Published Aerospace Power Journal - Fall 2001
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Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell
Col Allan W. Howey, USAF
Lt Col Eric A. Ash, USAF
Maj Thomas S. Szvetecz, USAF*
*Dr. Werrell is a military defense analyst at the Airpower Research Institute; Colonel Howey is director of the Airpower Research Institute; Colonel Ash is editor of Aerospace Power Journal; and Major Szvetecz is a C-17 pilot at Charleston AFB, South Carolina.
As we enter the twenty-first century, the United States finds itself as the sole superpower, dominant in economic, political, and military spheres throughout the world. The American military is clearly superior to any other in the world—in air and space, on land, and at sea. Clearly, "no one else comes close." We have no peer competitor at present and none on the immediate horizon—which is important, not from a desire to have world hegemony but simply to protect national interests and promote world peace and stability. We are in a very comfortable position—and in an uncomfortable one as well. Although we may be the top world power, we must not remain content and idle in that comfort zone.
If anything is certain, beyond death and taxes, it is change. Regardless of our intent and actions, other nations will chafe at American superiority, and some will challenge it. George Tenet, director of Central Intelligence, recently testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "the fact that we are arguably the world’s most powerful nation does not bestow invulnerability." He went on to warn that "in fact, it may make us a larger target for those who don’t share our interests, values or beliefs."1 If we are to maintain our present position and superiority, we must anticipate these changes and take steps today to meet future challenges—or pay the consequences.2
It is important to consider where we are and where we are headed. The implosion of the Soviet Union has rearranged the world’s power structure. The demise of our rival of a half century has left us not only superior to all comers, but also attempting to adjust to the post-cold-war world. In contrast to the situation we faced in the cold war, in which the threat of nuclear war and the enemy (the Soviet bloc) were obvious, today the specific threat is less clear. The national strategy was notionally set to accommodate two major theater wars (MTW) or a number of smaller contingencies. Although the overall situation appears less dangerous than in the past, overall military commitments have not subsided but increased since 1990. For example, since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, US Air Force deployments have increased threefold.3
At the same time, however, the US military has declined in numbers as a reaction to the loss of the Soviet threat. Accompanying this downsizing is the appearance of new technologies that promise greater capabilities with fewer forces. But new equipment is also much more expensive, reducing the number of units acquired. Whatever the cause, this has resulted in a 40 percent reduction in both Air Force personnel and aircraft inventory.4 So we must do more with less.
In addition, America’s clear military dominance and the demise of the "evil empire" have changed our relationship with our allies. Two factors are of immediate concern. First, the United States has drawn back some of its forces to US territory since the end of the cold war. One visible indication is that we have reduced our major overseas bases by two-thirds.5 The second concerns our mutual contributions to the common cause, for we are not only in a different league from would-be foes, but also from our allies. The latter are significant for diplomatic and political purposes—for bases and manpower. But today, and in the foreseeable future, they can contribute little military force to complement high-tech American forces.
In 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the US military was in excellent shape. It fielded a large, well-trained force armed with the most modern weapons. Designed to fight a large, well-equipped force in Europe, in the Gulf War it faced what turned out to be a smaller, much less capable force in a conventional conflict and in terrain well suited for both air and tank operations. Anticipating heavy losses against a desert-smart, tough, determined foe, the Air Force committed most of its inventory of key forces in the Gulf War. The entire F-117 and F-15E force; both joint surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS) aircraft; and the bulk of US precision-guided munitions went to the Gulf. Although the Air Force deployed only 27 percent of its tactical aircraft to the Gulf, these included 93 percent of its aircraft capable of launching laser-guided bombs (LGB). In addition, it sent 85 percent of all its equipment designed to operate from bare bases, 92 percent of its entire refueling assets, and many of its critical munitions: 43 percent of available cluster-bomb units, 52 percent of its antiradiation missiles, 63 percent of the LGB stockpile, and 63 percent of its Maverick missiles. Had another major action occurred at this time, the United States would have been stretched, at the very least.6
That potential scenario was precisely the one played out during the Global Engagement IV war game in 1999. The game involved two near-simultaneous theater wars in Asia in 2010. One of four key problems the players identified was trying to allocate high-demand, low-density aerospace assets—specifically, the B-2—most efficiently and effectively.7 Both theater commanders needed and wanted these bombers at the same time. The players attempted to meet requirements by basing all the bombers at Diego Garcia, but this did not solve the basic problem of who would control the aircraft. The after-action report noted that "the conventional construct of ‘swinging’ forces from one theater to another does not seem to capture the requirements of commanders to conduct two-theater warfare in 2010."8 Following the game, Secretary of the Air Force F. Whitten Peters recognized the problem: "What is not yet clearly defined is our ability to ‘swing’ from one MTW to the next. . . . It is important that we include the potential for just such a requirement [for the future]."9 In brief, then, the problem is how the United States is going to fight certain systems that in the future will be in high demand and short supply.
