• Although the strategic logic of space power argues that states will eventually feel compelled to field weapons in space to defend their strategic interests and control space, “that day may lie further in the future than is generally thought, especially by space enthusiasts” (pp. 1–2).

Watts also highlights two key implications derived from these judgements. First, a wide gap exists between US Space Command’s (USSPACECOM) “assigned responsibilities for space control and its capabilities to execute this mission” (p. 3). Second, a considerable amount of ambiguity is associated with the concepts and definitions of space control and force application. Watts argues that some USSPACECOM and Air Force definitions are neither very useful nor intuitive because, for example, they label conventional or unconventional attacks on terrestrial targets such as satellite-control facilities as space control rather than force application. More generally, this conceptual ambiguity makes it hard to define what constitutes a “space weapon.” It also foreshadows the notion that any path toward space weaponization is more likely to be a slippery slope with many shades of gray instead of a black or white step, as is too often portrayed. As Watts is careful to point out, his assessment that force application is unlikely to become more important than force enhancement before 2025 applies only to a narrow definition of force application: “Indeed, if force application is construed broadly enough to include terrestrial-based applications of military force aimed at affecting orbital systems or their use, one can argue that space warfare has already arrived even though no space-based weapons are currently deployed” (p. 109).

Beyond his overarching assessments, Watts’s monograph is rich in technical detail and filled with useful insights. It is, for example, a great explanation of how space systems have enabled recent air campaigns. His description of the Air Force’s use of joint direct attack munitions enabled by the Global Positioning System over the former Yugoslavia during Operation Allied Force in spring 1999 illustrates just how far the United States has come in its use of space power since the Gulf War. Another fascinating insight is the analogy Watts draws between railroads and space: both are very expensive, inflexible networks that had transformational effects on all military operations, yet neither (at least thus far) has emphasized direct-force application or even overt military applications. Likewise, Watts includes a disturbing discussion of how just one high-altitude nuclear detonation could rapidly destroy billions of dollars worth of satellite systems in low earth orbit (LEO) by pumping up the radiation belts through which the satellites orbit. Finally, Watts’s analysis and insights regarding the foundational components that led to his overarching assessments are perhaps the most interesting and important part of his monograph. Some of the most important of these observations include the following:

• Breakthroughs in launch technology and radical growth in launch demand are not likely to occur in the next 10 to 15 years.

• Distributed architectures that use much smaller satellites for a variety of functions are likely to begin emerging within the next one to two decades.

• Commercial forces will play an increasingly large role in shaping space systems and ser-vices.

• Commercial systems will increase global transparency; governments will have a difficult time controlling these systems; and the security implications of increased transparency are unclear.

• Access to data streams from space may be far less important than the trained people and organizations required to use such data effectively. The United States has a decade-plus head start in this area, but new users of space data are likely to be innovative and unencumbered by Cold War thinking and structures.

• Staring, all-weather, global-surveillance systems are unlikely to be available before 2020.

• Space weapons such as hypervelocity rods for striking terrestrial targets and space-based lasers (SBL) are unlikely to be available before 2025.

• The most likely paths to space weaponization may come from slippery-slope responses to degradation or destruction of ISR rather than a need for ballistic missile defense or a response to high-altitude nuclear detonations; in any event, the United States is likely to have the largest role of any state in the decision to place weapons in space.

• The current overall approach of the United States to the military use of space is best described as “dilatory drift” because of the legacy of Cold War thinking on our operational concepts, doctrines, and organizations.

• Although the strategic logic of space power favors development of space weapons in the long run, the critical link in this argument is “the assumption that near-earth space will be an economic and military center of gravity for the United States in the foreseeable future. Yet it is precisely this assumption that seems open to question—at least between now and 2025” (p. 111).

Policy makers would be well advised to take careful note of Watts’s comprehensive and well-supported assessments about the military use of space. Because his analysis examines primarily the technological and operational dimensions of military-space issues, however, we should also look at these matters from other perspectives.

Steven Lambakis’s On the Edge of Earth, by far the longest of the five publications, provides a wealth of details on a wide range of factors that contribute to space power. A senior national security and international affairs analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy, Lambakis has published a number of articles on military-space issues, as well as Winston Churchill: Architect of Peace. On the Edge of Earth contains a broad survey of military-space issues and is a good starting point for readers unfamiliar with military space and defense policy; it is particularly strong in describing the domestic political landscape for military-space issues. Unfortunately, because the book is far more descriptive than analytical, it too often engages in lengthy, general discussions of almost every conceivable space-related topic without boiling them down or blending them into coherent assessments of key space issues. Lambakis’s tendency toward thick description stands out—especially when one contrasts his approach with the more focused, analytical style of Watts, Dolman, Preston, and Smith. Clearly, Lambakis would like to see the United States think more seriously about military-space issues and use space more effectively, but his assessment of the current military-space balance is less clear than Watts’s; likewise, Lambakis’s proposed path forward is less clear than the one prescribed by Dolman.

Lambakis’s book is divided into three parts. The first, “The Vital Force,” is a broad survey that explains the importance of space in terms of its impact on many facets of modern life, the increasing number of space actors worldwide, and the critical kinks between space and US national security. The second part, “In the Arena,” not only describes the complexities of space threats to the United States in terms of our potential adversaries’ use of space, but also explains in considerable detail the threats to US space systems. According to Lambakis, US space policy must overcome complacency concerning threats to our use of space because today’s threats are immature, sparse, evasive, and “viewed generally to be nonlethal” (p. 110). The final part of the book, “Confronting Janus,” uses the two-faced god of Roman mythology to critique “our national dysfunction in space” (p. 205). The first face of US space policy considers space an important military medium—just as land, sea, or air raises the possibility of combat operations in space—and contemplates the prospect that military use of space will one day have a decisive effect on terrestrial combat. By contrast, the second face of our space policy opposes space weaponization or even greater militarization of space because it sees greater benefits in preserving space as a peaceful sanctuary that provides transparency and other stabilizing functions.

Lambakis shows that our Janus-like approach to space policy has deep, consistent roots by providing an administration-by-administration review of that policy, stretching back to President Eisenhower’s “space for peaceful purposes” approach, which he crafted before the opening of the space age. Lambakis’s penultimate chapter delves into the domestic politics surrounding current military-space issues by discussing controversial matters such as the changing definition of space control, President Clinton’s line-item veto of the kinetic-energy antisatellite system, and the testing of the midwave infrared advanced chemical laser. He also examines the spectrum of opinion among political leaders on these issues. Finally, Lambakis’s last chapter argues that a comprehensive review of US space policy is long overdue and lays out his ideas on the foundational components that would contribute to such a review. 

Lambakis’s description of the domestic political landscape for military-space issues is highly detailed and nuanced. It provides great background data for analyzing almost any current military-space issue. But his broad-ranging descriptions are both an advantage and a liability. On the one hand, they provide readers many details and insights into the complexities of domestic politics for military-space issues. On the other hand, because he provides so much description with so little analysis, readers may wonder about the importance of what he says and the way it all fits together. In the end, due to the author’s dearth of analysis and his focus on domestic politics, we must again cast our nets more widely in our quest to understand the full range of interrelationships between space and national security.

Everett Dolman, currently a professor at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, has actively studied space issues since 1982 as a space-systems and foreign-area analyst for the US government. His book Astropolitik stands in stark contrast to Lambakis’s study. Instead of becoming mired in the pulling and hauling of US domestic politics for military space, Dolman’s intellectual tour de force jumps straight to world politics at the highest level. He explains how the physical attributes of outer space and the characteristics of space systems shape the application of space power and then uses this astropolitical analysis to develop a compelling vision for America to promote free-market capitalism in space and use space to help provide global security as a public good. His book is intellectually grounded in the best traditions of geopolitics, has something genu-inely new to say, and makes vital contributions to the dialogue about the interrelationships between space and national security. Truly a seminal work, it is easily the most important book on space and security since the publication of Walter A. McDougall’s Pulitzer prize–winning The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age in 1985. 

Dolman begins by undertaking the yeoman’s task of resurrecting the Nazi-tainted discipline of geopolitics. He then applies geopolitics to space, deriving the astropolitical dicta that guide his analysis. Dolman defines astropolitics as “the study of the relationship between outer space terrain and technology and the development of political and military policy and strategy” (p. 15). Following Halford Mackinder’s approach, Dolman divides our solar system into four regions: (1) terra (Earth and space to a point just below sustained, unpowered orbit); (2) terran space (lowest viable orbit to just beyond geostationary altitude); (3) lunar space (just beyond geostationary orbit to just beyond lunar orbit); and (4) solar space (everything else in the solar system) (pp. 69–70). He argues that “future lines of commerce and military lines of communications in space will be the Hohmann transfer orbits between stable spaceports” (emphasis in original, p. 73). Since Hohmann transfer orbits begin in LEO—and all spaceflight must traverse LEO—Dolman identifies this orbit as the first and most important astropolitical strategic narrow or Mahanian choke point. He also describes the astropolitical importance of the geostationary belt, the Lagrange libration points, and the Van Allen radiation belts, as well as explains the advantages and limitations of particular launch sites and satellite fields of view. Dolman captures this analysis in his primary astropolitical dictum: “Who controls Low-Earth Orbit controls Near-Earth space. Who controls Near-Earth space dominates Terra. Who dominates Terra determines the destiny of humankind” (front dust jacket).

