Published Aerospace Power Journal - Winter 2000

Most Secret and Confidential: Intelligence in the Age of Nelson by Steven E. Maffeo. Naval Institute Press (http://www.usni.org), 2062 Generals Highway, Annapolis, Maryland 21401, 2000, 392 pages, $32.95.

Good military commanders appreciate the importance of intelligence to the success of their operations. Great military commanders work to ensure they actually have timely and accurate intelligence. One of history’s great commanders was Horatio Nelson, and Steve Maffeo, himself an intelligence officer in the US Naval Reserve, tells how Nelson gathered, analyzed, disseminated, and acted upon intelligence to help gain his victories.

After detailing how the British government, the Admiralty, and sea captains collected and analyzed intelligence, Maffeo looks closely at the sea campaigns of Copenhagen (1801) and the Nile (1798) to reveal how Nelson translated intelligence into operational practice. He concludes, convincingly if not surprisingly, that intelligence is a key to victory and that the commander’s attitude and personal involvement in the entire intelligence process are crucial. Nelson was perhaps the best intelligence officer of his generation, and his ability to use this asset played no small part in his success.

Spies have existed for millennia because governments or military commanders have always needed to know the capabilities and intentions of a potential adversary. By the end of the eighteenth century, the bureaucracy established in England for gathering this information was both extensive and credible. Spies wandered foreign capitals and ports, watching, eavesdropping, and talking to the disaffected. In addition, Maffeo points out the important role played by agencies such as the National Post Office––which routinely opened, deciphered, copied, and then resealed foreign mail––and Lloyds of London and the East India Company, both of which were intimately involved in tracking military and commercial sea traffic around the globe. In addition, sea captains like Nelson were wise to expend significant resources in monitoring foreign movements. Maffeo is particularly good at detailing how frigates––a class of ship characterized by its moderate armament but high speed––served as the eyes, ears, and mouth of the fleet. Frigates plied the sea routes watching merchant vessels and sailed near or perhaps even into foreign ports to count ships, evaluate their sea worthiness, and test the response time of coastal defenses. They would then shuttle to and fro between the combat fleets and London, relaying information and directives. These activities were certainly neither foolproof nor rapid by modern standards. It often took months for a certain piece of information to be collected, reported, and then relayed to the appropriate commander at sea. Nonetheless, time is relative: although it may have taken the Royal Navy two months to produce useful military intelligence, it took the French, Spanish, and Dutch far longer-if they could conduct such intelligence operations at all.

I found one of the more enlightening discussions to be Maffeo’s description of how sparse and small the typical commander’s staff was and, therefore, how personality-dependent such intelligence operations were at the close of the eighteenth century. Nelson had a small table in his quarters on board his flagship and a single secretary to take dictation, translate foreign letters and newspapers, make copies, and file documents. In a very real sense, Nelson’s intelligence function resided in his own brilliant mind. As the author phrases it, “Truly, the captain (admiral) had to be jack of all trades and, in reality, master of all as well” (p. 122).

As a good book often does, this one leaves us with questions that need to be further addressed and clarified. Maffeo shows how intelligence was gathered and analyzed, but the focus here is on operational intelligence. Nelson needed to know the location of the French fleet, its intentions, the quality of its personnel, the capabilities of its cannon, and so forth. He acquired and used this knowledge admirably in the major victories of his career. But in a broader sense, we need to know the objective of British naval strategy. England was a maritime nation that depended absolutely on its global trade. In turn, the Royal Navy sought both to protect that trade and to disrupt the enemy’s. How did it know if it had succeeded? How many merchant ships did it take to fuel the British economy? How many French, Spanish, and Dutch ships had to be captured or sunk to significantly weaken their economies? How long would it take for a blockade to break the will of a government or a population? These are important but difficult questions to answer. The effects of sea power are not always obvious or easily measured. After all, despite the greatness of Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar in 1803, the war against France burned on for another 12 years. Indeed, Napoléon’s greatest victories and the zenith of his power occurred several years after Trafalgar. One must therefore be excused for asking how important such naval victories actually were to the overall war effort. In short, how can we measure the effectiveness of sea strategy? These are important questions every bit as relevant today as they were two centuries ago. Perhaps they will be the subject of Steve Maffeo’s next book.

Although the author may rely a bit too heavily on the fictional accounts of C. S. Forester and Patrick O’Brian to illustrate his points, Most Secret and Confidential is a fascinating and rewarding account that would be useful to military officers of all ranks and services.

Phillip S. Meilinger
Tysons Corner, Virginia

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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