Leadership and Reorganization

Editorial Abstract: Although training and education are crucial in developing aerospace leaders, it is far more important that officers start honing leadership abilities early in their careers and begin developing an appreciation for the breadth of the aerospace mission through experience outside their specialties. In this provocative article, Colonel Fawcett proposes a substantial change in the Air Force’s organizational structure that pushes leadership down to the lower ranks and drastically reduces the number of major commands.

The missions of the various uniformed services in the Department of Defense (DOD) as directed by Title 10, United States Code—to organize, train, and equip—are not new and have been the subject of arguments for some time regarding their application to air forces. In testimony before the Baker Board in 1934, Maj Gen Benjamin D. Foulois argued strenuously for an independent air force in order to establish a vision of American military aviation that could be sustained without the bureaucratic red tape that then characterized aircraft development and procurement.¹ General Foulois’s struggle led to the establishment of a General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, which didn’t meet all of his requirements but focused on providing airpower in a coherent fashion to a theater commander at all levels of combat.

American military forces fight as task forces organized for success, based on mission requirements—not as individual services. Task forces run the gamut from humanitarian relief to the geographical and functional commands dictated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, as modified. The goal is to provide a well-organized, trained, and equipped force structure built on an interlocking foundation of standardized processes for communication, logistics, and intelligence. These standardized forces can be combined to enable the joint task force commander to create imaginative operational art that can respond effectively in the chaos of war. Individual service doctrine provides each service’s philosophical orientation to the task-force teaming concept. Joint doctrine articulates the formation and employment of the joint task force itself. This doctrine is challenged by the existence of characteristics of each level of warfare at every level of organization. For example, strategic and tactical implications exist at the theater level of warfare and so forth. These are straightforward military concepts, neatly—if somewhat simplistically—laid out. As usual, the difficulty, as General Foulois found out, lies in execution.

What follows is a proposed framework for the United States Air Force as it executes its service role of organizing, training, and equipping in the twenty-first century. The concepts are not necessarily revolutionary; for the most part, they are modifications to existing structures. But certain cultural issues can and must be addressed as the Air Force struggles to develop aerospace leadership. In any case, organizational modifications can be effective when coupled with a distinct vision.

While the nature of ground forces dictates command, including Uniform Code of Military Justice authority, starting as a second lieutenant, the average fighter pilot sees responsible command for the first time as a lieutenant colonel.

We begin with a basic organization and attempt to standardize structure across various aircraft types and missions as well as nonflying units with both kinetic and nonkinetic missions. By doing so, we establish a relationship among crew size, predominant mission type, and general system employment.

Tactical Level

In his cultural assessment of the Air Force, Carl Builder correctly identifies the various cultural tribes of the Air Force.² General officers with fighter-pilot backgrounds currently dominate the Air Force culture. So one would do well to start at the tactical level of warfare with an organization familiar to the leadership.

For the Air Force culture, the squadron has taken on the role of primary unit identification. This is a legacy of nearly 100 years of organizational engineering and even greater antecedents, going back to the days of the cavalry. The knight of the air is still a strong image for the men and women who fly.

Air Force fighter-squadron commanders are hampered by nothing so much as an introduction to a relatively large first-time command late in their careers. While the nature of ground forces dictates command, including Uniform Code of Military Justice authority, starting as a second lieutenant, the average fighter pilot sees responsible command for the first time as a lieutenant colonel. This is not to denigrate the leadership skills inherent in mission—or even formation—command, but these transitory opportunities are not the same as one finds in a full-time command position. Since periodic success in command is a generally accepted test of military leaders, the current Air Force command paradigm appears late in an officer’s career. Under the current organizational structure, the squadron commander is responsible for 18 to 24 aircraft with associated crews, mission support, administration, and maintenance personnel.

By creating squadron formations based on 12 combat-ready, primary authorized aircraft (PAA) plus spares, and by reducing the grade required for command to major for both the squadron commander and the operations officer, the second in command, we could provide a realistic level of leadership opportunity early enough in an officer’s career to start winnowing out the future leadership pool. This template also provides the opportunity to assign captains to flight-command positions with commensurate authority from the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This organizational concept actually harkens back to the days of the Second World War and can still be found in the rank structure of the Royal Air Force (i.e., the rank of squadron leader, equivalent to a US Air Force major). Based on current interpretation of aerospace expeditionary force (AEF) requirements, a 12 PAA squadron provides flexibility without having to disassemble a larger squadron to support the AEF. This results in the entire squadron’s being deployed instead of pieces of an 18 or 24 PAA unit. With the AEF structure in mind, we achieve a benefit over the current paradigm, which often fractures squadrons by geographically separating various bits and pieces in order to meet rotation requirements. Twelve PAA fighters appear, at least anecdotally, to meet most common-denominator requirements of AEF units.³

Nondeployed maintenance would be consolidated in maintenance squadrons with flying-squadron affiliations. Thus, flights of the maintenance squadrons would be aligned with their aircraft and flying squadrons for normal home-station training. When required, they would deploy together as an integrated force package that could be aggregated at a deployed location in support of an aerospace expeditionary task force (ASETF). With the garrison squadron defined as only its complement of flying officers and essential technical and administrative support, the unit size is manageable for an Air Force major’s career experience. Training operations during nondeployed periods would provide a firm grounding, preparing the commander for the addition of maintenance personnel during deployments. Selection for promotion to lieutenant colonel would be largely dependent on completion of a successful tour as a squadron commander or operations officer.

Twelve PAA fighter squadrons create some inherent inefficiency with maintenance support by multiplying the number of deployment-support kits required, as well as supervisory personnel. Consolidated maintenance squadrons commanded by majors and flying-unit-aligned flights commanded by captains provide deployment support. This alignment system was actually common during the 1980s in the Air Force. The maintenance flights, called aircraft maintenance units, provided the strong unit identification with mission that fosters high morale. On the other hand, maintenance consolidation does provide for some economies of scale with personnel and allows the maintenance-squadron commanders the flexibility to shift experience across aircraft maintenance units to support the mission.

One can find rough parallels in the air mobility; missile; space; special operations forces; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance communities. Under this new model, for example, bomber squadrons would include four or six B-52s or B-1s with a major in command. The B-2 will be organized more along the fighter model since it has only a two-man crew but with an eye toward the associated logistics tail. C-130s will be provided to a theater in six PAA squadrons. For the larger mobility aircraft and the tankers, command structure should conform to the six-aircraft squadron, with orders dictating the flow of aircraft to sustain intertheater and intratheater requirements. Joint surveillance, target attack radar system; RC-135; and airborne warning and control system aircraft have two possible organizational configurations. The wings can be organized with integrated flight deck and mission squadrons or with separate squadrons for flight deck and mission personnel. The cleanest organization is the integrated concept with an employment structure based on four-aircraft squadrons.

Medical, communications, force-protection, and support functions will be organized in their respective groups to facilitate their contribution to deployment requirements for both the 12 PAA squadrons and as a lead group contributing to an ASETF. For example, a wing may have a security police squadron with flight-size-deployment unit type codes that include a command function sized to support or lead in the force-protection role, based on tasking.

By placing a field-grade officer in command of a squadron, we can also send a message that the move to field grade starts the transition from the tactical to the operational level of command. Squadron commanders are expected to be tactically sound, to look at the higher echelons of command, and to expand their professional military thinking. This clearly marks a change in the Air Force’s corporate culture.

The new structure of the operations group will absorb all additional duties as currently defined and incorporate them in the operations support squadron. These functions range from administrative support to special duties. Group commanders and deputy group commanders will be selected from a pool of lieutenant colonels who have successfully completed tours as squadron commanders or operations officers. At the group level of command, the Air Force has the opportunity to provide a construct that addresses combat, combat support, and combat service support in a coherent framework that the rest of DOD can understand. These will be the three basic groups found in a standard wing. A wing may also include other types of groups—medical, security, and so forth. The groups can be aggregated into deployable units, as necessary, to support mission requirements.

Wings in the continental United States are force providers. The wing commander’s mission is to provide a fully trained and employable force of squadrons and specified unit type codes that can be mobilized as part of an ASETF. The commander will also ensure that the wing’s combat support units are prepared for deployment with the required command and control (C²) elements organized into an Expeditionary Operations Center. Wing commanders will find most of their time taken up with base-management functions and will monitor the readiness levels of the assigned squadrons. With wings consisting of five or six flying squadrons, at least one flying squadron will probably be deployed at any given time, with at least one squadron in postdeployment reconstitution.

This is similar to the Navy’s rotational model and will probably be decried as tiered readiness; it represents a harsh reality for a garrison force. During the Gulf War, it was common for a fighter wing to deploy only two of its three squadrons, and bombers were parceled out from various bases. It often required a judicious adjustment of crew numbers and capabilities to ensure that combat-ready squadrons were combat capable. There is a difference. Combat readiness, as defined during the Gulf War, related to the C status of the squadron, reported through the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. Although C status determination can be, and was, leavened by the command chain, combat capability is a phrase chosen here to describe the ability of a squadron to function as a team and to meet all of its flying and nonflying combat-mission requirements. These obligations range from providing commanders for large mission packages to supporting the wing’s mission-planning cell.

Wing commanders will be chosen from officers who have successfully completed group-command tours and have been promoted to the rank of colonel. This concept raises the question of whether or not wing commanders have to be rated aviators. With legal exceptions noted, the answer is no. One can—and will have to—make a strong argument that, at the higher levels of command, ability is not reflected in technical, tactical expertise. However, there should not be a slavish adherence to some politically correct, ecumenical approach to command. Warriors—not bureaucrats—lead, and the culture must adjust to focus on producing warriors, regardless of skill specialization. Clearly, the airman prepared to enter the pit of combat has the advantage in training and attitude but not an exclusive claim to superior leadership.

So is there a bill to pay at the base level? Most certainly. Bases must be manned with appropriate-level garrison support that is independent of whether all, some, or none of the base units are on station. The base garrison is sized to maintain this minimum steady state and is augmented by the wing structure, as determined by the number of units on site. This type of system provides a built-in pool of experience to level out deployment requirements. For example, one finds both base civil engineering, with a large contingent of civilian or contract personnel, and a civil engineering deployment squadron. The latter will assist with base support when it is on station but will also focus on readiness training aimed at the individual and unit skills essential for deployment. This concept borrows from the Army. During the Gulf War, entire Army divisions deployed, but they left robust garrisons at their home posts that were responsible for everything from running the post to providing a replacement pipeline.

Toward an Expeditionary
Aerospace Force

The Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) embodies the Air Force vision to organize, train, equip, and sustain its Total Force—active, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve—to meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century. The EAF addresses these challenges through enhanced sustainability, readiness, and responsiveness and through fostering an expeditionary-warrior mind-set. The fundamental objective of the EAF is to enhance the operational capabilities the US Air Force provides today to its clients—the war-fighting commanders in chief (CINC)—while sustaining a viable force that can also provide those capabilities in the future.⁴ The deployable Air Force construct is based on AEFs. These aggregates of the forces provided by wings still struggle with emerging definitions of everything from unit manning documents to deployable, wing-level C². An AEF represents a pool of readily deployable and employable forces that can be organized into aerospace expeditionary wings and aerospace expeditionary groups as required by mission tasking as part of an ASETF, which, in turn, draws its mission as part of a joint task force. From a C² perspective, it is important to note that theater-level C² is not the responsibility of the AEF or any of its deployed component parts. Theater C² is provided by a numbered air force (NAF), tasked for the job. The marriage of the NAF and AEF(s) creates the ASETF.

As part of the proposed reorganization, brigadier generals will be rotated through command billets to lead AEFs for an assignment period of not less than two years or more than three; furthermore, they should take at least two AEFs through a complete cycle (figs. 1 and 2). Centrally assigned, these generals will be provided with a small core staff and tasked to prepare their AEF for a deployment window in support of an ASETF. If the entire AEF, or a significant portion the size of an aerospace expeditionary wing, is required for the mission, the general will deploy and command the wing. If only an aerospace expeditionary group is required, the general will designate a colonel or lieutenant colonel from one of the participating wings to command.

