Organizing for Success: Theater Missile Defense in Korea

Editorial Abstract: To meet rising threats from ballistic missiles, Combined Forces Command and US Forces Korea created a theater-level missile defense command that serves as an excellent model for other theaters. The Combined and Joint Theater Missile Operations Cell fuses several theater missile defense elements into one joint organization, providing significant war-fighting abilities without additional force structure.

Combined Forces Command, Korea (CFC) and US Forces Korea (USFK) recently completed a theater missile defense (TMD) reorganization initiative that is proving to be an innovative solution to a serious war-fighting challenge. The initiative grew from a problem shared by many of the geographical commanders in chief (CINC) and may prove to be a model for other theater-level organizations. Prior to this initiative, missile-defense responsibilities in Korea were spread between several component staffs and service-specific organizations. This situation produced confusion, lacked unity of effort, and contributed to needless friction and inefficiency. Additionally, these organizations lacked the proper structure and resources for the execution of TMD.

Recognizing this problem, USFK approached it from the view that TMD is inherently a combined and joint mission area. It then created a new organization, the combined and joint theater-missile operations cell (CJTMOC) reflecting the combined and joint nature of the mission. The CJTMOC combines elements of the Joint and Combined Staff, air component staff, and the US-based 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command (32d AAMDC). It pulls together the various TMD players into one combined and joint organization capable of planning, integrating, and executing TMD operations at the theater level.

Cause for Concern

What caused USFK to look back at its organization and doctrine? CFC faced a serious war-fighting dilemma that, if left unresolved, could jeopardize its mission. It faced a growing theater ballistic-missile threat (possibly equipped with weapons of mass destruction) without a theater-level missile-defense command to counter the threat. Although all of the services have some TMD capability, no single service can provide a war-fighting CINC with an organization capable of producing integrated missile-defense plans. The only active organization with this capability is the 32d AAMDC, located at Fort Bliss, Texas.¹ Unfortunately, the 32d AAMDC is available to a CINC only during actual crises and major exercises.

So what options were available to the command? The best option was to create during peacetime a distributed TMD organization that merged elements of the in-theater staffs with the 32d AAMDC. Although units from Korea and Texas are geographically separated, the new organization would function as a theater-focused organization.

This option had several advantages. For example, merging in-theater staffs with the 32d AAMDC combines theater and missile expertise, producing a theater-level organization more capable of integrating all of the services’ missile-defense capabilities into one coherent operation. This also allows 32d AAMDC a greater voice during peacetime in the development of the TMD concepts and plans used during war. Together these factors should produce better plans, faster and smoother transition during crises, and better integration of missile defense operations, directly improving joint war fighting in Korea.

Creating the New Organization

Creating the organization required three components: a distributed structure, defined lines of authority, and requisite communications connectivity. CFC created the structure of the organization by using a distributed organizational structure, merging in-theater missile-defense staff sections with elements of 32d AAMDC and providing the coordinating authority needed to function. The use of modern communications enabled the organization to function as one, regardless of the geographical separation. The result was a split-based organization capable of meeting CINC requirements, without added force-structure costs.

CFC is currently testing the CJTMOC concept. The CJTMOC, working for the air component commander (ACC), merges elements of 32d AAMDC, Combined and Joint Staffs, and the air component staff into one joint team. The team is equipped and staffed for planning and execution of joint and combined missile-defense operations at the theater level.² During peacetime (armistice in Korea) the cell is a split organization, based in both the United States and Korea.³ In a contingency with the deployment of the 32d AAMDC to Korea, the units would physically merge into one command.

The CFC’s intent is to better use available resources to produce a synergistic organization supporting a seamless transition from peace to war. This concept involves more than the exchanging of liaison officers or establishing a "reach back" (the ability to directly access remotely located data and resources without having to go through other organizations first) capability. It represents a new way of organizing separate staffs into a specific, mission-focused organization and, if successful, will serve as a model for other theaters facing similar challenges.

Understanding the Differences:
Before and After

To understand how the new organization improved TMD, we must review how the previous organizations operated. Prior to February 2000, there were three different and competing staff organizations that could claim prepotency of TMD in Korea.⁴ While all contained some expertise in TMD, each one lacked both a combined and joint in-theater perspective. Additionally, because each orga-nization claimed prepotency, theater integration was usually not achieved at desired levels.

The first organization was the Air and Missile Defense Division, part of the Combined and Joint Staff. The division consisted of one US Army air-defense colonel, a Republic of Korea (ROK) air force officer, and a ROK army air-defense officer, all supported by "borrowed" air-defense personnel from the US Eighth Army.⁵ Although combined, the staff was not joint, lacking expertise in anything other than ground-based air-defense operations.

