Published Aerospace Power Journal - Winter 2000
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I am concerned about the latest doctrinal approaches to aerospace, as evidenced by Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power (17 February 2000), and the Air Force Doctrine Center’s essay “Five Myths about the Term Aerospace,” which seeks to explain it. The glossary of AFDD 2 defines aerospace as follows: “Of, or pertaining to, Earth’s envelope of atmosphere and the space above it; two separate entities considered as a single realm for activity in launching, guidance, and control of vehicles that will travel in both entities. (Joint Pub 1-02) [Of, or relating to, the total expanse beyond the earth’s surface.] {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the US Air Force and is offered for clarity.}”
Clearly, this new adjectival approach to aerospace, which emphasizes the separateness rather than the unity of air and space, departs significantly from one held by the Air Force since 1958, when Gen Thomas D. White spoke of “the operationally indivisible medium.” The current chief of staff, Gen Michael E. Ryan, seemed to endorse that traditional definition in his introductory statement for the newly renamed Aerospace Power Journal in its Winter 1999 issue: “Gen Thomas D. White, former Air Force chief of staff, first publicized the term aerospace back in 1958, promoting the vision of a single indivisible field of operations from the Earth’s surface to the stratosphere and beyond. Events worldwide show the significant reality of aerospace power in national security and global stability, and the new journal name reflects that reality as we enter the new millennium” (p. 2).
Not long after that, in May 2000, the secretary of the Air Force and the chief issued The Aerospace Force: Defending America in the 21st Century: A White Paper on Aerospace Integration, an authoritative statement of what they said was “the new Air Force Vision.” According to this white paper, “Our Service views the flight domain of air and space as a seamless operation. The environmental differences between air and space do not separate the employment of aerospace power within them. Commanders of aerospace power will be trained to produce military effects for the Joint Force Command-er (JFC) without concern for whether they are produced by air or space platforms.” It also includes a definition of aerospace that reflects the basic concept professed by the Air Force for decades: “Aerospace describes the seamless operational medium that encompasses the flight domain of air and space.” This “seamless . . . medium”—aerospace—is a noun, of course, not an adjective, as in AFDD 2.
Maj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., one of the founding fathers of Air University’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, believes that “air power doctrine is the point of departure for virtually every activity in the air arm.” That seems evident with respect to aerospace power in the pronouncements in the new white paper. Words do matter; concepts do matter; doctrine does matter—vitally and essentially.
So, is aerospace an adjective or a noun? If the meaning of words matters—if doctrine matters—then the Air Force must reconcile the differences between positions in its doctrine documents and the primary policy statements of its leadership.
Lt Col Frank W. Jennings, USAF, Retired
San Antonio, Texas
First of all, we at the Air Force Doctrine Center appreciate this and any other forum to discuss these types of issues—it’s at the heart of why we exist. As a direct reporting unit to the Air Force chief of staff, our organization works closely with Air Force senior leadership to ensure that our doctrine is clearly articulated. I respect the experience and thoughts of Lieutenant Colonel Jennings, a major voice in Air Force doctrine debates for many years. His letter gives us an opportunity to clarify our view of aerospace, a concept which we believe is widely misunderstood.
To ensure there is no confusion on this issue, I feel that it is important to emphasize that the definition of aerospace in AFDD 2 has two components—the first, which references “two separate entities,” is the long-approved definition found in Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. By the rules of the doctrinal road, the Air Force is officially “stuck” with this definition until we can get agreement among the other services to change it. In the meantime, the parenthetical portion of the definition is the Air Force’s adjectival clarification of the term. Adjectives describe things. Lieutenant Colonel Jennings references the White Paper on Aerospace Integration, which says that “aerospace describes the seamless operational medium that encompasses the flight domain of air and space” (emphasis added). The “Five Myths” essay, a thought piece that discussed the adjectival perspective further, also emphasized the seamlessness of air and space at the operational level of war. How exactly the AFDD 2 clarification “of, or relating to, the total expanse beyond the earth’s surface” emphasizes, in Lieutenant Colonel Jennings’s words, “the separateness rather than the unity of air and space” is not at all evident. The new clarification is, in fact, completely unconcerned with that distinction.
Lieutenant Colonel Jennings is exactly right. Words do matter; concepts do matter; doctrine does matter. It is precisely for these very reasons that the Air Force Doctrine Center invested time and effort to study the meaning of the word aerospace in all forums and facets and to propose a fresh characterization of the term that emphasized its oft-used adjectival sense rather than its traditional DOD meaning as a noun. Was this redefinition arbitrary? Hardly, AFDD 2—the document that encapsulates the adjectival context of aerospace—was approved by the Air Force chief of staff with the new clarification included.
A portion of the Air Force Doctrine Center’s study drew from the successful example of the US Navy. That service operates in all environments but effectively and truly unites its disparate operational communities in the word maritime, which is consistently used as an adjective. The Air Force has not yet had the same success with aerospace. Why? Because when it has been used as a substitute noun for “air and space”—the juxtaposition of two environments—it has led naysayers (including blue suiters) to ridicule the Air Force for pretending there is no difference between air and space. Of course there are differences. Aerospace as an adjective is geared towards obviating the pointless debate over those environmental differences where they really are not relevant— at the operational level of war.
