Document created: 6 December 01
Published Aerospace Power Journal - Winter  2001

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The War on Drugs

Two More Casualties

Lt Col Stephen P. Howard, USAF*

*Colonel Howard is chief of the Training Branch of the Operations, Plans, and Policy Center at Headquarters United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

WE MUST ADD two more names to the casualty list of America’s so-called war on drugs. On 20 April 2001, a Peruvian military aircraft shot down a civilian Cessna 185, killing American Christian missionary Roni Bowers and her seven-month-old daughter Charity:

A CIA-contracted American crew aboard a US drug interdiction aircraft tried to stop Peruvian authorities from shooting at a plane that turned out to be carrying American missionaries. . . .

Three Americans contracted by the Central Intelligence Agency, and a Peruvian air force officer, were aboard the Cessna Citation 2, about one mile (1.6 km) from where the missionaries’ plane was flying, the official said. . . .

The two-engine US Department of Defense aircraft was providing tracking and detection information as part of joint US-Peruvian efforts to stem drug trafficking.¹

Incidents like this give us the opportunity to reflect upon the broader implications of policies that have gone awry.

The facts and miscalculations of this incident will probably never receive full disclosure. News reporters, commentators, and others will “spin” the episode into a “terrible tragedy,” “careless accident,” or “unfortunate incident.” We will have difficulty uncovering the truth because too many special interests have a hand in this war on drugs. Each of these groups tries to push its own agenda instead of promoting what is best for solving America’s illegal-drug dilemma.

Political transitions such as the one currently under way in Washington, D.C., provide the opportunity to look at previous policies from a new perspective. On the one hand, the course of action followed by the United States for over a decade to counter the “supply side” has not yielded the results hoped for by the American people. Supply-side advocates say that the US surveillance flights (like the one that tipped off the Peruvian air force, which ultimately shot down the Bowers’ plane) play a vital role in stopping the spread of illegal drugs in America. What they will fail to say is that such interdiction efforts have failed miserably for over 10 years.

On the other hand, “demand side” advocates point to this incident as another example of overzealous law enforcement and of military officials trampling the rights of average citizens. They suggest that full funding of treatment programs for addictive behavior would do more good than shooting down civilian aircraft.

Neither view is completely correct. The most important point at stake in this issue is that the US military is the wrong tool for stopping the use of illegal drugs in America. We should not involve military force in domestic law-enforcement issues either inside or outside the borders of the United States. Rather, we should train, equip, and prepare our military forces to fight the nation’s “real” wars. Because of ignorance and self-serving agendas, many people have lost sight of the intended use of the US military.

Uninformed individuals support counterdrug interdiction operations by the military (such as the Peruvian aircraft shootdown) because they have little understanding of what military force can or should do. To them, the military is an expensive burden that should find gainful employment. Counterdrug interdiction operations sound like just the right sort of employment for the military. Although such operations squander America’s military capability, some advocates are willing to misuse our national-defense assets in return for drug-seizure headlines and costly, yet ineffective, surveillance and interdiction operations.

Furthermore, some special interests prosper financially or philosophically by using America’s military personnel to fight a war that doesn’t exist. The Nixon administration transformed America’s perspective on illegal drugs from “concern” to “war” in 1971, when the president first proclaimed a war on drugs. Like the war on poverty, it was a catchy phrase. In their haste to do something, well-intentioned government leaders could say, “We’re taking action.” Sadly, a great deal of misguided “action” has also taken place while presidential administrations have tried to figure out how to deal with the problem of illegal drugs in the United States.

But this problem is so complex and profitable that it defies dissection and analysis. Each administration since 1971 has looked for a quick fix to stem the tide of illegal drugs flowing over our borders. For national-defense crises, the nation’s “911” capability lies within the Department of Defense. Because drug trafficking had become a transnational problem, it seemed logical to pass the responsibility for battling illegal drugs to the military.

Until 1990, US generals and admirals had opposed such a tasking. They knew of the huge physical and philosophical differences that existed between law enforcement and military operations. However, after America won the Cold War, those same generals and admirals feared losing their market share in the New World Order. Without the Soviet Union to fight (or at least to prepare to fight), senior military leaders sought missions that would maintain their relevancy in the minds of the American people. The “peace dividend” represented an alarming concept to the military-industrial apparatus (both civilian and military) that had staked its future on the Cold War. When that war ended, it sought any mission that would maintain the US military’s Cold War infrastructure. Whether the military was the correct tool or not, senior military leaders reversed themselves and embraced an active military role in counterdrug interdiction operations. But at what cost?

According to the US Department of Justice, the federal government has spent more than $179.5 billion over the last two decades combating the importation and illegal use of drugs in the United States. Yet, according to those same statistics, the supply and purity of illegal drugs have increased. At the same time, the price of illegal drugs has decreased. What have we purchased with those billions of tax dollars?

For one thing, military readiness has steadily declined during the past 10 years. The war on drugs isn’t solely responsible, but it has contributed. Likewise, military recruitment and retention are falling. This decade has seen sharp declines in the numbers of men and women willing to serve in the military. Again, counterdrug operations are not the sole cause here but do contribute to the problem.

The reliability of military equipment and hardware is also on a steady decline. Interdiction operations tend to create shortages of spare parts, reduce the time devoted to routine maintenance, push weapon systems beyond their reasonable life cycles, and add to the wear and tear on personnel—all of these effects reduce military capability. We cannot entirely blame counterdrug operations for the military’s decline, but they are a factor. And the US taxpayer receives little benefit from this considerable expenditure of funds and manpower.

If America continues to wage a war on drugs, more lives will be lost and more costs will be incurred. What if the downed Cessna aircraft had carried a load of cocaine? Would it have mattered? Would the price of cocaine in New York City, Atlanta, Chicago, and Los Angeles have risen? US government statistics clearly show that one airplane full of drugs has no impact on the total quantity or retail price of cocaine on the streets of America. What price did we pay over the jungles of Peru? And for what purpose?

Today, according to Roger Rumrill, a Peruvian author and expert on the drug trade, “more than 70 percent of the drug traffic between Peru and Colombia now moves by sea along the Pacific coast, not by air.”2 Since the air-interdiction effort has forced drug traffickers to change their business practices, should we launch submarines from Hawaii or San Diego to interdict and sink boats suspected of carrying illegal drugs? Is this the next logical step in the war on drugs?

Illegal drug use in the United States is a terrible dilemma that requires serious thought and action. However, military action is not the answer. Instead, perhaps it is time to transfer responsibility for the war on drugs from the military generals and pass it to the surgeon general. Using America’s soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines is not the solution to this “war.” Instead, we should continue to prepare them for the wars they are meant to fight.

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

Notes

1. “Official: CIA Crew Opposed Peru Plane Attack,” China Daily, 23 April 2001, on-line, Internet, 4 October 2001, available from "http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/docs/2001-04-30/3357.html" .

2. Quoted in Kevin G. Hall, “Peru Is Fighting Drugs—And Itself,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 24 April 2001, on-line, Internet, 24 September 2001, available from "http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01/n719/a06.html" .

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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