The air-component staff was the second organization involved in past operations. As the area air-defense commander (AADC), the ACC was responsible for TMD and required a missile defense staff for assistance.⁶ Therefore, the commander created his own TMD coordination cell, an "ad hoc," minimally manned organization staffed by US Seventh Air Force personnel and a ROK air force liaison officer. The result was a predominately US Air Force cell focused on airpower attack operations and the passage of ballistic missile early warnings.⁷

This structure produced an odd relationship between the Combined Staff, the Joint Staff, and air-component missile-defense staff. Rather than focusing on theater-level and component-level issues, they focused on different elements of TMD.⁸ The Combined and Joint Staffs wrote active defense policy, plans, and procedures while the air-component staff wrote attack-operations policy, plans, and procedures. This separation blurred the areas of responsibility between the combined and joint headquarters and component headquarters, contributing to a lack of integration in missile-defense plans and procedures.

The third organization with missile-defense responsibility was 32d AAMDC, which has worldwide theater air- and missile-defense responsibilities.⁹ Although it lacks joint representation, it is organized and equipped for theater-level planning and coordination of all missile-defense activities, including attack operations, active defense, and passive defense. Unfortunately, the 32d AAMDC is not in a position to participate in Korea’s day-to-day TMD. As a result, the two in-theater cells developed missile-defense plans and operating procedures without much input from the 32d AAMDC. This lack of coordination meant that, in a contingency, the 32d AAMDC was expected to coordinate and execute operations that it had little voice in developing. During exercises, this situation contributed to needless confusion and produced more than a fair amount of friction.¹⁰

According to current joint doctrine, TMD is clearly a joint mission area.¹¹ Unfortunately, all three organizations are service solutions to a joint-mission problem. Despite doing their best to "think jointly" they were service specific in their areas of expertise and perspective. Lt Gen Charles H. Heflebower, combined air component commander (CACC), realized that coupling the in-theater experience of the air component, Combined, and Joint Staffs with the expertise and robustness of 32d AAMDC, would produce a joint and combined organization ideally suited for executing the TMD mission. Such an organization would be capable of pulling together the separate missile defense plans into a synergistic TMD plan.

The Reorganization Process

In November 1999, to exploit the potential strength of such an organization, General Heflebower directed a TMD reorganization.¹² He had a simple premise: organizations should train and organize as they would fight. He wanted to use the strengths of each organization to balance the others’ weaknesses. His intent was to gain efficiency and unity of effort by merging parts of the three competing organizations into one planning cell—under the leadership of one commander. His guidance was to create and train a combined and joint theater missile-operations organization that integrated, located, and aligned missile-defense expertise and functions under the CACC. Lastly, it should be organized the same in armistice as in war, facilitating a seamless transition.¹³

The CACC’s role as the theater’s AADC provided the doctrinal foundation for the creation of the CJTMOC. To assist him, the commanding general of 32d AAMDC was designated the "theater air-defense advisor for TMD" (US joint doctrine uses the term deputy area air defense commander. The two terms are synonymous.). Since the commander of 32d AAMDC, as the theater air-defense advisor for TMD, is responsible for executing a combined as well as a joint mission, he logically required a combined and joint staff to assist him. The need for this staff resulted in the creation of the CJTMOC working group.

In December 1999, a working group met and designed the CJTMOC, thus meeting General Heflebower’s intent. The working group’s first step was to redefine the functions and responsibilities of the existing staffs and the new organization. This step was necessary because the different commands established the three existing staffs independently and never reviewed their functions in total. This caused confusion and needless friction during combat exercises. The working group decided that the Combined and Joint Staff’s Air and Missile Defense Division would be responsible for developing theater policy and guidance. The new organization, CJTMOC, would be responsible for theater-level planning and execution. After defining areas of responsibility, the working group addressed the critical step of manning and budgeting for the new organization.

The group took the existing operations and intelligence sections of AAMDC and combined them with the existing air component’s TMD coordination cell, forming the base of the new organization. The group added positions for ROK air force officers, increasing the Korean military’s contributions to TMD—particularly in attack operations and passive defense. Because the CJTMOC picked up additional planning requirements from the Joint Staff, three newly approved joint positions were moved to the cell, providing the planning nucleus. The incumbents in these positions included a US Navy surface-warfare officer with Aegis experience, a US Army officer with Patriot experience, and an USAF space-operations officer. These positions, along with the ROK air force positions, made the in-theater portion of the cell truly joint and combined (fig. 1).

Figure 1. In-Theater Combined and Joint Theater Missile Operations cell

Figure 1. In-Theater Combined and Joint Theater Missile Operations cell

The concept design allows the in-theater portion of the cell to work day-to-day, Korean-specific, missile-defense issues, sharing information and ideas with AAMDC and collaboratively producing plans and procedures. The commander of 32d AAMDC, as chief of CJTMOC, provides guidance and approves products for forwarding to the CACC for approval.

