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Document created: 6 September 00
Published Aerospace Power Journal - Fall 2000

Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 by Gordon Nathaniel Lederman. Greenwood Press (http://www.greenwood.com), 88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881, 1999, 232 pages, $59.95.

Graduate school, Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, the boss, the wife, the kids—for cryin’ out loud, who has time to read another book, especially one as nebulous and abstract as Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Although this topic at first appears to be a tad esoteric at best, it is in fact one of the most profoundly relevant subjects that any US military officer could investigate. The organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the development of the unified command structure, and the “joint versus service-specific debate” in general have literally given us the structure that provides form to the US military and defense community. To understand the JCS, its place in the US defense community, and the debate surrounding how it got there is to go a long way toward understanding the design and implementation of US defense policy on both the strategic and tactical levels. Thus, no topic is more germane to US military officers of any service.

Lederman begins his work with a history of the JCS and its function over the last 50 years with a balance of detail that doesn’t bog the reader down in irrelevant minutiae. He then proceeds to set the historical context of the question at hand (i.e., the reorganization of the JCS) by examining three basic tensions inherent in any military organization.

First is the tension between centralization and decentralization. On the one hand, “in centralized organizations, the apex of the hierarchy retains control of major decisions and insists on receiving detailed information from the hierarchy’s base.” Decentralization, on the other hand, “allows lower level officers the freedom to exploit opportunities without awaiting the hierarchy’s cumbersome decision-making process.” Lederman acknowledges this as a permanent tension and contends that no permanent and perfect balance exists. Second, “military organizations face the choice between geographic and functional delineations of responsibilities.” Geographic divisions allow for focus and detail but are less efficient as duplicative sets of military units are built for each area. Functional divisions allow for economies of scale but tend to blur the focus and detail required for an understanding of individual countries and regions. Third is the specialist-versus-generalist perspective. Current high-tech systems and varying operational environments require personnel to undergo a great deal of education and training if they are to utilize them fully. Time spent focusing on one’s “core skill” may adversely affect the appreciation of a more holistic approach. In the US military, these tensions have given rise to the pluralist model of organization in which representatives of the group provide differing perspectives on the tensions to a central authority, much like the division of power in the US political system. From there, Lederman discusses key points of the joint-versus-specific debate, as well as the JCS from World War II through current issues.

Lederman has done a fine job of presenting the material in an interesting and objective manner. He treats both sides of the continuing “joint-specific” debate fairly, without mistreating either one—something not easy to achieve. For this, Lederman is to be commended.

The book is very well documented and organized. In fact, the bibliography is worth the price of the book for any military officer serious about his or her professional development. It includes subjects such as “Military Theory and Organizational Behavior,” “American Peace-Enforcement Deployments: Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia, Balkans, etc.,” and “Air Power—Including the Gulf Air Campaign and the Kosovo Conflict,” among others.

Like all of us, from college to grad school to continuing professional development, I have read a lot of books. I would place Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff close to the top of the list. It deals with a subject inherently germane to every military officer, no matter the service. Further, it treats a complex topic with fairness and succinctness, and provides a bibliography well suited to further investigation.

If you are a professional military officer, you owe it to yourself, your service, and your country to become familiar with the subjects covered in this book. So, in your scant minutes of freedom, sandwiched between the requirements of graduate school, SOS, ACSC, the boss, the wife, and the kids, take a little time to acquaint yourself with Mr. Lederman’s work. It’s worth the time.

Capt Brett Mers, USAF
Whiteman AFB, Missouri

He never rode off any field except as a victor. He quitted war invincible; and no sooner was his guiding hand withdrawn than disaster overtook the armies he had led.

––Winston Churchill on the Duke of Marlborough, 1933

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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