In the remainder of the book, Dolman explains the actual evolution of the legal and political regime for space that is dominated by the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, analyzes how this regime relates to his astropolitical dicta, and lays out a new path forward. He also develops a number of sophisticated social-science arguments on issues such as collective action, the Coase theorem, and the tragedy of the commons, relating them to how a legal and political regime for space ought to operate. Not surprisingly, Dolman finds that both the theory and practice behind the current OST-dominated space regime are inimical to his astropolitical dicta. He argues that this regime has already stunted the development and use of space and that the United States, as the lone superpower and preeminent space power, should establish a benign hegemony of free-market sovereignty in space. Dolman advocates three immediate steps for the United States: (1) withdraw “from the current space regime and announce it is establishing a principle of free-market sovereignty in space”; (2) use “its current and near-term capabilities . . . to seize military control” of LEO; and (3) establish “a national space coordination authority” to “define, separate, and coordinate the efforts of commercial, civilian, and military space projects” (p. 157). Throughout, however, he is careful to emphasize that America’s priorities in space must remain in balance:

The ultimate goal of astropolitics and Astropolitik is not the militarization of space. Rather, the militarization of space is a means to an end, part of a longer-term strategy. The goal is to reverse the current international malaise in regard to space exploration, and to do so in a way that is efficient and that harnesses the positive motivations of individuals and states striving to improve their conditions. It is a neoclassical, market-driven approach intended to maximize efficiency and wealth (emphasis in original, p. 183).

Astropolitik is a stunning intellectual achievement and the first book that can legitimately claim to present a comprehensive theory of space power. It challenges conventional thinking about the status quo for space and will undoubtedly generate a great deal of controversy and provoke many responses. To be sure, many issues are open to debate, such as whether space will really be a virtually limitless source of wealth, as Dolman asserts. Likewise, he spends little time on the technical means by which the United States might assert dominance over LEO and devotes almost no analysis to how and why domestic political forces might align with his astropolitical prescriptions. But one mark of a great book is that it helps to define and structure subsequent debate, and Astropolitik has clearly laid down the gauntlet by providing the language and lines of argumentation for future discourse.

The authors of Space Weapons, Earth Wars undertake a much more narrowly focused study than does Dolman, but they provide an important, comprehensive, and timely discussion of key technical considerations for near- and mid-term space weapons in terrestrial conflict. This RAND study is a useful primer on the technological feasibility of space weapons. It helps form the essential foundation for the analysis of paths toward space weaponization, but, perhaps most interestingly, it provides only limited support for the technical efficacy of space weapons. The authors’ lack of enthusiasm for these weapons pervades their book. They clearly spell out the assumptions about space-weapon system performance that underlie their analysis, emphasizing that this analysis is sensitive to changes in these assumptions. It is less clear that they give sufficient weight to creative ways in which these systems might be employed, to the synergies that are likely from operating a “system of systems” comprised of dissimilar types of space weapons, and especially to the likely synergies from operating both space and terrestrial weapons. Likewise, because their analysis focuses solely on the potential of space weapons in terrestrial conflict, the authors say far too little about the targets, technologies, and operations for warfare in space—despite the fact that the nature of space and of these weapons makes these subjects inherently interrelated and indicates that they should be examined together. Even a very modest space-based ballistic-missile defense system is likely to have a significant antisatellite capability, and any decision to develop and deploy such systems must consider their design and residual capabilities in all mediums and across the spectrum of conflict.

Preston and his coauthors define terms carefully, providing a number of comprehensive and complex technical analyses (the technical appendices with detailed parameters for notional systems are almost as long as the text). They begin by disaggregating the term space weapons (“things intended to cause harm that are based in space or have an essential element based in space” [p. 23]) into the four distinct classes of potential weapons of most interest: (1) directed-energy weapons, (2) kinetic-energy weapons (KEW) against missile targets, (3) KEWs against terrestrial targets, and (4) space-based conventional weapons against terrestrial targets. They then analyze each of these four classes of potential weapons in terms of their targets, the medium in which they operate, the weapon itself, and sizing and basing considerations.