The CJTMOC has two main divisions: operations and intelligence. The operations division, responsible for current operations and future planning, is made up of five sections. The first four sections represent each of the pillars of TMD: active defense; attack operations; passive defense; and command, control, communications, and computers. The fifth section contains liaison teams from the 32d AAMDC that are sent to the various component headquarters in wartime to assist in plan execution. The intelligence division’s plans and operations section focuses on intelligence preparation of the battlefield, targeting intelligence to support active defense, and attack operations.¹⁴

Army Heavy, Yet Joint?

The organization is Army-heavy—a strength, not a weakness. Continuous operation in wartime requires the robustness that the 32d AAMDC provides. The Army portion comprises not only air-defense artillerymen, but also Army aviation, special operations, chemical weapons, field artillery, and intelligence personnel.¹⁵ The organization has a solid mix of joint personnel: Korean air defenders, and pilots; a US Navy surface-warfare officer; and USAF pilots, space operators, communicators, and intelligence personnel. This mix makes the CJTMOC a well-structured organization capable of joint and combined theater-level missile-defense operations, planning, and execution. One must remember TMD is more than air defenders shooting Patriot missiles; the additional non-air-defense specialties bring the unique skills required for combined and joint TMD.

Dual Requirements of CJTMOC

Two requirements were needed for the CJTMOC to function during armistice and allow a seamless transition in war: staff authority and communication technology. During armistice the CJTMOC operates in a split-based mode, with the 32d AAMDC’s portion in Texas, while the ACC’s portion is at Osan Air Base, Korea, both connected electronically. However, the two portions actually belong to different commands, the 32d AAMDC belonging to US Army Forces Command and the Osan cell to ACC. For the organization to work as one, the commander of the 32d AAMDC, as chief of the CJTMOC, required the authority to directly consult and coordinate TMD issues with the CACC staff. The CFC and ACC gave this authority by approving "direct liaison authorized" for deliberate planning.¹⁶ This authority allows the cell’s armistice split-based elements to staff and coordinate the development of plans and procedures as if they were one organization. However, it is a cell with a specific and defined purpose: deliberate planning of TMD operations. The authority does not give either commander the ability during armistice to command, task, or compel agreement. Additionally, the parent units of personnel making up the cell retain administrative control over their personnel (fig. 2).¹⁷

The second requirement was communications. Existing phone and computer systems provided the ability to work together using video teleconferencing, net meetings, classified/unclassified E-mails, and voice systems. The sharing of ideas, information, and draft plans now occurs on virtually a daily basis, despite differing time zones. Communication between the US and Korean cells is fostering a "one team concept," breaking down archaic organizational barriers that once supported a "we versus them" attitude.

There are several positive aspects of this new organization. The theater CINC, as well as the ACC, now has a single point of responsibility for TMD operations. The commander of the 32d AAMDC as the theater air defense advisor for TMD (deputy area air-defense commander), now has a combined and joint staff with day-to-day in-country experience to assist him/her. The CJTMOC also gives the commander of the 32d AAMDC a larger voice in the development of plans and procedures that he/she is expected to execute in war. Additionally, the in-theater cell has the facilities and most of the communications, intelligence architecture, and equipment in place ready for the commander and staff of the 32d AAMDC. All of this facilitates a seamless wartime transition, requiring only a physical move to Korea. CFC expects these positive aspects to replace inefficiency and friction with synergy, thus improving overall theater-level air and missile-defense planning, execution, and war fighting.

Unproven Concept Concerns

As with any unproven concept, CJTMOC does have its critics. One area of concern is the increased workload this may place on the 32d AAMDC. The fact is the 32d AAMDC already has worldwide mission responsibility, and this initiative does not add to those responsibilities. What it does provide is an improved structure that should make executing those responsibilities easier. Will the 32d AAMDC be able to participate in planning for Korea, given its other responsibilities? We believe so—we also believe that the investment in the planning of the Korea mission will pay huge dividends in the event of war. Regardless, this is an experiment, and the workload will be tested and adjusted as lessons are learned. However, the burden on the 32d AAMDC should be manageable because the in-theater staff’s functions and personnel have been redistributed, enabling them to shoulder more of the burden.