As units move through their training and deployment cycles, they will come under the command of their assigned AEF commander (fig. 1, AEFs 9 and 10). This transition will occur prior to entering the deployment window and is a departure from current practice, which does not formalize the shift in command until deployment. During this period, the AEF will undergo a training deployment to Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, to participate in an AEF Flag exercise. Nellis is the home of the very successful tactics exercise Red Flag. An AEF Flag will differ from Red Flag in its focus on the full range of deployment requirements, combat to combat support, and combat service support. C² in the context of a theater operation—the force-projection part of an ASETF—will be integral to this exercise. Upon completion of the flag exercise, the AEF will be certified as deployment ready. When the deployment window closes, the AEF units will change operational control back to their parent wing and reconstitute. The cyclical nature of this process provides wing commanders the ability to adjust individual and unit training in preparation for the demands of employment.

Theater: The Numbered Air Force

The responsibility for theater-specific operations falls squarely on the NAF, which provides leadership for the ASETFs, expertise on an aligned theater in support of a CINC, and fundamental knowledge of a geographic or functional area as related to the CINC. This is the role of the commander of air force forces (COMAFFOR), and the NAF fills this role at all component levels: unified command, subunified command, or joint task force. In addition, the NAF should be prepared to lead a joint task force. The only NAFs that exist are directly aligned with a regional or functional CINC, a subunified command, or a standing alliance or coalition. A unit without a direct war-fighting role, supported or supporting, is not a NAF. There will be no training NAFs in the current structure.

NAFs will have a lieutenant general as commander and a major general as vice commander, as well as a brigadier general as chief of staff, having completed a tour as an AEF commander. The NAF will have a numbered staff in alignment with a joint staff structure. This staff is the core of the air force forces for a specific theater and will provide support for organizing, training, and equipping as identified by law and by joint and Air Force doctrine. NAFs may or may not have forces assigned on a day-to-day basis and therefore may not have administrative responsibilities for units unless engaged in ASETF tasking or an exercise. An example of an engaged NAF is Seventh Air Force’s support to United States Forces Korea, a subunified command with major units assigned at Osan Air Base and Kunsan Air Base on the Korean peninsula. Authorized NAFs in the new model include the following:

By providing the capability to meet the full range of tasking (fig. 3), the NAF provides the flexibility of aerospace power across the range of missions that could be required of a COMAFFOR from a joint force air component commander to a commander of a joint task force.

Figure 3. Supporting CINCs Worldwide as “Full Service” Air Components

Figure 3. Supporting CINCs Worldwide as “Full Service” Air Components (From briefing, Air Force Command and Control Training and Innovation Group, subject: Air Operations Center Baseline, Hurlburt Field, Florida, 3 January 2001)

Major Commands

The Air Force has used major commands to delegate the tasks for organizing, training, and equipping that are inherent in the service’s mission. These commands have also established component relationships with some CINCs during the 50 years of the Cold War. With the reductions in both overall troop strengths and overseas basing structure, the Cold War major-command construct is no longer relevant. NAFs are war fighters, and major commands facilitate the providing of forces to the CINCs and joint task forces, as required.

Only three major commands are necessary to achieve the organize-train-equip mission (fig. 4). They will be commanded by four-star general officers, along with a three-star deputy and a three-star chief of staff. The chief of staff will have completed a NAF tour of duty as either a commander or vice commander prior to assignment. Reporting to the chief of staff will be staff oriented to the joint numerical-designation system:

Aerospace Doctrine, Training, and Education Command (ADTEC), with a general as commander and a lieutenant general as vice commander, is responsible for entry-level education and training, as well as doctrine and combat development. By incorporating all the basic missions in one command, the Air Force will finally achieve a focus that has eluded it. In order for this command to be effective, it is essential that all members of the Air Force realize that they are part of the training team, no matter the command in which they currently serve. In order to progress in rank, position, and authority, officers will be required to serve in ADTEC for at least one tour prior to selection for flag rank. Education, training, and doctrine are not nuisance assignments; nor are they to be left to "career trainers." Successful Air Force officers are also successful educators, doctrinal thinkers, and combat developers. Whenever possible, training will be contracted out to private firms or supported by the Air National Guard or the Air Force Reserve, always under the leadership of active duty officers at appropriate command levels.

Component organizations in ADTEC will be centers, which will have a range of flexibility for organizational structure and chain of command to get the job done (fig. 5). This is not to say that anarchy will rule but that center commanders will be able to adjust their units’ structure with wide latitude as technology, processes, and missions change to reflect the changing demands of war fighters. Major generals will command the centers with brigadier generals as deputies.