We do not know what these specific systems will be in the future. At present they consist of such items as intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)/battlefield-management assets (such as the airborne warning and control system, JSTARS, and Rivet Joint aircraft); electronic-warfare aircraft (EA-6B and EC-130H); special operations forces (MH-53J helicopter and MC-130P and MC-130E aircraft); Patriot air defense units; rescue aircraft (HC-130 and HH-60G) and chemical/biological defense.10 Clearly, if present trends (limited forces and greater commitments) continue and if our assumptions for the future are correct (that we will have to perform more tasks with fewer resources and prepare to fight two MTWs simultaneously), then certain systems undoubtedly will be in short supply.
A possible solution to the problem, or at least a piece of the solution, is organizational. New technology will allow home-based or space-based assets to operate effectively anywhere in the world, and an organizational concept known as "Global Dynamic Operations" (GDO) might be able to take advantage of this technology. GDO, which involves centralized control of scarce assets, has historical precedent as well as logical justification.
Throughout their history, airmen have fought ground commanders for control of their aircraft.11 Out of such conflicts over command and control of air assets grew developments in air doctrine that influence much of what the Air Force does to this day. Basically, a system had to be worked out that could address the allocation of limited assets in high demand in different locations. Unfortunately, until development of that system—specifically codified in products such as War Department Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power—both airmen and ground soldiers lost their lives due to inefficiencies.
A strategic example of the GDO concept in action is that of the B-29s of Twentieth Air Force in World War II. Acting as the executive agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Gen Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, chief of the Army Air Forces (AAF), retained direct control of the B-29 force. Three different theater commanders wanted the bombers for their own theater: Gen Douglas MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific Area, Adm Chester Nimitz in the Central Pacific, and Lord Louis Mountbatten in the Southeast Asia Command. Because the aircraft’s extended range allowed it to reach targets in more than one theater and due to the political connections and personal forcefulness of all three commanders, the decision makers decided that a system of centralized control was necessary.12 The system worked. B-29s operated in three theaters, effectively bombed Japan, and provided support to the Navy (mining and suppression of kamikaze airfields in southern Japan) yet remained under centralized (AAF) control.13 The major rationale for this arrangement still exists (and certainly will continue to do so).
But the examples aren’t just historical. The National Reconnaissance Office was certainly created to deal with this kind of problem, and it clearly involves centralized control of scarce space resources. In addition, US Transportation Command is the central authority that dictates where, when, and how US military and contract air and sea transport is executed worldwide. Admittedly, both of these are support organizations, but the principle is still the same—how to allocate and employ high-demand, scarce aerospace resources most efficiently and effectively.
From a logical standpoint, GDO makes sense and seems inevitable in the long run. Basically, it envisions the global planning and employment of aerospace power. It executes "dominant maneuver" on a global scale. Technology continues to shrink the globe, moving us toward one aerospace theater. We simply cannot continue to limit our aerospace thinking to the past and present wherein time and geography frame our thinking and processes, limiting us to tightly drawn geographic theaters. Clearly, by facilitating more efficient command and control, GDO would join Joint Vision 2020’s14 perspective of reducing the "fog and friction" of war. In particular, it would help eliminate the competition between commanders in chief (CINC) for high-demand, low-density assets.