Another concern is what might happen in a contingency if the 32d AAMDC is already committed to another theater. The answer is simply that the command initially fights the best it can without the 32d AAMDC. Given the current force structure, this lack of a second quickly deployable AAMDC is a real concern, emphasizing the need for in-theater CJTMOC-like organizations to fill the gap. In war with or without the 32d AAMDC, the CJTMOC will have produced sound integrated missile-defense plans and procedures in collaboration with the best subject-matter experts available, resulting in improved theater war-fighting capability. If another AAMDC is activated (the Army National Guard is organizing an AAMDC) and deployed, Korea will have the plans and procedures on hand. If there is no missile-defense command, the in-theater cells will work harder, but they will have a sound product to work with. Either way, CJTMOC is better prepared

Insights for Positive Improvement
on Joint Doctrine

The CJTMOC has great potential to provide insights for improving joint doctrine. Although many people assume that the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) has the lead in TMD, joint doctrine actually takes a "committee" approach to TMD. Joint Publication 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense states that "the J-2, J-3, J-4, and J-6 are the primary staff elements responsible for JTMD [joint theater missile defense] operations at the joint force level."¹⁸ Each of these staff sections certainly has a role in missile defense, but can four different staff sections actually share primary responsibility? Many will argue that J-3 has "primary responsibility" and that the other staff sections only provide support. However, joint doctrine further confuses the responsibility issue by saying that the JFC normally assigns overall missile-defense responsibility to the AADC.¹⁹ Does this mean that parts of the Joint Staff or J-3 work for the AADC? Probably not—the CJTMOC avoids these issues and offers a better, simpler way by providing the AADC (who has been given the responsibility by the JFC) with a staff capable of assisting him/her in that responsibility, along with relieving the joint force staff from detailed missile-defense planning requirements.

CFC is testing CJTMOC in exercises and continues to study, change, and refine its role. No one is claiming that this organization is "the way" to organize for TMD, but it is certainly "a way" that may provide useful insights. The missile-defense cell may also provide insights into other joint and service doctrinal questions. For example, does the joint TMD area require a "functional component command" similar to special operations commands? Should the 32d AAMDC be a jointly manned organization? Is the AAMDC best utilized by working for the JFC, the ACC, or the land component commander?

Conclusion

By reorganizing and using communications technology, CFC solved the dilemma of not having its own theater-level air- and missile-defense command. As a result, the CINC now has a "train as you fight" organization, designed and resourced to coordinate and execute joint and combined TMD.

Is this organization a model for other theaters? The strategy of employing a small, forward military presence that relies on US-based reinforcements suggests the answer is yes. Given the resource-constrained environment, the CJTMOC concept may be a way to provide critical war-fighting capabilities without adding force structure. The concept of merging small, in-theater assets with more robust, US-based assets via electronic means during armistice and war is certainly worth exploring.

1. FY 00 Air and Missile Defense Master Plan, USAADASCH (Fort Bliss, Tex.: US Army Air Defense Artillery School, 1999), 9-5.

2. Executive Summary of meeting conducted at Yongsan Korea, 27 December 1999, between Lt Gen Charles Heflebower, commander 7^th AF and Col Dale C. Eikmeier chief, CFC/USFK, CJ3 Air and Missile Defense Division, subject: Korean Theater Missile Operations Restructuring Initiative, USFK, Korea, 3 January 2000.

3. A peace treaty in Korea has not been signed; therefore, a state of war exists under armistice conditions.

4. Working papers and author’s notes, Theater Defense Missile Operations Workshop, USFK, Yongsan, Korea, 10–14 January 2000.

5. Eighth Army (TAADS-R), Document, P8W5GMAA, US Army Garrison, Yongsan Korea, 15 September 1998.

6. Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense, 19 October 1999.

8. Joint Pub 3-01.5, I-3. Joint TMD is made up of four elements: CI, active defense, passive defense, and attack operations.

9. Headquarters Army (TOE), Table of Organization and Equipment, (TOE) no. 44601A00, October 1997.

10. Author’s observations as CJ3 CFC/USFK, during exercise Ulchi Focus Lens 99.

12. Lt Gen Charles H. Heflebower, CACC, discussion with author, Osan AB, Korea, 15 November 1999.

16. Brig Gen Michael A. Vane, commanding general, 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), E-mail to Lt Gen Daniel P. Petrotsky, chief of staff, US Forces Korea, and commanding general, Eighth US Army, subject: CJTMOC Approval, 25 February 1999; and discussions between Colonel Eikmeier and General Heflebower, November 1999 through January 2000.

Col Dale C. Eikmeier, USA (BA, San Jose State University; MA, Webster University; MMAS, US Army Command and Staff College), is chief of the Air and Missile Division, Combined J3 (Operations Directorate), Combined Forces Command and US Forces Korea. He previously served as battalion commander in the 101st Airborne Division, instructor at the School of Advanced Military Studies, senior air defense trainer at the National Training Center, and operations officer in the 1st Infantry Division. Colonel Eikmeier, who participated in a senior service college’s fellowship program, also served as lead action officer for a theater missile defense reorganization initiative.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.