The report focuses in particular on assessing the effectiveness of two types of systems against specific terrestrial target sets: (1) SBLs for boost-phase defense against ballistic missiles and (2) KEWs against surface targets. For the first in-depth case, the RAND report assesses the sensitivity of overall system effectiveness based on a number of variables, including the number, type, altitude, and power of the lasers; various defense-system configurations, including relay mirrors; and different numbers, ranges, and hardness of attacking missiles. Within this range of variables, RAND finds that laser boost-phase defense systems may be able to kill as few as two to as many as 18 salvo-launched ballistic missiles. The authors emphasize that since large satellites such as SBLs “would be extremely difficult to hide or to maneuver enough to be unpredictable,” the orbital parameters of an SBL system would be “predictable and readily available to any opponent sophisticated enough to have ballistic missiles” (p. 33). Armed with this knowledge, opponents would choose the timing and scale of salvo attacks to minimize their losses and, therefore, “only a claim of minimum performance is reasonable” for SBL systems (p. 34). In their second in-depth case, the authors assess a complex set of trade-offs among the variables associated with KEWs against surface targets. They find that “thermal design is the most challenging aspect of this weapons class” and indicate that slender tungsten rods about one meter long “dropped” vertically from elliptical orbits seem to produce the “most bang for the buck” for this class of weapons (p. 139).

Following these technical assessments, the report examines operational and political issues concerning how space weapons might be employed and how the United States and other nations might acquire them. In discussing employment issues, Preston and his coauthors emphasize the importance of attributes of command such as responsiveness, flexibility, precision, cost, and communication in shaping the system’s effectiveness. The report uses four paths to analyze how both the United States and other nations might acquire space weapons: (1) response to a threat by an undeterred adversary, (2) response in kind, (3) acquisition in concert with others, and (4) unilateral acquisition in advance of a compelling threat. The authors further illuminate these paths by discussing how deliberate or incidental outcomes; incremental or monolithic decisions; and issues of scope, sequence, and visibility of implementation can all affect paths toward space weaponization. Finally, they reiterate the overall advantages and limitations of space weapons, concluding that “there is no compelling reason for the United States to acquire them at this time” (p. 107).

M. V. Smith’s Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower is a unique study of space power from the perspective of an Air Force officer who has spent several years integrating space-related capabilities into numerous exercises and real-world combat. Specifically, his study seeks to answer the philosophical question “What is the nature of spacepower?” (p. 1). To answer this central query, Smith begins with a crisp history of American space power, tracing its evolution since the end of the Second World War. He makes a very compelling argument that three distinct geopolitical events shaped American space-power doctrine. The first—the Cold War—enticed America into space as a means to spy on the Soviet Union, which also drove America’s early support for space treaties that ensured freedom of access to space. The second event, he argues, was Operation Desert Storm, which demonstrated the military utility of space in conventional warfare. This event occurred in the waning days of the Cold War, when nuclear tensions were greatly reduced. Since that time, the US military has freely sought to exploit space systems as a means of enhancing terrestrial war fighting—and this trend is not expected to accelerate. Finally, Smith points to a future in the wake of the Space Commission wherein military control of space will be essential for success, both economically and militarily. His work is very consistent with Dolman’s on this issue.

Next, in the central part of his work, Smith describes the nature of space power by presenting 10 propositions, supporting each one with historical evidence:

1. Space is a distinct operational medium. Like Dolman, he uses the lower boundary of a satellite in circular orbit as the lower limit of space. Interestingly, he points to the enormous gap between the ceiling of aviation and the floor of space operations, calling this the “transverse region,” an invisible dividing line between the earthly media and the space environment (p. 5).

2. The essence of space power is global access and global presence. Having made the case earlier that, during the Cold War, space provided access to denied areas, he argues that achieving access to all parts of the globe remains perhaps the most compelling reason for putting a satellite on orbit. This point is made by the other authors as well (p. 84).

3. Space power is composed of a state’s total space activity. Space power requires a large national and commercial infrastructure. Smith argues that each element of a state’s space activity must be nurtured to assure progress as a space-faring nation (p. 84).

