Published Aerospace Power Journal - Winter 2000

Chinese Policy toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics by Mark Burles. RAND (http://www.rand.org), P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138, 1999, 84 pages, $15.00.

This book observes the factors that have recently led the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to pursue a warming of ties with Russia and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (countries commonly referred to, in international relations, as the Stans). Although the book mainly addresses why the PRC seeks to maintain stability in the Stans and an amicable relationship with Russia, the author also covers the adverse impact that expanded Chinese regional influence would have upon Sino-Russian relations; barriers to increased Chinese influence over the Stans; and, ultimately, the potential impact that Chinese regional dominance would have on US policies in Central Asia. Due to its narrow scope, this book will primarily be of interest to area specialists, intelligence personnel, and policy makers who want a more in-depth understanding of the motives behind Beijing’s desires to expand its sphere of influence in Central Asia and the effects that such an expansion could have on the balance of power in the region.

The author boils down the wide range of geo-strategic issues that drive the PRC’s policies toward Russia and the Stans to four considerations: (1) a desire for stability on its frontier and border provinces, (2) a desire to enhance economic development of its inland regions, (3) its growing energy needs, and (4) its position in the post-cold-war strategic environment. These considerations also form a means for Beijing to determine how to tailor its approach toward expanding relations with each state in the region. According to Burles, the Sino-Russian relationship is of paramount importance in the strategic sphere, while expanded ties with the Stans are aimed at promoting stability within the PRC’s borders and protecting against outside threats.

Central to the first consideration is the PRC’s need to maintain the stability of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Residents of the XUAR have far more in common with the Turkish and Islamic populations of Central Asia than with the PRC’s ethnic Han Chinese population. Given this fact, the PRC cannot afford to have the Stans exporting Islamic fundamentalism or nationalism to the XUAR. If the secular governments of the Stans fail, the ensuing regional instability could threaten the energy resources of the three oil basins in Xinjiang and throw into turmoil a region that “has historically served as a buffer against potential aggressors from the mountains and steppes northwest of China” (p. 10). One can argue that the third consideration—involving the development of overland (pipeline) routes from Central Asia and Siberia to meet the growing energy needs of the PRC—is of far more importance to Beijing than the economic development of its inland regions. The increased development of lines of communications to further the transport of trade and energy resources will inevitably spur development of the PRC’s inland regions, thereby making the second consideration somewhat moot. The fourth consideration illustrates the PRC’s desire to make the world a more multipolar environment in which the hegemonic influence of the United States is, at a minimum, offset by “a broad network of secure regional and global relationships . . . able to offer China alternative sources of trade, technology, investment, and international political support should China’s relationship with the United States deteriorate” (p. 34).

The expansion of Beijing’s influence in Central Asia will undoubtedly have an effect on American and Russian policies in the region. Ironically, Russia and the United States share the PRC’s goal of promoting secular governments and diminishing the influence of Islamic radicals in Central Asia. Although they agree on promoting stability, Moscow and Beijing will remain at odds with the United States over numerous issues. Even though several analysts believe that their mutual displeasure over US policies will prove sufficient to bolster their strategic partnership, it will not be enough to overcome the friction resulting from their competition to dominate the Stans. Given their mutual distrust, it is in fact more likely that “Russia will likely face a choice between the increasingly close embrace of more dynamic China and attempting to find regional and global partners to help balance Chinese influence” (p. 48). Although it is in both of their interests to avoid conflict, we can see from this quotation that relations between Moscow and Beijing are more likely to deteriorate than improve in the near term.

Burles’s closing chapter tackles the question of how an expansion of Beijing’s regional influence will affect the United States. To his credit, rather than drawing out his analysis, the author is quick to explain that “many aspects of China’s relationship with Russia and the Central Asian Republics . . . have no real impact on American interests” (p. 61). In short, most of the PRC’s motivations to expand its influence in Central Asia have little to do with its relationship with the United States. As regards the potential for conflict between the United States and the PRC, the author believes that this would not occur unless “Chinese actions in the region begin to restrict international access to energy resources” (p. 63).

Chinese Policy toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics is brief yet informative. It is a thorough study, narrow in scope, and intended primarily for strategists and policy makers who have a need to keep abreast of the geostrategic issues in Central Asia. I recommend it to researchers working on a broader topic involving the aforementioned countries or to readers who simply hope to expand their knowledge of the issues that will continue to dominate the balance of power in the region.

Capt Clifford E. Rich, USAF
F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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