Published Aerospace Power Journal - Winter 2000

The Collapse of the Soviet Military by William E. Odom. Yale University Press (http://www.yale. edu/yup), P.O. Box 209040, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-9040, 1998, 544 pages, $37.50 (cloth).

William E. Odom, a retired Army general officer and noted scholar of Russian and Soviet affairs, presents a new and compelling book about how and why the Soviet military collapsed and the connection of that event to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In a succinct and readable style, Odom illustrates why the Soviet military, once the feared behemoth that threatened western Europe, expired alongside the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.

Odom’s analytical approach differs from that of many others who came before him. He realizes that a study of any country’s military must include the political and economic context and concludes that this is particularly important in the case of Russia and the Soviet Union. By examining the politics, economy, and military of both Russia and the Soviet Union, as well as their interrelationship, Odom draws sound conclusions about the nature of the Soviet military without running the risk of oversimplifying the problem by leaving out important information.

The author sets the stage for his explanation by providing the reader an understanding of the complicated organizational arrangements of the Soviet military, Communist Party, economy, and state. He does so by examining these issues separately in the opening chapters. Odom first explains how one can view Marxism as a theory of war and why Lenin found it compatible with the writings of Clausewitz. After that, he examines the Soviet military’s organizational structure, its manpower policies, and military and industrial arrangements that evolved over time.

In the process, Odom stakes out his own position in a number of contentious areas. For example, he concludes that the Soviet Union’s goals in the arms-control arena prior to the Gorbachev regime were not concerned with ensuring strategic stability between it and the West. Instead, those goals sought either to mitigate problems in the Soviet economic structure or to retain or increase a military advantage. This runs counter to the two prevailing schools of thought on this issue: Soviet senior leadership, if not the military leadership, accepted US conceptions of strategic stability and deterrence theory, or it never seriously entertained them. Odom acknowledges that many of his conclusions run counter to some of the conventional wisdom about understanding the Soviet military. Yet, his integrated approach and new evidence, based on archival findings and interviews with former senior officers in the Soviet military, lead him to these plausible conclusions.

In the end, Odom concludes that three structural variables—the desire for empire, the military, and the economy—have captured not only the Soviet Union, but also have driven the policies of tsarist Russia since the time of Peter the Great. Russia constantly aspired to empire. But it needed a large military to capture new territory, control it, and defend it. Providing for the military’s ever increasing demands required the Russian economy to grow at a substantial rate. But tsarist fears of the introduction of Western, liberal, democratic ideas into the country drove it to a state-controlled economy, with all of its inefficiencies. Tsarist Russia bequeathed this heritage to the Soviet Union, and Odom asserts that these structural variables still influence post-Soviet Russia. In the end, Odom predicts that if the current Russian Federation drops its historical vision for empire, then it will need only a small military and thus will be better able to reform its economy. But if Moscow still seeks an empire, then Odom suggests that Russian economic and military inertia may force that country to continue down the road it has followed for centuries.

The Collapse of the Soviet Military provides a new and more in-depth understanding of one of the most important events of the twentieth century. I recommend it to readers interested in the Soviet military and the ways in which a nation’s politics, economy, and military interrelate, as well as those with an interest in world affairs and the role that Russia will continue to play in that arena.

Maj Peter W. Huggins, USAF
Washington, D.C.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

[ Back Issues | Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor ]