PIREP Summer 2000

Missile proliferation has been a national security topic since the 1980s. In spite of attempts to limit the spread of this technology, missiles—especially when combined with weapons of mass destruction (e.g., nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads)—offer a military advantage some states find irresistible. As a result, more than a dozen countries are currently developing ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between three hundred and six hundred kilometers. Development of longer-ranged missiles and cruise missiles continues as well.

A recent search for “missile proliferation” on the World Wide Web, using AltaVista’s search engine, resulted in 318,475 hits. Although AltaVista provided the longest list of sites, a researcher can, of course, use other search engines. Even though many sites can be quickly dismissed as having marginal utility, the challenge of examining so many possible sources remains daunting to someone interested in this topic. For that reason, this survey identifies web sites offering useful or interesting information on missile proliferation. It compares and contrasts unclassified English-language sites and summarizes the available data. Readers who wish to explore these sites further should visit the on-line version of this article at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/sum00/phisum00.htm, which provides links to each site mentioned.

I first examined various US government sites. Collectively, these provide everything from broadly worded statements of policy down to detailed technical information. The State Department’s Bureau of Nonproliferation makes available treaty texts, recent meeting notes, and current US policy. The Missile Technology Control Regime, covered at http://www.state. gov/www/global/arms/np/mtcr/mtcr99.html, has useful fact sheets on this international agreement but little information concerning actual or suspected violations. Another page at the bureau’s site, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/np/mtcr/wassenaar.html, features the Wassenaar Arrangement, which limits the exports of so-called dual-use technologies for conventional arms. The information here comes from a combination of chronologies and fact sheets. Most states running covert missile-development programs obtain technical know-how and hardware by using equipment that has both commercial and military uses, hence the term dual use.

The Department of Defense offers two important sites. The Defense Technical Information Center at http://www.dtic.mil/mctl lists critical technologies subject to export control, and the Pentagon’s DefenseLink at http://www.defenselink.mil has graphics, official reports, and press briefings on a variety of military subjects, including missile proliferation. National Defense University’s site (http://www.ndu.edu) offers concise background material on proliferation and on countries engaged in acquiring missile technology. The Congressional Research Service, another good source for policy and legislative papers dealing with proliferation, has sites at http://www.house.gov and http://www.loc.gov.

Although authoritative government sites are, by necessity, circumspect regarding sensitive information and delicate conclusions, some sites run by specialist groups are more provocative (keep in mind that they also likely reflect the strengths, weaknesses, and ideology of the sponsoring organization). All the nongovernmental sites have links to other sites, allowing a researcher to gather data on every aspect of missile proliferation, from political policy to in-depth technical-design parameters. Foremost among these is the Federation of American Scientists at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/index.html and http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/wassenaar/index.html. These web pages provide a host of information on the provisions, status, chronology, texts, documents, and news concerning missile proliferation. In addition, they provide a list of related sites that allow “surfers” to gather even more in-depth data. The federation also manages a missile-proliferation site, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/index.html, boasting one of the most comprehensive overviews of systems, charts, maps, and pictures of missiles on the web. The country-by-country breakdown clearly shows how widespread missile proliferation has become. For example, see http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/facility/nodong.htm for one-meter-resolution space-based imagery on North Korean missile developments.

The Center for Non-Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies also maintains detailed databases. At http://www.cns.miis.edu, researchers can download a 33-page-long paper by Joseph S. Bermudez that tracks the entire history of ballistic missile development in North Korea. The center also features links to over a hundred more sites with missile-proliferation data.

Other sites focus more on issues involving ballistic missile defense. The Stimson Center (http://208.240.90.149/index.html), one of many US think tanks and policy-research institutions, offers in-depth policy analysis on the quest for a US-based anti-ballistic-missile defense/national missile defense system, which is directly tied to the threat the United States might face from ballistic missiles. Similarly, the Cato Institute examines all forms of proliferation, making available policy papers, foreign-affairs analysis, and downloadable reports at http://www.cato.org. As its name implies, the Arms Control Association (http://www.armscontrol.org) focuses on the political-diplomatic approaches to limiting proliferation, and its site contains treaty texts, press reporting, and a search engine that allows researchers to comb through thousands of data points. One of the site’s background pieces on tracking the proliferation of ballistic missiles includes 55 articles and features that examine all aspects of worldwide missile proliferation.

Other notable US sites include those maintained by RAND at http://info.rand.org, featuring policy papers; think tanks at Harvard University (http://hdc-www.harvard.edu/cfia/ olin/homepage.htm) that offer numerous sites on international security; and the Arms Trade Resource Center at http://worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports.html, which has reports on arms transfers—including missile proliferation. These three sites explore the policy implications of proliferation, focus on ways to monitor proliferation, and consider regional and international implications of the acquisition of missile technology. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace posts reports on proliferation roundtables at http://ceip.org/programs/npp/index.html. These roundtables feature top domestic- and foreign-policy experts and academics, who provide in-depth insights and analyses into all current forms of missile-proliferation challenges and problems. Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (http://www.stanford.edu/group/CISAC), which focused on the Asia-Pacific region and Russian developments during 1999, produces downloadable reports on a wide range of missile-proliferation issues. Washington-based think tanks such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (http://www.csis.org) and the Institute for Science and International Security (http://www.isis-online.org) have publications, background papers, and up-to-the-minute briefings on current missile-proliferation issues. The Institute for Science and International Security also posts a country listing and a large collection of commercial satellite photographs on proliferation. All of these sites update important issues hourly.

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists at http://www.bullatomsci.org offers older articles in its special collection, but this site places greater emphasis on weapons of mass destruction than the proliferation of ballistic missiles. The University of California at Berkeley runs the Nautilus Institute, http://www.nautilus.org, which covers both North and South Asian proliferation issues in depth, providing a great deal of information on Korea, China, India, and Pakistan in the form of pictures, graphs, and downloadable reports.

Of course, many foreign think tanks and academic research centers have data on missile proliferation. Depending on the region of interest, some are quite good while others are very politicized. The United Kingdom’s Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at http://www.cdiss.org offers a comprehensive package that provides very detailed analysis dating back to World War II, which marked the beginning of ballistic missile usage. This is also one of the few sites that breaks down missile proliferation into ballistic and cruise missile threats, giving a more in-depth approach to both weapons. Other international sites that usually carry good regional data include the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Israel) at http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss, the Taiwan Security Research Group (Nationalist China) at http://www.taiwansecurity.org, and the European Institute for Research and Information on Peace and Security (Belgium) at http://www.ib.be/grip. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (http://www.sipri.se), especially good for its long-term studies, tracks most of the technology exported around the globe. It documents missile proliferation and the closely related dual-use technology exports, giving a comprehensive picture of the amount of trade on a global scale. The London-based Verification Technology Information Center at http://www.fhit.org/vertic devotes itself to verification technology and the application of monitoring to missile proliferation.

The Heritage Foundation (http://www.heritage.org) provides policy papers and reports on missile proliferation. It also publishes one of the best handbooks currently available—Jack Spencer’s The Ballistic Missile Threat Handbook, which includes a historical overview of missile proliferation and an examination of each country’s arsenal of ballistic missiles. Illustrated with maps and drawings of individual missiles, the book also shows the extent of proliferation and identifies main exporters of the technology. Using the Soviet-designed and -built Scud B as a starting point, the text documents how proliferation, reverse engineering, and improvements occur as various countries become proficient in rocket manufacturing and design work. This handbook is also one of the few texts that lists the various designations assigned to each missile system—very helpful for researching missiles in countries such as China, whose systems have up to three designations each. Well researched with an extensive bibliography, Spencer’s book is useful to anyone interested in ballistic missile proliferation.

If you find this survey useful, please let us know. Manpower permitting, we will update and continue to provide this information on our web site (), but we need your help! As you find new information on this subject, please share it with us.

Department of Defense
Defense Technical Information Center
http://www.dtic.mil/mctl

European Institute for Research and Information on Peace and Security (Belgium)
http://www.ib.be/grip

Federation of American Scientists
Missile Proliferation Page
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/index.html

Federation of American Scientists
Missile Technology Control Regime
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/index.html

Federation of American Scientists
Wassenaar Arrangement
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/wassenaar/index.html

Harvard University (numerous sites)
http://hdc-www.harvard.edu/cfia/olin/homepage.htm

Monterey Institute of International Studies
Center for Non-Proliferation Studies
http://www.cns.miis.edu

Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation
http://www.stanford.edu

Taiwan Security Research Group (Nationalist China)
http://www.taiwansecurity.org

US Congress
Congressional Research Service
http://www.house.gov
http://www.loc.gov

US State Department
Bureau of Nonproliferation
Wassenaar Arrangement
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/np/mtcr/wassenaar.html

US State Department
Missile Technology Control Regime
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/np/mtcr/mtcr99.html

Go tell the Spartans, thou that passeth bye/That here obedient to the laws, we lie.

––Simonides of Ceos

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Survey of Web-Based Data on Missile Proliferation

Survey of Web-Based Data on
Missile Proliferation