Should we be alarmed that the new AFDD 2 clarification is not used verbatim in the white paper of May 2000? Not at all. Ultimately, like all living things, the Air Force’s concept of aerospace is evolving. It will continue to evolve as long as the Air Force cares about being the preeminent aerospace force. In the meantime, we see no inconsistency—in substance or philosophy—between how current, approved Air Force doctrine defines aerospace and how the service’s leadership is using the term in its forward-looking Air Force vision.
Maj Gen Lance Smith, USAF
Commander, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
As the Air Force moves toward a new way of operating through the aerospace-expeditionary- force concept, it is time to change the way we think and learn about airpower and the Air Force’s role in future conflict. Many avenues can lead us to this goal. Professional military education, professional reading, experience, and mentoring are a few of the possible methods. Soaking up experience in the office, at lunch, or at the club is just about the cheapest way to learn. To facilitate this type of learning, I recommend that the Aerospace Power Journal begin a new department devoted to providing Air Force members across the spectrum of ranks and Air Force specialty codes the opportunity to talk and think critically about the pressing issues facing the future Air Force. The general concept would involve providing a problem or dilemma to APJ’s audience and then inviting readers to submit their solutions for publication. Publishing the best three or four solutions, allowing for some “outside of the box” ideas, would not only encourage new ways of thinking about some of our problems but also stimulate new solutions to problems we have not yet faced. Possible problems could include a range of strategic and operational airpower issues as well as leadership dilemmas from which everyone can learn. I believe that this venue, coupled with our other educational programs, would greatly enhance the concept of “air-mindedness” among APJ’s readership.
Capt Chris A. Golden, USAF
Andrews AFB, Maryland
Dr. Jeffrey Record (“Force-Protection Fetish-ism: Sources, Consequences, and [?] Solutions,” Summer 2000) and Maj Charles K. Hyde (“Casualty Aversion: Implications for Policy Makers and Senior Military Officers,” Summer 2000) overlook one important fact in their criticism of current policies that seek to minimize casualties. To justify policies that allow for a higher number of casualties, they cite research showing that the public is willing to absorb a greater loss of life to achieve national objectives than are the military elite. The reason for this is that the public does not bear the cost of war and has come to see troops as expendable pieces in a global chess game.
Mandatory military service for all men and women would change public opinion in this area dramatically. Only when all the sons and daughters of Americans find themselves in harm’s way can the nation accurately determine whether the benefits of any campaign are worth the cost in human life.
John Williams
San Francisco, California
I wish to highly commend Aerospace Power Journal for its excellent four-article series on casualty aversion (Summer 2000). The articles were stimulating and, most of all, important. Although I differ with the authors on a number of points, I prefer to advance the argument rather than debate these matters.
But first, let me inject a dose of skepticism into one of their central points. Much is made of the finding that the public would tolerate higher casualties than would either the civilian or military leadership, implying that leaders are out of step and unnecessarily self-restrained. I wonder how the public will react when body bags begin arriving in the United States and when graphic pictures appear in American homes? How supportive will the American public be when hypothetical becomes reality? The decline in the percentage of civilian leaders with military experience also leads me to question how solid civilian leadership will be if events turn sour. With that one caveat, let me make a number of observations.
1. Casualty aversion is not just an American problem. Although many people believe that democracies are more susceptible to these pressures than are authoritarian states, the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan and Chechnya indicates that is not altogether true. Heavy casualties and a questionable cause, coupled with indecisive results over a period of time, led to the collapse of Russian will.
2. The decision makers and the public must be educated to understand that using military force puts people at risk. Murphy’s Law (“friendly fire,” for ex-ample) will apply with tragic consequences. People—good and bad, innocent and guilty, friend and foe, civilian and military—will die when lethal force is applied. Therefore, we must carefully consider the costs and benefits of our actions and inactions.
3. There is much more to the lack of US support for intervention than just aversion to casualties. One factor is the lack of a clear, vital cause. The American people have demonstrated that they will expend blood if they believe it is for a justifiable cause. Certainly, the end of the cold war has made American intervention more difficult to justify. Without a peer competitor, it is more difficult to argue that American national interests are at stake. (The cold war allowed the United States to support a number of ruthless dictators against the Red Menace.) Doing “good” in the world is fine, but it must not be too costly, uncomfortable, or unrewarding for Americans.
4. Another factor is the American demand for creditable and perceivable results (“success”) in a reasonable time period. An important reason for the unpopularity of both the Korean and Vietnam Wars was their prolonged and indecisive nature. The military history of the United States indicates that we can best fight quick, successful wars or crusades but have difficulty with limited wars and extended conflicts for unclear goals and with no demonstrated success. Put another way, it may well be that America can be successful in only two kinds of wars: (a) a crusade in which American vital interests are endangered and the country is rallied to fight a demonized foe and (b) a quick, cheap, decisive action.