4. Space power must be centrally controlled by a space professional. Space power is different from other forms of military power because its missions are global in scale. Thus, it would be wrong to manage its assets from a theater perspective, as is the case with most terrestrial forces. Doing so would handicap space power in the same way airpower was handicapped at the outbreak of the Second World War, when it was broken into penny packets under Army control (p. 84).

5. Space power is a coercive force. The mere presence of space-power assets such as reconnaissance and surveillance satellites has already influenced and will increasingly influence actors who wish to conceal certain activities. This flows from the deterrent potential of collection assets that have long been used as national technical means of treaty verification. It is quite likely that some actors are deterred from certain courses of action in the presence of spy satellites. Increasingly, space-power assets are integrating into the sensor-to-shooter loop of active combat operations. This, plus the inevitable emergence of weapons on orbit, signals the expansion of space power’s coercive force into the role of compellence in addition to deterrence (p. 84).

6. Commercial space assets make all actors space powers. The advent of commercial vendors selling military-related space products has created a new form of mercenary. The types of asymmetric advantages the superpowers once enjoyed because of their space prowess is quickly eroding because anyone who is able to pay the price can receive certain kinds of space support. Military and law-enforcement planners must take into account the potential for any opponent to exploit these commercial services (p. 84).

7. Space-power assets form a national center of gravity. The fact that more and more segments of society are turning to space-based assets for services makes the relatively few satellites on orbit very lucrative targets for an adversary who has the will and means to strike them. Although access to satellites is seldom a single point of failure, losing access to the vital information collected and carried by them will increase the fog, friction, and cost of operations. In certain circumstances, this may turn the tide against space-faring states, such as the United States (p. 85).

8. Space control is not optional. The increasing reliance on space-power assets by the government, intelligence, military, and business segments of society makes it essential to secure access to satellite services. At the same time, it is equally important to deny adversaries access to their space systems in order to increase their fog, friction, and cost. Adversaries will likely compete for relative control of the space medium; therefore, the United States must take measures to secure its interests in space (p. 85).

9. Space professionals require career-long specialization. Going to space is still difficult. Despite more than 40 years of space-faring experience, we still face numerous technical challenges. Moreover, space operations are so different from any form of terrestrial operations that developing space experts requires highly specialized and recurring education, as well as careful career management (p. 85).

10. Weaponizing space is inevitable. Smith presents the most pessimistic view on this issue, pointing out that wherever mankind goes, weapons follow. Some rock-solid reasons exist for not weaponizing space, but they fail to take into account the technologi-cal imperative that often drives human behavior in ways frequently beyond rational thought. When weapons will appear in space is anybody’s guess, but political and military pragmatists must assume that someone will put them there and plan accordingly (p. 85).

Smith’s work concludes with a brief space-power theory that focuses more on military applications than does the one offered by Dolman. Most importantly, he goes against the current tide inside the Department of Defense by arguing that space power will not usurp missions from other forces, pointing out that even though space systems perform many missions similar to those of their terrestrial counterparts, such as reconnaissance and communications, this in no way eliminates the need to perform these missions in terrestrial mediums as well (p. 94). The fact that space-power assets are always present, even when terrestrial forces are not, he argues, makes the nature of missions performed in space different from the regionally focused missions performed in air, on land, and at sea.

Reviewing these five books draws out points of agreement and disagreement, thus highlighting enduring issues for US national-security space policy. All of the authors agree that space has been and will continue to be important to our national security. In this regard, they independently echo one of the main findings of the Space Commission: “The present extent of U.S. dependence on space, the rapid pace at which this dependence is increasing and the vulnerabilities it creates, all demand that U.S. national security space interests be recognized as a top national security policy” (p. ix). Beyond agreeing on this fundamental point, however, the books have little in common. Two of the greatest points of disagreement concern the economic potential of space and the efficacy of space weapons. Dolman and, to some extent, Lambakis emphasize the economic potential of space; at least implicitly, both see great potential and utility in space weapons. By contrast, Preston questions the efficacy of space weapons, which, Smith argues, are inevitable, while Watts—an agnostic on space weapons—questions whether space will become an economic center of gravity in the near term to midterm. Cumulatively, as these fundamental disagreements show, national-security space issues provide one of the best illustrations of the complexity of interactions among technology and operations, domestic politics, and world politics that shape American defense policy. Any analysis that attempts to divine America’s future in space in a comprehensive way must assess all of these factors and consider how they interrelate.

Lt Col Peter Hays, USAF
Washington, D.C.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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