Component commands of ADTEC include the Aerospace Doctrine Center, collocated with Air University, as well as the training centers at Lackland AFB, Texas; Keesler AFB, Mississippi; Goodfellow AFB, Texas; and Sheppard AFB, Texas. The commander of Air University will be a lieutenant general. Flying training wings will report to the ADTEC commander.

ADTEC will also contain the Aerospace Warfare Center at Nellis AFB, which will be responsible for the Air Force battlelab; the tactical center of excellence wing (57th Wing, Nellis AFB); the operational art center of excellence wing (53d Wing, Hurlburt Field, Florida); the functional wings for space (Schriever AFB, Colorado), air mobility (Fort Dix, New Jersey), and information warfare (Kelly AFB, Texas); and the Air Force Experimentation Office (fig. 6). The battlelab will be a central structure that will establish temporary (a three-year minimum) detachments at locations as needed to support experimentation. This concept replaces the multitude of independent battlelabs in today’s construct. All of these wings, the battlelab, and the Air Force Experimentation Office will be commanded by brigadier generals. Because of the need for experienced personnel with career maturity, the rank structure of the Aerospace Warfare Center units may be inflated from those of normal, equivalent operational and training wings. But the center will also have the flexibility to look for officers of relatively junior rank who have good ideas and leadership skills, and give them an opportunity to create new constructs in support of the war-fighting mission.

Aerospace Materiel Command (AMC), commanded by a general with a lieutenant general as vice commander, is responsible for the acquisition of all materiel that must be purchased to support the conduct of aerospace operations. This includes large-scale, long-range programs such as aircraft or satellite acquisition as well as the rapid turnover of software and hardware associated with C² systems.

Spiral acquisition will have to become the norm for all requirements. Small batch processes may be implemented with contractors for just-in-time logistics that rapidly adjust to advances in technology and changes in force-employment processes.

Component organizations in AMC will be centers, which will have a range of flexibility for organizational structure and chain of command to get the job done (fig. 7). As in ADTEC, center commanders will be able to adjust their units’ structure with wide latitude as technology, processes, and missions change to reflect the changing demands of war fighters. Major generals will command centers with brigadier generals as deputies.

AMC will own the Air Force lab structure; product centers, such as Electronic System Center; and depots. In fact, the current structure of Air Force Materiel Command is a good starting point. The biggest changes to AMC will be in establishing new business practices that facilitate rapid acquisition, fielding, and institutionalization of new products and processes. Actually defining and implementing the concept of spiral development will be the first step on this path.

AMC must also deal with a realistic plan for getting a grip on the various black (secret) programs in the Air Force. Currently, these programs often exist in a stovepiped vacuum. The cost is exorbitant if these emerging capabilities cannot be integrated into the war fighter’s tool kit. Extremism in national security may not be a vice, but it makes using classified programs difficult—if not impossible.

GHQ Air Force, commanded by a general with a lieutenant general as vice commander, is the major command responsible for providing air force forces to war fighters. It will maintain employment training that relates to readiness capabilities required by Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reporting procedures. GHQ Air Force has responsibility for all NAFs and is the war-fighting advocate to the other major commands and the Air Staff.

A worldwide network of C² support nodes will be the responsibility of GHQ Air Force. The nodes will be oriented by region as well as function and will facilitate deployment of the EAF and its associated AEFs. Initially, at least, the nodes will be the existing Air Force support centers.

For example, the tanker/airlift control center (TACC) is one such affiliated node, which already exists and can slide into the new construct. In conjunction with Second Air Force, it will be responsible for the employment of air mobility assets worldwide in support of Transportation Command. The existing TACC is already a node of expertise on the global network, simultaneously establishing air bridges for tanker and airlift support, maintaining en-route visibility on aircraft and cargo, and providing feedback to the logistics architecture, ranging from specific theaters to Air Force Materiel Command.

GHQ Air Force will monitor and direct all unit training worldwide, maintain knowledge of readiness status, and provide advice and feedback to the National Command Authorities through the Joint Chiefs of Staff on unit-deployment options. Once deployment options are assessed and deployment is initiated, the Air Force global network will provide the essential flow of information while forces are en route as well as upon arrival in-theater.