In addition, GDO might help with another current problem—the apparent growing American aversion to casualties. GDO promises to reduce the vulnerability of US forces deployed to forward bases in foreign lands. It clearly falls in line with post-Vietnam desires and influences such as the [Caspar] Weinberger-[Colin] Powell doctrine geared to ensure military success at the least possible cost and the greatest possible popular support. GDO does just that, helping protect both assets and people. In the words of Maj Gen Charles Link, home basing will "project distant military effects without projecting vulnerabilities in the same ratio."15
Certain assets, defined as high demand and low density, must be assigned to a central authority—perhaps labeled a global force air component commander (GFACC). Presently, the services designate which of their assets are high demand/low density, and these are handled in accordance with the Global Military Force Policy. The secretary of defense uses this policy to appropriate these forces to the various CINCs. But this is strictly a peacetime arrangement. At present, no structure exists to handle the situation in wartime. As a result, the secretary would have to referee the CINCs as they worked out an agreement on the use of such forces.
In a two-MTW situation, this would cost precious time and produce a faulty compromise. Consider the birth of the world’s first air force. The Royal Air Force (RAF), created in 1917, came into being on 1 April 1918, largely as a result of nearly four years of competitive bickering over assets between the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service during wartime. Only an amalgamated RAF could set proper priorities.16 Two things dictate priorities: need and time. One theater might have a greater overall need than another for a given limited asset—but perhaps not as quickly as the other theater. In a two-MTW scenario, decision makers will seek military victory in both theaters as quickly and cheaply as possible, thus requiring the careful application of scarce resources to achieve the optimum effect overall. Considering the increasingly high-speed look of war in the not-too-distant future, this may need to take place very rapidly. A system in which each CINC fights to win his or her theater war without the knowledge of, or perhaps even concern for, what is going on elsewhere will likely take more time and may not use assets optimally.
In GDO, the GFACC would report to the secretary of defense directly or through the JCS. A GFACC would own globally capable aerospace assets either permanently or as the need arose, in which case these assets would go to the GFACC via a change of operational control. A number of possible arrangements come to mind. One would entail redrawing the Unified Command’s boundaries to place both war zones under one commander. Another involves getting the GFACC from US Strategic Command. A third would use the commander of Air Combat Command as the air component commander of Joint Forces Command. Another possibility calls for assigning the GFACC’s responsibility to the Air Force chief of staff. The particulars of this potential command designation obviously would have to be worked out, but the imperative is simply recognition of the importance and inevitability of the concept.
For all its advantages, the GDO concept has problems—but so did Orville and Wilbur’s concept of powered flight. First, GDO threatens many established Air Force comfort zones. It flies in the face of current thinking and has the appearance of breaching a cornerstone Air Force concept of "centralized control and decentralized execution," a tenet of both the joint world and the Air Force world as we now know it. But everyone should bear in mind that the first objective of airmen from the very first aerial conflict was to centralize control over air assets under airmen, a battle that has continued into the twenty-first century. Some people have suggested that the elevation of jointness to Olympian heights is a new parochialism similar to the obsession some airmen have had with strategic bombing.17 In reality GDO rejects neither jointness nor centralized control and decentralized execution, but critics may claim that it does.
For this and other reasons, any GFACC arrangement would face significant challenges. Sister services will most likely have doubts and reservations, based primarily on their thinking that such high-demand, limited aerospace assets are only part of the strategic equation and that a GFACC would hold inappropriate authority in employing such assets. Their argument is that the concept is simply not joint. Wrong argument. Joint employment of forces does not mean equal sharing. Rather, each service brings its fighting ability to the table for use in the best possible manner, even if that means excluding other services in certain situations. Each situation dictates which services and arms receive support and which provide support. In the end, surface services would have to be persuaded to agree with the importance of the GDO concept to a world-crisis situation, even though they might have few forces in this category. Considering the historical record, this will be no easy task.
Another objection, no doubt, would come from the unified CINCs, who would stand to lose some power. Quite simply, GDO runs contrary to the trend of giving the CINCs more authority, not less. Further, some people in the Air Force would object to the pressures on "reach-back" capabilities—the air-tasking-order cycles and logistics. And some might remember command and control problems in Vietnam between Strategic Air Command and Seventh Air Force. Finally, it is possible that GDO might require some sort of change in public law—never a small or easy task. Yet, such a move is simpler to accomplish and probably more rational if contemplated in peacetime rather than in the heat of crisis.