5. A third factor in the American reluctance to intervene is the way recent interventions have been conducted. Coalition operations have never suited American tastes, and military peacekeeping is an alien concept for most Americans. The public’s perception of allied and world public opinion may well be critical, for Americans like to be loved and appreciated.
The bottom line, then, is that casualty aversion is an obstacle to committing US military forces to war but only one of a number of factors. It may well be that this is only a cover for other reasons not to act, such as the inconvenience it will cause to reservists called to active duty, the fear of events turning out poorly, the cost in dollars and political capital, and just a plain lack of will.
Therefore, don’t overdo this reaction to casualty aversion and the apparent gap between leadership and popular taste for intervention. Casualty aversion is understandable and isn’t all bad. Certainly, before we risk American treasure, prestige, and—most of all—lives, we should be fairly confident that the action is worthwhile. Possible casualties should not paralyze US actions but should give leaders pause. They must be realistic with policy aims, carefully consider costs and benefits, and not overreach. Most of all, positive political leadership is required—leadership that can make clear, forceful, and candid statements of understandable aims to the public and to the troops.
Kenneth P. Werrell
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
The cadre at the USAF Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Battlelab was enamored with the assessment of command and control and UAV interoperability by 2d Lt David Ortiz (“A New Role for Today’s UAVs,” Fall 2000). Although we share his high regard for the future of UAVs, he predicts a “future” that’s both past and present. The UAV Battlelab and others in a rapidly growing UAV community have been busy making his and others’ visions into reality.
In September 2000, during Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 2000 activities hosted at Nellis AFB, Nevada, UAV battlelabbers joined with Predator and joint surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS) operators to successfully provide the JSTARS Moving Target Indicator picture directly to the Predator ground station. The picture was used to cue the Predator sensor/payload operator to locate and identify mobile targets. This is only the most recent of the many successes the Battlelab has enjoyed.
In February 1999, engineers and operators successfully used the in-place satellite communications network and emerging JSTARS technology to inject Predator UAV imagery directly into a JSTARS platform. On the near horizon is Forward Area Launch and Control (FALCON), an initiative to demonstrate direct command and control and battle management of UAVs from airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.
Wherever he is, Lieutenant Ortiz can sleep well, knowing that the UAV Battlelab, as well as the Aerospace Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Center; the Global Hawk, Predator, and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle System Program Offices; the Defense Advanced Research Program Agency; and others are awake and hot on the trail.
Lt Col William A. Malec, USAF
Eglin AFB, Florida
With regard to Lt Col Lourdes A. Castillo’s article “Waging War with Civilians: Asking the Unanswered Questions” (Fall 2000), it is plain to see that the military has outsourced for expertise and not cost savings. But what sacrifices will the military have to endure (decay of military morale, retention, training, etc.)? These are concerns that must be dealt with immediately by senior leaders in the Air War College (AWC) curriculum. AWC war games should take into account the closure of bases and the high influx of civilian personnel. What are the political and psychological impacts of these decisions? Who will eventually pay the price?
Capt Kendall Scipiaruth, USAF
March ARB, California
As a missileer and former avionics-sensor-system instructor who enjoys your publication, I wish to request that you please stop perpetuating an error! Page 69 of Dr. David Mets’s article “The Force in US Air Force” (Fall 2000) contains a reference to the acronym “FLIR,” explaining it as “forward-looking infrared radar.” But the reference to radar is not accurate since the “IR” in the acronym refers only to infrared. Infrared and radar represent different wavelengths in the electromagnetic spectrum. Many systems, such as low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN), package FLIR, terrain-following radar, and laser subsystems, but “FLIR” refers only to the passive infrared receiver system.
Lt Anthony Zilinsky, USAF
Cheyenne AFB, Wyoming
Editor’s Note: Thanks for the correction. The error was ours and not Dr. Mets’s.
I just finished reading Maj Lisa L. Turner’s “The Articles of War and the UCMJ” (Fall 2000). Hats off! Her use of the Sincock/ Balides case to set the foundation of this ar-ticle was brilliant. As military members, many of us take the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for granted. We tend to concentrate on what the military is taking away from us and not so much on what we are provided. Major Turner does a great job informing the reader of how important the UCMJ is to establishing and maintaining military discipline. It is a well-known fact that our sense of discipline is one of the reasons the US military is so highly respected.
The purpose of the UCMJ is to define, as clearly as possible, the do’s and don’t’s of serving in our nation’s military. People need to respect something before they will abide by its boundaries. In this case, someone’s respect for the boundaries of the UCMJ should mean never having it work against him or her.
Military members of all grades should have a working knowledge of the UCMJ. Supervisors should discuss this document and its benefits with their troops. The fact that nobody spoon-fed this information to us is no reason not to give our troops as much information on the subject as possible. We may have to do some of the research and legwork, but, all things considered, isn’t it worth the effort?
TSgt Thomas B. Mazzone, USAF
Duke Field, Florida
I appreciate your “aerospace” perspectives (vice “air” or “space”). APJ’s “Net Assessments” section is always very informative and challenges my thinking with multiple points of view. Keep up the literary recommendations—great stuff!
Capt Jeffrey Moore, USAF
Cheyenne, Wyoming
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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