Air Staff

As usual, Washington provides the greatest challenge to a reorganization proposal. The Air Staff resides in the Pentagon and provides interface with the other services and the secretary of defense. Planning, programming, and budgeting are the harsh realities of the Pentagon, and the Air Staff is the Air Force advocate in this arena.

Currently, the head of the Air Staff is the chief of staff of the Air Force, a general; the vice chief of staff is also a general. The assistant vice chief of staff, a lieutenant general, has the day-to-day responsibility of assisting the vice chief in running the Air Staff and functions as the chief-of-staff-equivalent to the other command levels.

In any reorganization, the Air Staff must respond to the needs and direction of the secretary of the Air Force and chief of staff of the Air Force and provide the essential fiscal support to the major commands. In order to break across bureaucratic logjams, the secretary shall provide for the establishment of task-oriented agencies that will have specified life spans with renewal options. These agencies will have very specific charters with timelines and will report to the assembled leadership at Corona. Agencies may also be chartered at the direction of Congress and report back to that body, as required. An officer ranking no lower than major general will provide leadership for an agency.

The overarching rule for the Air Staff is very simple: staffs support war fighters. If a staff area or agency cannot provide a direct contribution to the war fighter, then it should be eliminated. Air Staff members are constantly challenged to contribute to effective solutions that can be funded and implemented while managing to avoid being impediments. The current advocacy role of program element monitors makes this challenge particularly daunting. Rewards are not given to monitors who cancel programs or make money available to other efforts, yet this is exactly the behavior that will be required if the existing Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is to have any relevance to the constantly emerging requirements of an Air Force in transition. Pursuant to reorganization guidelines laid down in 1947, the Air Staff is organized in a Deputy Chief of Staff system reporting to the chief of staff of the Air Force. Currently, these are three-star billets:Air and Space Operations; Installations and Logistics; Personnel; and Plans and Programs.⁵ Also on the Air Staff with various military and civilian ranks are the chief master sergeant of the Air Force; director of Security Forces; director of Communications and Information; Air Force historian; chief scientist; chief of the Air Force Reserve; director of the Air National Guard; USAF Scientific Advisory Board; judge advocate general; director of Test and Evaluation; surgeon general; and chief of Chaplain Services.⁶

Gen Carl Spaatz selected the deputy system after a study by both the secretary-general of the Air Board and the Air War College recommended that system, based on feedback from the wartime commanders.⁷ The Air Staff was to be small and responsive, with the deputies working as commanders in their functional areas. This was perceived as an improvement on the assistant chief of staff system.⁸ The staff goals have not changed over the last 50 years, so if the existing staff structure is not supporting the fundamental goals, then it must be changed. This is not to say that there have not been changes in the history of the Air Force. But most have been "salami slicing"—changes at the margins rather than changes in business practices.

Office of the Secretary
of the Air Force

Complementary to the Air Staff is the organization of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, whose role is to provide civilian leadership essential to the integration of an effective military and the democratic government of the United States. This office currently includes the secretary and undersecretary of the Air Force as well as four assistant secretaries: Financial Management and Comptroller; Space and director of the National Reconnaissance Office; Acquisition; and Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations, and Environment. The office also includes the following positions: general counsel; legislative liaison; auditor general; inspector general; director of Public Affairs; director of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization; and deputy undersecretary for International Affairs.⁹

In the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the question for every organization should be, Is this done at the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense? If the answer is yes, then the office should be eliminated or reduced to the minimum essential for coordination. At this level, the Air Force political interface shades all decisions, including organizational structure. Interservice rivalry also comes into play since no service is going to willingly give organizational advantage to another. Thus, the Air Force will be loath to give up its Directorate of Legislative Liaison unless the Departments of the Army and Navy do the same. The secretary of the Air Force is the primary advocate for human-resources issues and major program funding. Further complicating the Air Staff/secretary of the Air Force relationship are field operating agencies and direct reporting units.¹⁰ Even a cursory reading of the names highlights some potential redundancies in organizations that encompass 32,815 military and civilian authorizations and raises the question of how many of the organizations are required and how many have simply grown over the years of the cold war.¹¹