The Air Force attained its present status by overcoming the inertia of tradition when tradition blocked innovation. GDO goes against some entrenched principles and powers; surely the obstacles are real. But the potential problems on the horizon are real as well. We will be derelict if we sit idle in our comfort zone and do not attempt to best use our technological advantages, taking steps to maximize their effectiveness. Presently, one hears discussions about whether the military has or has not entered a new era called a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Certainly, new technology offers exciting possibilities, but an RMA requires more than just new technology. It also demands innovations in doctrine and organization. We must develop all three elements to enable the RMA, and GDO helps that process. It offers a way to build the organization required to support a new way of war. Although many of our problems have solutions outside the military, this is a case in which the Air Force can do something to improve the situation. We must take that step.
Studies suggest the existence of three emerging areas where military operations will change under the current RMA: weapons, space, and information. GDO clearly fits the first and is enabled by the third. As stated in "Concept for Future Joint Operations," "First, long-range precision weapons, with unprecedented worldwide mobility, coupled with effective sensors, C2 systems, and precise intelligence will alter operations and tactics. Long-range precision engagement can play an increasingly prominent role in power projection at all levels across the range of military operations."18 Indeed, this is the vision of GDO, but with added reality. High-tech expenses will continue to limit the number of some of those longest-range, most precise weapons. At the same time, however, demand for them will continue to increase.
In essence, GDO seems the ultimate legacy of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which sought to improve military advice to the National Command Authorities, produce more efficient use of resources, enhance the effectiveness of military operations, and improve management and administration in the Department of Defense. The act certainly gave CINCs more command authority, and, on the surface, GDO might appear to erode the power and authority of the CINCs. In reality, however, through greater efficiencies and global perspective, it increases their power by more effectively employing assets to improve their collective force.
Obviously, the Air Force of tomorrow will be far more capable than it is today, surely in ways we can barely conceive. It may well be true that our future capabilities will exceed our capacity to control them, especially as the world shrinks due to technological innovations. More than likely, Global Dynamic Operations will be part of the Air Force of tomorrow, so it is time to start thinking about how better to organize it—today.
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Notes
1. Quoted in Chuck McCutheon, "Defining, Asserting the National Interest," Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 14 October 2000, 2398.
2. This of course brings to mind Giulio Douhet’s ageless quotation that "victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur." Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 30.
3. Mackubin Owens, "The Price of the Pax Americana," Wall Street Journal, 18 October 2000.
4. F. Whitten Peters, "The International Dimension of Aerospace Power," speech delivered to the Air Force Association, Washington, D.C., 15 September 1998.
5. Ibid.
6. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 176–77.
7. The other three were forward support, simultaneous deployment and employment, and early offensive ground-force operations. The chief of staff of the Air Force directed further study of the issues raised by Global Engagement IV under the (initial) titles Dynamic Shift, Dominant Effects, Agile Combat Support/Rapid Global Mobility, Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, and Early Offensive Ground Operations. See "Global Engagement IV," draft after-action report (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Force Wargaming Institute, January 2000), iv–v, vii–viii.
8. Ibid., v.
9. F. Whitten Peters, "Preparing for the Next Challenge," remarks to the Global Engagement War Game dinner, Montgomery, Ala., 28 October 1999.
10. Orientation briefing, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., subject: Global Military Force Policy, 20 June 2000.
11. Soldiers want direct support close to the front, whereas airmen want to attack strategic targets far to the enemy’s rear or enemy ground forces some distance from the front.
12. For information about Twentieth Air Force, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 5, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945 (1953; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 33–41.
13. See Kenneth Werrell, Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during World War II (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996).
14. Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000).
15. Elaine M. Grossman quoting Maj Gen Charles D. Link in an interview of 22 September 2000. See "As Aerospace Role Grows, Air Force Focuses on Developing Leaders," Inside the Pentagon 16, no. 40 (5 October 2000): 8.
16. Eric Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, 1912–1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 112–13.
17. David Mets, "A Glider in the Propwash of the Royal Air Force," in Airpower and Ground Armies: Essays on the Evolution of Anglo-American Air Doctrine, 1940–43, ed. Daniel R. Mortensen (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1998), 50–51, 55, 82.
18. "Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010" (Suffolk, Va.: Joint Warfighting Center, May 1997), 24.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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