If there is not a legislative requirement for an organization, it should be under immediate review. If there is a legislative requirement, the secretary of the Air Force should be asking why; if the requirement is in response to Cold War issues, the secretary should propose new legislation. Best business practices should not be held hostage to arbitrary manpower ceilings that drive the formation of below-the-line organizations, hiding manpower and making mission assessment difficult—if not impossible. In short, if we save a position here and one there, pretty soon we’re talking about some real numbers that can be reallocated to the areas where manpower increases are needed. This includes innovative views on ongoing requirements. For example, the Air Force Academy could remain a direct reporting unit, but its command structure could be tasked to provide all officer accessions, including Officer Training School (OTS) and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) (fig. 8). The Preparatory School is already on the Academy campus; OTS classes could be scheduled to maximize use of the entire existing physical plant. Weather could be an issue, or OTS could be concentrated during the more clement season to train the current level of 1,700 graduates per year.¹² ROTC is essentially a distributed network that needs a hub for providing standards. What better way to concentrate consistency in all program standards while maintaining the unique characteristics of each commissioning source? This type of innovative approach should be applied to all the field operating agencies and direct reporting units and their missions.

These proposals for reorganization are sweeping, but they are within the realm of what could be implemented relatively rapidly. More evolutionary in nature than revolutionary, the changes take into account the debate over the revolution in military affairs, the cultural shift of the Air Force to an expeditionary force, and some needed post–Cold War adjustments. The biggest drawback is the politics in the reduction of the number of four-star generals. Even this issue can be sidestepped in the short run by providing for four-star deputies of the major commands, although one could argue that there has not been a drawdown in flag officers commensurate with the overall post–Cold War force reduction. In any case, the preceding arrangements provide for a force that can transition to the full range of military missions with a minimum of confusion over command structure and responsibilities. Subsequent articles in a proposed series will deal with the train and equip missions, as well as force-employment C² and the underlying infrastructure necessary for the employment of forces.

1. John F. Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931–1935 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1984), 197–98.

2. Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 179–88.

3. At the US Air Force Aerospace Expeditionary Force Center Web site, see "TPFDD Library" under "AEF Information" and ongoing evaluations at the AEF Center regarding the tasking of six- and 12-ship fighter packages in dependent and independent War Readiness Spares Kit configurations to meet AEF requirements, on-line, Internet, 24 January 2001, available from https:// aefcenter.acc.af.mil.

4. EAF Homepage, Headquarters AF/XOP, on-line, Internet, 27 February 2001, available from http://www.xo.hq.af.mil/ eaf/CD%20ROM%20Files/5%20-%20EAF%20Update% 201%20Oct%2099.doc.

5. Herman S. Wolk, Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force, 1943–1947 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1984), 188–92.

10. Current field operating agencies include the Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation, Air Force Audit Agency, Air Force Base Conversion Agency, Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, Air Force Cost Analysis Agency, Air Force Flight Standards Agency, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Air Force History Support Office, Air Force Inspection Agency, Air Force Legal Services Agency, Air Force Logistics Management Agency, Air Force Manpower and Innovation Agency, Air Force Medical Operations Agency, Air Force Medical Support Agency, Air Force News Agency, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Air Force Operations Group, Air Force Personnel Center, Air Force Personnel Operations Agency, Air Force Program Executive Office, Air Force Real Estate Agency, Air Force Review Board Agency, Air Force Safety Center, Air Force Services Agency, Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency, Air Force Technical Applications Center, Air Force Weather Agency, Air Intelligence Agency, and Air National Guard Readiness Center. Current direct reporting units include the Air Force Communications and Information Center, Air Force Doctrine Center, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, United States Air Force Academy, and the 11th Wing.

Lt Col John M. “Jay” Fawcett Jr., USAF, retired (USAFA; MBA, Cornell University), is a contractor supporting the commander of the US Air Force Command and Control Training and Innovation Group at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Formerly a division chief with the JFACC Operations Division, 505th Command and Control Evaluation Group at Hurlburt Field, he retired from active duty in 1998. His articles have appeared in Airpower Journal, Air Chronicles, and Parameters. Colonel Fawcett is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.